Lee v. State
| Decision Date | 27 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 71A05–1702–PC–326 |
| Citation | 91 N.E.3d 978 |
| Parties | Dorian LEE, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appellant Pro Se : Dorian Lee, Carlisle, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Dorian Lee ("Lee") appeals, pro se, the post-conviction court's denial of his amended petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
[2] On appeal, Lee raises multiple ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims, which we restate as follows:
[3] The facts underlying Lee's convictions were set out in the Indiana Supreme Court's decision on Lee's direct appeal:
On June 12, 1995, [Lee], along with two armed men, Terrance Mitchem and Michael Greer, broke and entered a home occupied by four adults. [Lee] raped one of the female victims and participated in the shooting of all four victims. One victim was killed,1 while the other three survived.2
Lee v. State , 684 N.E.2d 1143, 1145 (Ind. 1997). We will provide additional facts as needed.
[4] Following a December 1995 jury trial in which Lee was tried jointly with co-defendants Terrance Mitchem ("Mitchem") and Michael Greer ("Greer"), Lee was convicted of murder;3 burglary, as a Class B felony;4 three counts of attempted murder, as Class A felonies;5 and rape, as a Class A felony.6 Lee filed a direct appeal in which our Supreme Court upheld his convictions. Lee , 684 N.E.2d at 1150.
[5] On May 8, 2003, Lee filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). On September 4, 2007, Lee filed a motion for an indefinite continuance of his PCR petition, and the trial court granted the motion. On May 1, 2015, Lee filed an amended petition for PCR in which he raised numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court held a post-conviction evidentiary hearing on May 27, 2016, and October 29, 2016. On January 11, 2017, the post-conviction court issued its order denying Lee's petition. This appeal ensued.
[6] Lee appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his amended petition for post-conviction relief. Our standard of review is clear:
[7] Lee contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. As our Supreme Court has noted:
[t]his Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This requires a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and that the errors were so serious that they resulted in a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment, id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
Wentz v. State , 766 N.E.2d 351, 360 (Ind. 2002) ; see also Wrinkles v. State , 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1192 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted) ("In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to object, a defendant must prove that an objection would have been sustained if made and that he was prejudiced by the failure.").
[8] We will not second-guess trial counsel's strategy and tactics unless they are so unreasonable that they fall outside objective standards. See, e.g. , Benefield v. State , 945 N.E.2d 791, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Wentz , 766 N.E.2d at 361. And if we can dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by analyzing the prejudice prong alone, we will do so. Benefield , 945 N.E.2d at 797 (citing Wentz , 766 N.E.2d at 360).
[9] Lee raises eight ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, each of which we address in turn.
[10] Lee was charged, as a principal, with the murder of Victor Hill, and the State also tried Lee as an accomplice to that murder.7 Lee contends that the jury instructions regarding accomplice liability for murder8 were improper because they did not inform the jury that, in order to find Lee guilty as an accomplice, it must find that those whom he was aiding acted with the knowing or intentional mens rea for murder. In support, he cites the Court of Appeals case Taylor v. State , 820 N.E.2d 691, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). However, that decision was vacated by our Supreme Court, which specifically held that a defendant can be found guilty of murder for intentionally aiding and abetting a principal to kill a victim so long as the principal killed the victim and the defendant knew or intended that the victim would be killed. Taylor v. State , 840 N.E.2d 324, 335–36 (Ind. 2006). This is so even if the principal did not "knowingly or intentionally" kill the victim. Id. Thus, a defendant can be found guilty of a greater degree of homicide than the principal; in such a situation, the defendant's mens rea would be more culpable than that of the principal. Id. Therefore, the post-conviction court did not err in ruling that Lee's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object that the jury instructions regarding accomplice liability for murder did not require the jury to find that the principal had the specific mens rea to kill.
[11] Lee maintains that the jury instructions regarding attempted murder were improper because they included the information in six counts against Lee, including Counts III through V, which used the word "knowingly" in relation to the element of mens rea for attempted murder.9 In support, he cites Spradlin v. State , which held that jury instructions regarding a charge of direct liability for attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill and took a substantial step toward such killing. 569 N.E.2d 948, 950–51 (Ind. 1991) ; see also Rosales v. State , 23 N.E.3d 8,...
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