Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 10 July 2000 |
Docket Number | No. S99G1523.,S99G1523. |
Citation | 272 Ga. 583,533 S.E.2d 82 |
Parties | LEE et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lanham & McGehee, William C. Lanham, Clark H. McGehee, Atlanta, for appellants.
Allen & Associates, Twanda Turner-Hawkins, Atlanta, Cooper & Markarenko, Gary M. Cooper, Duluth, for appellees.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Lee v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 238 Ga.App. 767, 517 S.E.2d 328 (1999), to consider its determination that the mother, who was physically injured in the same automobile collision which took the life of her young daughter, could not recover for emotional distress from witnessing her daughter's injuries and death. We reverse, because under the circumstances in this case, the mother is allowed to pursue a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress from witnessing the mortal injury to her child.1
The relevant facts are set forth by the Court of Appeals. Bridget Lee and her daughter sustained significant physical injuries in an automobile collision caused by an unknown hit-and-run driver. Lee witnessed her daughter's suffering, which ended with her daughter's death an hour later. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company, Lee's and her husband's uninsured motorist carriers, paid the policy limits for the claim of the daughter's wrongful death. Lee filed suit to recover for her own physical injuries and for the emotional distress that she experienced from witnessing her daughter's suffering and death. Her husband sued for loss of consortium. State Farm intervened on its own behalf and Allstate defended in the "John Doe" name of the unknown motorist. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Lee's claim for emotional distress. Based on OB-GYN Assoc. of Albany v. Littleton, 261 Ga. 664, 410 S.E.2d 121 (1991) ("Littleton IV"), and its statement of Georgia's impact rule, a majority of the Court of Appeals found that Lee's claim was not actionable and affirmed.
Id. at 768, 15 S.E. 901.
Georgia's impact rule became prey to criticism soon after its inception. See, e.g., Glenn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1 Ga.App. 821, 826, 58 S.E. 83 (1907); Ga. R. & Elec. Co. v. Baker, 1 Ga.App. 832, 838, 58 S.E. 88 (1907). And through the years, Chapman was distinguished and limited to exclude recovery only in actions of negligence by a defendant from which the plaintiff suffered neither monetary loss nor actual physical injury. Mayer v. Turner, 142 Ga. App. 63, 64(3), 234 S.E.2d 853 (1977), citing Montega Corp. v. Hazelrigs, 229 Ga. 126, 189 S.E.2d 421 (1972); Southern R. Co. v. Daughdrill, 11 Ga.App. 603(2), 75 S.E. 925 (1912). But, the impact rule in its current form was largely shaped by the "Littleton" cases, a series of four appeals in a parents' suit for wrongful death, loss of services, and the mother's mental suffering and emotional distress resulting from the allegedly negligent delivery of the parents' infant daughter and the child's death two days later. See OB-GYN Assoc. of Albany v. Littleton, supra ("Littleton IV"); Littleton v. OB-GYN Assoc. of Albany, 199 Ga.App. 44, 403 S.E.2d 837 (1991) ("Littleton III"); OB-GYN Assoc. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) ("Littleton II"); Littleton v. OB-GYN Assoc. of Albany, 192 Ga.App. 634, 385 S.E.2d 743 (1989) ("Littleton I"). In Littleton II, this Court sought to clarify the Georgia rule regarding impact by pronouncing that "the impact which will support a claim for damages for emotional distress must result in a physical injury."3Littleton II at 666(A), 386 S.E.2d 146. In so doing, the Court overruled Christy Brothers Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga.App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928), a case in which the plaintiff was allowed to seek damages for emotional distress resulting from the "impact" of an animal defecating in the plaintiff's lap. By Littleton IV, this Court stated unequivocally that any potential award of damages to the mother in the malpractice claim for her injuries was limited to compensation for any physical injury she suffered as a result of the alleged negligence and any mental suffering or emotional distress she sustained as a consequence of her physical injuries, but that any mental suffering or emotional distress that the mother suffered as a result of injuries to her child was not compensable.4 See DeKalb County v. Wideman, 262 Ga. 210, 416 S.E.2d 498 (1992); Goins v. Tucker, 227 Ga.App. 524, 526(2), 489 S.E.2d 857 (1997). See also Southern R. Co. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916).
Thus, the current Georgia impact rule has three elements: (1) a physical impact to the plaintiff; (2) the physical impact causes physical injury to the plaintiff; and (3) the physical injury to the plaintiff causes the plaintiff's mental suffering or emotional distress. It is plain that the last element is lacking in the case at bar. And the failure to meet any one of these requirements has proved fatal to recovery even in cases like the present in which the circumstances portend a claim of emotional distress. See, e.g., DeKalb County v. Wideman, supra. Consequently, there have been attempts to find theories of recovery within the confines of the present rule in order to avoid its sometimes harsh results. See, e.g., Lee v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., supra at 770, 517 S.E.2d 328 (Blackburn, J., dissenting) and Thomas v. Carter, 234 Ga.App. 384, 506 S.E.2d 377 (1998), applying a "common force" rationale; Chambley v. Apple Restaurants, 233 Ga.App. 498, 504 S.E.2d 551 (1998), applying expansive views of "impact" and "physical injury."
Numerous rules have been employed in other jurisdictions for determining recovery of damages for emotional distress. These rules run the gamut from variations of the impact approach, to analysis under a so-called "zone of danger,"5 to a broader rule based on foreseeability of injury assessed by application of factors relating to proximity, direct observation, and relationship to the victim,6 to the most expansive view of reasonable foreseeability of injury under general tort theory. See generally 86 CJS Torts, §§ 79-83; Annotation, Immediacy of Observation of Injury as Affecting Right to Recover Damages for Shock or Mental Anguish from Witnessing Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R.4th 833-851 (1981-1999). See also Pieters v. B-Right Trucking, 669 F.Supp. 1463, 1466 (N.D.Ind. 1987); Saechao v. Matsakoun, 717 P.2d 165, 168 (Or. 1986). Each rule, whether based upon a theoretical construct or upon purely policy considerations, is problematic, to some degree, in its integrity of reasoning or its pragmatic implications. 7 There are three policy reasons traditionally given for having the impact rule and denying recovery for emotional distress unrelated to physical injuries. First, there is the fear, that absent impact, there will be a flood of litigation of claims for emotional distress. Second, is the concern for fraudulent claims. Third, there is the perception that, absent impact, there would be difficulty in proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligent conduct and claimed damages of emotional distress. See Zell v. Meek, 665 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla.1995); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ind.1991); Pieters, supra at 1470.
These policy concerns have been criticized and even held to be wholly invalid in the context of a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Zell, supra at 1050; Shuamber, supra at 455. The impact rule is also susceptible to the charge that it is arbitrary, but any rule seeking to circumscribe a defendant's liability to bystanders must necessarily involve a degree of arbitrariness. Saechao, supra at 170 (Warren, J., dissenting). However, the benefits of an impact rule are plain in that it provides a brighter line of liability and a clear relationship between the plaintiff's being a victim of the breach of duty and compensability to the plaintiff. Saechao, supra at 169. And a rule is not superior to its alternatives simply because it expands recovery if there is no connection between the nature of the damages and the reason for allowing the additional recovery. Id.
The circumstances of this case clearly invite this Court to reject the impact approach. However, as has been discussed, the impact rule, even with its shortcomings, is not without benefit. And certainly, it would be imprudent to abandon over a hundred years of Georgia precedent. What is more, we decline to adopt any rule which might, in...
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