Lee v. State, No. 8-821/07-1879 (Iowa App. 2/19/2009)
| Decision Date | 19 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 8-821/07-1879,8-821/07-1879 |
| Parties | TINA LEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF IOWA, POLK COUNTY CLERK OF COURT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, James Richardson, Judge.
The State of Iowa appeals a judgment in favor of a terminated employee, maintaining that her lawsuit under the Family and Medical Leave Act was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Paige Fiedler and Brooke Timmer of Fiedler & Newkirk, PLC, Urbandale, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield, JJ, and Robinson, S.J.*
The State of Iowa appeals a judgment in favor of a terminated employee, maintaining that her lawsuit under the Family and Medical Leave Act was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We agree with the district court that Congress validly abrogated the State's immunity to suit and, in any event, the State waived its immunity to suit.
Tina Lee worked for the Polk County Clerk of Court from mid-1981 until late 2004. Her employment was effectively terminated after she provided her employer with a physician's notification that she was receiving treatment for a medical condition.
Lee filed suit against the State of Iowa and Polk County Clerk of Court, alleging she was terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).1 In its answer, the State of Iowa2 denied Lee's claim and asserted the following affirmative defense: "The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars Lee's FMLA claims against the State of Iowa." The State subsequently moved for summary judgment on this ground. The district court dismissed the motion, finding "the self-care provision [of the FMLA] was enacted pursuant to a valid exercise of power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in turn validly abrogated state Eleventh Amendment Immunity."
Following trial, the jury found in favor of Lee and awarded damages of $165,122. Issues of reinstatement and front pay were reserved for later determination by the court. In a post-trial ruling, the court again ruled that sovereign immunity did not bar Lee's claims against the State. The court denied the State's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and awarded Lee prejudgment interest, lost wages and benefits, a credit for retirement and FMLA benefits, attorneys fees and expenses, and post-judgment interest. The State moved for a stay of all proceedings pending appeal. The parties stipulated to a voluntary stay of collection of the monetary judgment. The district court found good cause did not exist to stay Lee's reinstatement to her position and denied that part of the State's motion.
After filing a notice of appeal, the State sought a stay from the Iowa Supreme Court. That court granted the motion to stay Lee's reinstatement pending disposition of the appeal. The court subsequently transferred the appeal to this court for disposition.
The court reviews the district court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for correction of errors at law. Bredberg v. Pepsico, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Iowa 1996). Likewise, review of a grant or denial of summary judgment is at law. Hill v. McCartney, 590 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
The FMLA generally affords an eligible employee a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for such son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care.
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.
(E) Because of any qualifying exigency (as the Secretary shall, by regulation, determine) arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on active duty (or has been notified of an impending call or order to active duty) in the Armed Forces in support of a contingency operation.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The Act makes it "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The Act affords an employee a private right of action against the employer for damages, interest, and other equitable relief. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). The action "may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency)." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2).
Lee alleged a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) pertaining to leave for "a serious health condition." That subsection relates to the care of the employee, and has come to be known as the "self-care provision." See, e.g., Toeller v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 461 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2006); Brockman v. Wyoming Dep't of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 2003). It may be distinguished from subsection C, for example, which relates to the care of family members and has been referred to as a "family-care provision." See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976, 155 L. Ed. 2d 953, 961 (2003).
The appeal raises a challenge to the district court's predicate conclusion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Lee's suit against the State. We will proceed to that issue.3
The principle of sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits by citizens against their own States. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866, 876 (2001). Congress may abrogate this immunity when it "both unequivocally intends to do so and `act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.'" Id. at 363-64, 121 S. Ct. at 962, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 877 (quoting Kimel v. State Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522, 535 (2000)).
There is no question that Congress unequivocally intended to abrogate immunity; as noted, it explicitly stated that employee lawsuits for money damages could be maintained against "any employer (including a public agency)." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726, 123 S. Ct. at 1976, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 962 (). The key question is whether Congress "acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority" in abrogating the States' immunity for money lawsuits that allege a violation of the self-care provision. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73, 120 S. Ct. at 640, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 535 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has not answered this precise question. The Court, however, has answered a related question: whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority in abrogating the States' immunity from money lawsuits that allege a violation of one of the family-care provisions of the FMLA. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727, 123 S. Ct. at 1977, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 962-63. Therefore, we begin our analysis with Hibbs.
In Hibbs, the Supreme Court held that state employees may recover money damages for a State's failure to comply with the family-care provision of the FMLA set forth in subsection C. Id. at 725, 123 S. Ct. at 1976, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 961. The court reasoned that, in enacting subsection C, Congress exercised its power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which affords it authority to enforce the substantive rights contained in section one of that Amendment. Id. at 727, 123 S. Ct. at 1977, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 962-63.
The Court began by defining the scope of the substantive right at issue. Id. (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 121 S. Ct. at 963, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 878). Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, in part, prohibits States from denying persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1). The Court stated that "[t]he FMLA aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace." Id. at 728, 123 S. Ct. at 1978, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 963. That type of discrimination by States, the Court noted, was "chronicled in—and, until relatively recently, was sanctioned by — this Court's own opinions." Id. at 729, 123 S. Ct. at 1978, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 964. Given the pervasiveness of sex discrimination, the Court explained that measures making distinctions on the basis of gender warranted heightened scrutiny. Id. at 730, 736, 123 S. Ct. at 1979, 1982, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 964, 968.
With that background, the Court turned to the FMLA's legislative record. Id. at 730, 123 S. Ct. at 1979, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 964-65. According to the Court, the record showed that "stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of family duties remained firmly rooted, and employers' reliance on them in establishing discriminatory leave policies remained widespread." Id. at 730, 123 S. Ct. at 1979, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 965. The Court stated that the differential leave policies "were not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work." Id. at 731, 123 S. Ct. at 1979, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 965.
Having reviewed the legislative record, the Court returned to the purpose behind the family-care provision of the FMLA set forth in subsection C. The Court stated that Congress "sought to adjust family-leave policies in order to eliminate their reliance on, and perpetuation of, invalid stereotypes, and thereby dismantle...
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