Lee v. State, 81-63

• Citation: 38 St.Rep. 1729,635 P.2d 1282,195 Mont. 1
• Decision Date: 18 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 81-63,81-63
• Parties: Gary LEE, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1282

635 P.2d 1282

195 Mont. 1

Gary LEE, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent and Respondent.

No. 81-63.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Sept. 14, 1981.

Decided Oct. 22, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 18, 1981.

Cameron Ferguson, argued, Great Falls, for petitioner and appellant.

Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Sarah Power, argued, Law Student, Office of Atty. Gen., Helena, J. Fred Bourdeau, County Atty., Great Falls, for respondent and respondent.

SHEEHY, Justice.

Plaintiff Gary Lee filed in the District Court, Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, his complaint seeking declaratory judgment that section 61-8-304, MCA, is unconstitutional. The District Court held the statute to be constitutional, and entered judgment against Lee. He appeals from the District Court judgment. We reverse the District Court.

The full text of section 61-8-304, MCA, follows:

"Declaration of speed limits-exception to the basic rule. The attorney general shall declare by proclamation filed with the secretary of state a speed limit for all motor vehicles on all public streets and highways in the state whenever the establishment of such a speed limit by the state is required by federal law as a condition to the state's continuing eligibility to receive funds authorized by the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 and all acts amendatory thereto or any other federal statute. The speed limit may not be less than that required by federal law, and the attorney general shall by further proclamation change the speed limit adopted pursuant to this section to comply with federal law. Any proclamation issued pursuant to this section becomes effective at midnight of the day upon which it is filed with the secretary of state. A speed limit imposed pursuant to this section is an exception to the requirements of 61-8-303 and 61-8-312, and a speed in excess of the speed limit established pursuant to this section is unlawful notwithstanding any provision of 61-8-303 and 61-8-312."

The foregoing statute was enacted by the legislature as a part of Ch. 60, Laws of Montana (1974), where it was denominated section 32-2144.1, R.C.M. 1947. The statute became section 61-8-304, MCA (1978). In 1979, the legislature amended the section slightly in Ch. 421, Laws of Montana (1979), § 66.

The statute was enacted by the legislature in 1974, in response to the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act (Emergency Act) (Pub.L. No. 93-239). In effect, this federal act provided that no federal highway funds should go to any state failing to enact a 55 mile per hour maximum speed limit on its highways.

In section 2(e) of the Emergency Act, Congress provided that:

"This section shall cease to be in effect (1) on and after the date on which the President declares that there is not a fuel shortage requiring the application of this Act, or (2) on and after June 30, 1975, whichever date first occurs."

The provisions of Ch. 60, Laws of Montana (1974), granting the attorney general the power to proclaim a speed limit, became effective March 2, 1974. On that date, the Montana attorney general issued a proclamation "that the maximum speed limit day and night, for all motor vehicles on all public streets and highways in the state of Montana is fifty-five (55) miles per hour, effective midnight, March 2, 1974."

Before the expiration of the Emergency Act, Congress adopted and the President of the United States approved on January 4, 1975, the "Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974," 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq, (Pub.L. No. 93-643). This new law provided that a state must have a 55 mile per hour maximum speed limit in order to receive federal funds. The same new law, in section 114(c), 23 U.S.C. § 154, repealed section 2 of the Emergency Act.

There have been subsequent changes in the federal laws respecting the entitlement of states to federal funds for state highway purposes. The most recent change is Pub.L. No. 97-35, enacted in August 1981. It is enough to say here that as of the time of this opinion, there is still in effect a federal law which conditions the rights of states to receive federal funds for highway purposes upon the adoption of a 55 mile per hour maximum speed limit law.

Since March 2, 1974, no proclamation respecting a maximum speed limit has been issued by any Montana attorney general. The parties have argued pro and con as to the effect of that lack of further proclamation in the light of the repeal of the original speed limit provisions in the Emergency Act. It makes no difference to our decision whether the proclamation of March 2, 1974, became void after the repeal of the original federal law, or whether the attorney general should have issued a new proclamation. We view the provisions of section 61-8-304, MCA, as unconstitutional as originally enacted, and as now provided. We concern ourselves only with two facets of the history of the legislation: (1) The legislature, having met four times since the enactment of the 1974 legislature, has done nothing about a statewide speed limit except to re-enact section 61-8-304, MCA, in 1979; and, (2) a statewide maximum speed limit of 55 miles per hour is now being enforced in this state under and by virtue of the attorney general's proclamation of March 2, 1974.

Lee argues on appeal that section 61-8-304, MCA, is unconstitutional as an impermissible delegation of the legislative power of the state. The state contends that: (1) Lee has no standing to challenge the authority of the attorney general under section 61-8-304, MCA, and therefore a justiciable controversy is not presented here; (2) the act is valid; (3) the statute may be saved in any event, by severing therefrom the objectionable portions; and, (4) section 61-8-304, MCA, incorporates an existing law and is therefore valid.

We look first to whether Gary Lee has standing to bring this action. In his complaint, he alleges that he is a resident of Fort Shaw, Cascade County, Montana; that he frequently drives a motor vehicle on the highways of this state, particularly Montana State Highway No. 200 and Interstate Highway No. 15 between Fort Shaw and Great Falls, Montana; that the attorney general has issued the proclamation to which we have adverted; that except for such proclamation, he would be entitled to drive a motor vehicle under the provisions of section 61-8-303, MCA, (the basic speed rule) in excess of 55 miles per hour as he was accustomed to doing prior to the issuance of the proclamation.

The state filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, raising the standing of the plaintiff to sue in the action. The District Court denied this motion, and did not treat the subject of plaintiff's standing in its subsequent orders or judgments. The state did not cross-appeal, but we examine the issue of standing in any event under Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P.

Lee's complaint is for declaratory judgment. It is brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. Section 27-8-101 et seq., MCA. That act provides, in section 27-8-202, MCA:

"Any person ... whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."

The stated purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is remedial. Section 27-8-102, MCA. Its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity as to rights, status, and other legal relations; and, it is to be liberally construed and administered. Section 27-8-102, MCA.

The test of whether a justiciable controversy exists is set forth in Matter of Secret Grand Jury Inquiry (1976), 170 Mont. 354, 357, 553 P.2d 987, 990. There this Court said:

"First, a justiciable controversy requires that parties have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interest. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument invoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion.

Third, must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or lacking these qualities be of such overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them."

It is readily seen that Lee's complaint and attack on the constitutionality of the statute fit all three of the tests. Those tests are supported by a substantial number of cases decided in Montana, all set forth in Secret Grand Jury Inquiry, supra.

In arguing that Lee has no standing to sue in this case, the state relies chiefly upon Chovanak v. Matthews (1948), 120 Mont. 520, 188 P.2d 582. In that case Chovanak attacked a 1945 Montana statute providing for the licensing of slot machines owned and operated by religious, fraternal, charitable or nonprofit organizations. He sued as a resident, citizen and elector. This Court pointed out that he was suing against gambling in general, and said that it appeared from his complaint that slot machines, licensed or unlicensed, were utterly anathema to him. This Court found no controversy between him and the defendants in that case.

On the other hand, Gary Lee is directly affected by the operation of the statute he attacks in this case. His right or privilege to drive a motor vehicle by the basic rule of safety under section 61-8-303, MCA has been adversely limited by the enforcement or threatened enforcement of section 61-8-304, MCA. He wants to drive his motor vehicle as fast as the basic rule allows. The statute he attacks operates against him and all drivers in Montana directly. All members of the driving public have an affected interest under the statute attacked, but that does not mean that no member of that driving...