Lee v. Taylor (In re Taylor)

• Decision Date: 13 September 2012
• Docket Number: A. P. No.: 11-00404,Case No.: 11-04694-BGC-7
• Citation: Lee v. Taylor (In re Taylor), A. P. No.: 11-00404, Case No.: 11-04694-BGC-7 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Sep 13, 2012)
• Parties: In re: Carley Cathleen Taylor, Debtor. David and Mona Lee, co-administrators of the Estate of Alexander Lee, deceased Plaintiffs, v. Carley Cathleen Taylor, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Alabama

In re: Carley Cathleen Taylor, Debtor.David and Mona Lee, co-administrators of the Estateof Alexander Lee, deceasedPlaintiffs,

v.Carley Cathleen Taylor, Defendant.

Case No.: 11-04694-BGC-7

A. P. No.: 11-00404

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: September 13, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The matter before the Court is the plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed December 5, 2011, by David and Mona Lee, co-administrators of the Estate of Alexander Lee, deceased. A.P. DocketNo. 11¹

After notice, a hearing was held on January 24, 2012.Mr. Frederick Mott Garfield, one of the defendant's attorneys, and Mr. Kearney Dee Hutsler, the plaintiffs' attorney, appeared.²

The motion was submitted on the record in this proceeding, the record in Bankruptcy CaseNo. 11-04694-BGC-7, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the motion, and the arguments and briefs of counsel.As discussed below, the Court finds that the motion is due to be denied.

I.Findings of Fact

On October 16, 2008, a Jefferson County, Alabama jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder pursuant to Code of Ala.1975, §13A-6-2.The deceased wasAlexander Lee, the plaintiffs' intestate.After that conviction, the plaintiffs sued the defendant for wrongful death in state circuit court.Before that case could be tried, the defendant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in this Court in which she listed the plaintiffs as a creditor.The plaintiffs filed the present adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the debt owed to them by the defendant is not dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).That section provides that a Chapter 7 discharge does not discharge any debt owed by an individual debtor for, "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity...."Id.

II.The Plaintiffs Contention

The plaintiffs contend they are entitled to summary judgment because the defendant's state court criminal conviction precludes her, by collateral estoppel, from litigating the dischargeability issue in this Court of whether she willfully and maliciously injured the plaintiffs' intestate.

III.Conclusions of Law

A.Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable to this proceeding by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.The framework in this Circuit for determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary judgment is outlined in the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Court in Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112(11th Cir.1993).This Court has followed that framework in this proceeding.

B.Collateral Estoppel

1.General Rules

Once a court has decided an issue of fact or law, collateral estoppel, "precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of action between the same parties...."Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6(1982).Where that decision is one from a state court, such as here, federal courts are required, "to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged."Kremer v. Chemical Const.Corp., 456 U.S. at 466.³Given that rule, it is no surprise then that federal law also requires, "a federal court to look... to the law of the state in which...[the] judgment was entered," in determining what preclusive effect to give a particular state court judgment.Weir v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 574, 579(N.D. Ala.1989)(emphasis added)(citingKremer).⁴

Consequently, this Court must look to Alabama law to determine whether the defendant's criminal conviction should be given preclusive effect in the dischargeability matters pending here.

2.Alabama's Law of Collateral Estoppel

for a Criminal Conviction

The law in Alabama on the preclusive effect of a criminal conviction in a civil proceeding is clear.Writing for the Supreme Court of Alabama, Justice Arthur B. Foster stated:

At the outset we eliminate some questions not involved and as to which there seems to be no conflict of authority.The conviction of the criminal charge is held in this state not to be conclusive of the fact of which...[the defendant] was convicted when such fact is an issue in a civil case, in which the state or government securing the conviction is not a party.

Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387, 392(1933)(parenthetical added).⁵

Consequently, this Court must find that this defendant's criminal conviction does not preclude her from litigating the dischargeability issue in this Court of whether she willfully and maliciously injured the plaintiffs' intestate.Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate on this point.

3.Even if Collateral Estoppel Could be Applied,Summary Judgment Would Not be Appropriate

This Court's holding would be the same even if it gave preclusive effect to the defendant's conviction.⁶In the context of the instant proceeding, it is the complex relationship of Alabama's felony murder law to bankruptcy's willful and maliciousnondischargeability in section 523(a)(6) which creates this result.On the bankruptcy side, "nondischargeability [under section 523(a)(6)] takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury."Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61(1998)(emphasis in original)(parenthetical added).

In contrast, on the state side, Alabama's "felony murder"statute penalizes actions which result in unintended injuries.It provides:

(a) A person commits the crime of murder if he or she does any of the following:

...

(3)He or she commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, burglary in the first or second degree, escape in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, rape in the first degree, robbery in any degree, sodomy in the first degree, any other felony clearly dangerous to human life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant if there be any, causes the death of any person.

Code of Ala.1975, § 13A-6-2(emphasis added).

The offense proscribed in section 13A-6-2(a)(3) has been historically referred to as "felony murder," and pertinent descriptions of its intent have been consistent.Some of those are: "Felony murder... does not require the specific intent to kill; it requires only the intent to commit the underlying felony."Heard v. State, 999 So.2d 992, 1005(Ala.2007).With felony murder, "There is an intended felony and an unintended homicide."Knotts v. State, 686 So.2d 431, 457(Ala. Crim. App.1995)."The crime of felony murder is reserved for those situations where an unintended death occurs as a result of a defendant's dangerous conduct."Calhoun v. State, 932 So.2d 923, 969 -970(Ala. Crim. App.2005).

Consequently, even if the defendant's felony murder conviction could be accorded collateral estoppel effect here, it could not establish, in a subsequent civil proceeding, that the defendant intended to injure or kill the plaintiff's intestate as is required for a determination of nondischargeability pursuant to section 523(a)(6).The issue of whether a defendant willfully and maliciously injured someone is simply not the same as the issue of whether an unintended homicide occurred during the course of a defendant's commission of a felony.Similarly, a determination that a "willful and malicious injury" was inflicted is not necessary to a felony murder conviction.

A look at the defendant's jury verdict form in the context of the statute under which the defendant was tried, confirms these conclusions.The jury verdict form reads:

WE, THE JURY, FIND THE DEFENDANT, CARLEY TAYLOR, GUILTY OF THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF FELONY MURDER.(DEFENDANT, CARLEY TAYLOR, COMMITS OR ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT ROBBERY IN ANY DEGREE, AND IN THE COURSE OF AND FURTHERANCE OF THE CRIME THAT SHE IS COMMITTING OR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT, OR IN IMMEDIATE FLIGHT THEREFROM, SHE OR ANOTHER PARTICIPANT, CAUSES THE DEATH OF ANY PERSON).

Second Motion for Summary Judgmentat 21, "Exhibit B", A.P. Docket No. 12.

The Alabama robbery statutes referred to above provide:

A person commits the crime of robbery in the third degree if in the course of committing a theft he: (1) Uses force against the person of the owner or any person present with intent to overcome his physical resistance or physical power of resistance; or (2) Threatens the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or any person present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property.

Code of Ala. 1975, § 13A-8-43(a)(emphasis added).

A person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree if he violates Section 13A-8-43 and he is aided by another person actually present.

Code of Ala. 1975, §13A-8-42(a)(emphasis added).

A person commits the crime of robbery in the first degree if he violates Section 13A-8-43 and he: (1) Is armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or (2) Causes serious physical injury to another.

Code of Ala. 1975, § 13A-8-41(a)(emphasis added).

As the plain language of these subsections indicate, Alabama's robbery statutes do not require an injury of any sort, much less a willful and malicious one.Similarly, they do not require the intent to injure anyone, whether willfully and maliciously or not, for conviction.A threat of imminent force will suffice under section 13A-8-43(a); a threat of imminent force plus...