Lee v. Tipton
| Decision Date | 18 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2010-CA-002189-MR,2010-CA-002189-MR |
| Parties | JOHN SCOTT LEE AND AMANDA LEE APPELLANTS v. CALVIN TIPTON APPELLEE |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Kentucky |
JOHN SCOTT LEE AND AMANDA LEE APPELLANTS
v.
CALVIN TIPTON APPELLEE
NO. 2010-CA-002189-MR
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
RENDERED: MAY 18, 2012
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: John Scott Lee and Amanda Lee (collectively referred to as the Lees) bring this appeal from a September 17, 2010, Order of the Estill Circuit Court adjudicating a boundary line dispute between the parties and awarding Calvin Tipton damages of $18,333, representing his one-third interest in
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certain real property known as Muncy Bottom. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.1
The underlying facts of this case are rather complicated, so we will recite only those facts necessary to our disposition of this appeal. The Lees and Tipton own adjoining tracts of real property; both tracts were originally owned by their grandfather, Andrew Tipton. Andrew held these tracts as a single tract prior to his death. Upon his death, Andrew devised by will his real property, including one tract of property to Tipton and one tract of property to John's mother, Ethel Tipton Lee.2 Ultimately, a boundary line dispute arose between Tipton and the Lees as to the exact location of the boundary line separating their respective adjoining properties.
Consequently, the Lees filed a quiet title action seeking an adjudication of the common boundary line between their tract and Tipton's tract. The Lees claimed to hold record title up to their claimed boundary line and
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particularly pointed out that they built a garage upon the disputed property in 2000. Alternatively, the Lees claimed to have either adversely possessed such property up to their boundary line or to have established their boundary line by estoppel.
Tipton answered and disputed the Lees' location of the common boundary line. Tipton also filed a counterclaim. In the counterclaim, Tipton asserted that he acquired through Andrew's will a one-third fee-simple interest in another tract of real property commonly referred to as Muncy Bottom and that the Lees improperly conveyed Muncy Bottom to third parties in 2005.3 Tipton sought damages to compensate him for the loss of his one-third fee-simple interest in Muncy Bottom.
In the Lees' answer to the counterclaim, the Lees maintained that they held fee simple absolute title to Muncy Bottom and possessed full authority to alienate the property. In support thereof, the Lees claimed to have acquired fee simple absolute title to Muncy Bottom from Beatrice Tipton by deed dated September 6, 1969, or, alternatively, to have adversely possessed Muncy Bottom.4
The trial court heard this matter without a jury and made findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. In its order, the trial court found the testimony of Tipton as to the
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location of the common boundary line credible and fixed the boundary line between the Lees' and Tipton's tracts accordingly. The trial court rejected the Lees' claims of adverse possession or of boundary by estoppel in connection with the establishment of the common boundary line. The trial court also concluded that Beatrice held only a life estate in Muncy Bottom and, thus, only conveyed the Lees her life estate by deed. As a result, the trial court determined that the Lees did not hold fee simple title to Muncy Bottom and improperly conveyed same to third parties. The court recognized Tipton's one-third fee-simple interest in Muncy Bottom and awarded him $18,333 as damages arising from the Lees' conveyance of the property. This appeal follows.
We initially address the Lees' allegations of error related to Muncy Bottom and then address allegations related to the trial court's determination of the common boundary line.
The real property known as Muncy Bottom was originally owned by the parties' grandfather, Andrew. As with his other real property, Andrew devised Muncy Bottom in his will. The relevant portion of Andrew's will read:
I give, devise and bequeath to my son Halline Tipton . . . the tract of land known as Muncy Bottom, for and during his natural life, with remainder to his wife and children, to be divided equally among them, so long as said Halline Tipton's wife shall remain his widow, and in the event that said Halline Tipton's widow remarries, then in that event, her share shall descend to their children, and in the event there are no children by the
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said marriage, then the said land shall descend to his brother and sisters and their children.
From the above language, the trial court believed that Halline Tipton and his wife, Beatrice, were both devised a life estate in Muncy Bottom with remainder in fee simple to either Halline's children or Halline's siblings. Therefore, the trial court determined that Beatrice only conveyed a life estate to the Lees by deed dated September 6, 1969, and that the Lees erroneously conveyed Muncy Bottom in fee simple absolute to third parties. The trial court also noted that Halline and Beatrice had no children; hence, under the terms of Andrew's will, the trial court determined that Halline's brothers and sisters and their children acquired fee simple title to Muncy Bottom upon Beatrice's death. As one of Halline's brothers was Tipton's deceased father, the trial court recognized that Tipton acquired a one-third fee-simple interest in Muncy Bottom.5
We begin by observing that interpretation of a will presents an issue of law, and our review proceeds de novo. Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444 (Ky. 2010). From the plain terminology utilized in the will, it is certainly clear that Halline was devised a life estate in Muncy Bottom. In particular, the will reads that Muncy Bottom was devised to Halline "during his natural life." See 31 C.J.S. Estates § 37 (2012). Thus, we agree with the trial court that Halline possessed a
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life estate in Muncy Bottom. We, however, disagree that his wife, Beatrice, was also devised a life estate in Muncy Bottom through Andrew's will.
Per Andrew's will, Halline was specifically devised Muncy Bottom "during his natural life, with remainder to [Beatrice] and children . . . so long as . . . [Beatrice] shall remain his widow, and in the event . . . [Beatrice] remarries, then and in that event, her share shall descend to their children, and in the event there are no children . . . to [Halline's] brother and sisters and their children." Of particular import is the language devising the remainder to Beatrice so long as she remains a widow.
It has been recognized that a devise or conveyance to a spouse "so long as she remains a widow . . . presents a difficult problem of construction." Cornelius J. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real Property 45 (2nd ed. 1988). Kentucky Courts have been inconsistent when interpreting the "so long as she remains a widow" language contained in an instrument of conveyance.6 Some of our Courts have interpreted the "so long as she remains a widow" language as creating a defeasible fee simple estate while others have interpreted the language as creating a defeasible life estate.7 See Hutter v. Crawford, 225 Ky. 215, 75
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S.W.2d 1043 (1928); Duncan v. Cole, 303 Ky. 746, 199 S.W.2d 438 (1947); Hopson's Trustee v. Hopson, 282 Ky. 181, 138 S.W.2d 365 (1940); Hutter v. Crawford, 225 Ky. 215, 7 S.W.2d 1043 (1928); Mann v. Frese, 203 Ky. 739, 263 S.W. 21 (1924). But see Thomas v. Stafford, 305 Ky. 559, 204 S.W.2d 940 (1947); Mouser v. Srygler, 295 Ky. 490, 174 S.W.2d 756 (1943); Morgan v. Christian, 142 Ky. 14, 133 S.W. 982 (1911). This inconsistency is partly explained by the innately ambiguous nature of the "so long as she remains a widow" language and by the particular context in which the language is utilized. Simply put, the language "so long as she remains a widow" is insusceptible of a singular interpretation applicable in every case. Hopson's Trustee, 138 S.W.2d at 366. Rather, it is dependent upon the facts of each case per the analysis as follows.
When confronted with the "so long as she remains a widow" language in an instrument of conveyance, two rules of interpretation are paramount to the court's analysis. First, the intent of the parties should be given full effect by interpreting ambiguous terminology consistent with such intent. In so doing, the court must initially look to the four corners of the instrument of conveyance and attempt to glean intent therefrom. Taylor v. Farrow, 239 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1951); Cuddy v. McIntyre, 312 Ky. 606, 229 S.W.2d 315 (1950).
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Second, an interpretation should be adopted that favors the conveyance of a fee simple estate. Often, an instrument of conveyance may be susceptible to two reasonable interpretations - one conveying a fee simple estate and another conveying a lesser estate. In such instance, an interpretation favoring conveyance of a fee simple estate should prevail. Scheinman v. Marx, 437 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1969); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey, 351 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1961); Boggs v. Baxter, 261 S.W.2d 684...
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