Lee v. Tracy Engleson, Stephen Haire, Diane Schwarz, Megan Pinas, Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 March 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 14 C 0368
• Parties: COREY LEE, Plaintiff, v. TRACY ENGLESON, STEPHEN HAIRE, DIANE SCHWARZ, MEGAN PINAS, WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

COREY LEE, Plaintiff, v. TRACY ENGLESON, STEPHEN HAIRE, DIANE SCHWARZ, MEGAN PINAS,WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 14 C 0368

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 5, 2019

Judge Joan H. Lefkow

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Cory Lee brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs when he was incarcerated at Stateville's Northern Reception and Classification Center ("Stateville NRC") in 2013-2014. Plaintiff challenges treatment that he received for gastroesophageal reflux disease ("GERD"). Named as defendants are Diane Schwarz, physician's assistant, Megan Pinas, licensed practical nurse, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (hereafter collectively "the Medical Defendants") and Superintendent Tracy Engleson and Officer Stephen Haire (hereafter collectively "IDOC Defendants"). Both the Medical Defendants and the IDOC Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment (dkts. 136, 143), which are currently before the court. Plaintiff has failed to respond, though he was repeatedly informed of the court's briefing schedule and granted three extensions of time (dkts. 147, 149, 152). For the reasons that follow, the court grants both the Medical Defendants' and the IDOC Defendants' motions.

I. Legal Standard

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." To establish that a material fact is undisputed, a party "must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Rule 56(c)(1). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Rule 56(c)(3). Courts must "construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

Once the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, "the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute." Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). The non-movant must go beyond the allegations of his complaint and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Hannemann v. Southern Door County School Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if there is evidence "to permit a jury to return a verdict for" the nonmoving party. Egonmwan v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 602 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2010); Carroll, 698 F.3d at 564 ("[m]ere metaphysical doubt" about material facts is not enough).

B. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Consistent with the local rules, both the Medical Defendants and the IDOC Defendants filed Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statements of undisputed facts along with their summary judgment motions. (Dkts. 144, 140-1.) Also consistent with the local rules, both sets of defendants filed and served on plaintiff a Local Rule 56.2 Notice, which explains in detail the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. (Dkts. 139, 146.)

Plaintiff failed to respond to defendants' summary judgment motions, despite the court's having granted him three separate extensions of time to do so and despite repeated warnings that failure to respond would result in the court's ruling on the motions based on the papers submitted by the defendants. (Dkts., 147, 149, 152.) Instead of responding to the summary judgment motions, plaintiff responded to the court's briefing schedules by filing repeated motions or letters that requested recruitment of counsel. (Dkts. 151, 152, 158, 162, 164.) The court had in fact recruited counsel on plaintiff's behalf at the outset of this case, upon screening of the original complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. (Dkt. 4.) Recruited counsel drafted the third amended complaint - which is the operative complaint in this matter. (Dkt. 75.) But as the case further progressed, approximately seven months later, recruited counsel filed a motion to withdraw in which he attested that he could no longer in good faith continue to represent plaintiff consistently with his Rule 11 obligations to the court. (Dkt. 102.) This Court granted the motion to withdraw and directed that plaintiff shall proceed pro se. (Dkt. 104.)

In ruling upon plaintiff's first request for counsel after the summary judgment motions had been filed, this court explained that given the past history with recruited counsel and the particular issues raised in the summary judgment motions, this was not an appropriate case for the recruitment of a second attorney from the limited pool of attorneys who are eligible torepresent indigent plaintiffs. (Dkt. 153.) See Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (While "[a]lmost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer . . . there are too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases."); Grund v. Murphy, 736 F. App'x 601, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2018) ("[a]llowing a litigant to proceed pro se when the court has made a reasonable effort to find a volunteer attorney is not an abuse of discretion as long as the litigant is adjudged competent") (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007); Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2014)). The court recognized and considered plaintiff's stated limitations but found that plaintiff had not compellingly demonstrated the presence of any issues above and beyond the general obstacles posed by incarceration.

The court was further mindful that plaintiff's case is based on alleged medical deliberate indifference and that, "where an inmate alleges an objectively serious medical condition, it may be better to appoint counsel." Miller v. Campanella, 794 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 784 (7th Cir. 2015)). But there is no absolute right to counsel each time a prisoner asserts a medical claim, even if other factors might limit his ability to litigate on his own or he is receiving assistance from other prisoners. See Robinson v. Scrogum, 876 F.3d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 2017). As the present opinion below demonstrates, this case turns on whether plaintiff can establish the defendants' sufficiently culpable state of mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment that he received. The court lastly notes that it was not until plaintiff's fifth filing in response to the court's summary-judgment briefing schedule (at which point the summary judgment motion had been pending for four months and this case had been pending nearly five years) - that plaintiff first specified discovery that he purportedly needed the assistance of counsel to complete. (Dkt. 164.) But there was no suggestion in thatfiling that plaintiff lacked the opportunity or ability to have pursued this discovery earlier, and thus shortly after plaintiff filed this request, the court accepted defendants' reply briefs and explained that it would take the summary judgment motions under advisement. (Dkt. 168.) As stated, plaintiff never did substantively respond to the motions for summary judgment.

A district court "is entitled to decide [a summary judgment] motion based on the factual record outlined in the Local Rule 56.1 statements." Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011); Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 2009); Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., 401 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant does not excuse him from complying with Local Rule 56.1. See Coleman v. Goodwill Indus. of Se. Wis., Inc., 423 Fed. Appx. 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Though courts are solicitous of pro se litigants, they may nonetheless require strict compliance with local rules."); Wilson v. Kautex, Inc., 371 Fed. Appx. 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2010) ("strictly enforcing Local Rule 56.1 was well within the district court's discretion, even though Wilson is a pro se litigant") (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the court will accept as true the facts set forth in Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statements, viewing those facts and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C) ("All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party."); Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010); Rao v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 589 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 2009) ("In accordance with a local rule, the district court justifiably deemed the factual assertions in BP's Rule 56.1(a) Statement in support of its motion for summary judgment admitted because Rao did not respond to the statement.");see also Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006); Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2005); Koszola, 385 F.3d at 1108-09; Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2003).

Nonetheless, "a nonmovant's failure to . . . comply with Local Rule 56.1 . . . does not . . . automatically result in judgment for the movant. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with [the movant] to show that [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Raymond, 442 F.3d at 608 (internal citation omitted). In addition, notwithstanding any admissions, the court has interpreted plaintiff's filings in this case generously...