Lee v. United Pub. Workers

Decision Date04 August 2011
Docket NumberNo. 28413.,28413.
Citation191 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2755,125 Hawai'i 317,260 P.3d 1135
PartiesAmy M. LEE, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS, AFSCME, LOCAL 646, AFL–CIO; State of Hawai‘i, Department of Public Safety, Defendants–Appellees,andJohn Does 1 through 10; Jane Does 1 through 10; Doe Corporations 1 through 10; Doe Unincorporated Associations, Including Partnerships 1 through 10, Defendants.
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

R. Steven Geshell, on the briefs, for PlaintiffAppellant.Herbert R. Takahashi, Danny J. Vasconcellos, Rebecca L. Covert, on the briefs, for DefendantAppellee United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL–CIO.James E. Halvorson, Jeffrey A. Keating, Deputies Attorney General, on the briefs, for DefendantAppellee State of Hawaii, Department of Public Safety.NAKAMURA, Chief Judge, and FOLEY and FUJISE, JJ.Opinion of the Court by NAKAMURA, C.J.

PlaintiffAppellant Amy M. Lee (Lee), a public employee, filed suit against her employer, DefendantAppellee State of Hawai‘i, Department of Public Safety (DPS or State), and her union, DefendantAppellee United Public Workers AFSCME, Local 646, AFL–CIO (UPW). Lee's complaint alleged a “hybrid action” against (1) the State for breaching the collective bargaining agreement by wrongfully terminating her and (2) UPW for breaching its duty of fair representation by “declining to pursue” her grievance for wrongful termination against the State. Lee filed her hybrid-action complaint in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court) without first seeking relief before the Hawai‘i Labor Relations Board (HLRB). The Circuit Court 1 dismissed Lee's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The principal issue raised in this appeal is whether the HLRB has exclusive original jurisdiction over Lee's hybrid action or shares concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts. We hold that the HLRB has exclusive original jurisdiction over Lee's hybrid action and thus the Circuit Court properly dismissed Lee's lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. We also hold that the Circuit Court did not err in limiting its award of attorney's fees against UPW to one-half of the $1,480 in fees incurred by Lee in pursuing a default judgment against both UPW and the State.

BACKGROUND

Lee was employed by the DPS as an adult correctional officer (ACO) at the Women's Community Correctional Center (WCCC) and was a member of UPW. In 2000, Lee sustained work-related injuries to her left shoulder and back. Lee underwent surgery for these injuries in 2002. As a result of Lee's injuries, Lee's treating physician certified that Lee was permanently unable to perform her usual and customary duties as an ACO. Lee chose to return to temporary light duty at WCCC and to participate in the State's Return to Work Priority Program, under which she would be subject to termination if a job search to place her in an alternative position was unsuccessful. In 2003, the State terminated Lee's employment after advising her that a search under the program for suitable state jobs had been unsuccessful.

In response to her termination, Lee requested that UPW pursue a grievance against the State pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State and UPW. In December 2003, UPW filed a grievance on Lee's behalf with the Department Head of the DPS. In May 2005, the Acting Director of the DPS submitted the DPS's decision denying the grievance. In August 2005, UPW notified Lee that based on its review of the matter, it had decided not to pursue her grievance any further. Under the applicable grievance procedures of the CBA, only UPW, and not the employee, had the authority to further pursue a grievance denied by the State by submitting the grievance to binding arbitration.

On February 9, 2006, Lee filed a civil complaint in the Circuit Court asserting a hybrid action against both the State and UPW. Lee alleged that the State was liable for breach of “contract” (presumably the CBA) and for breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. Lee alleged that UPW breached its duty of fair representation, its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and its contract with Lee to be the exclusive representative of Lee under the CBA by “declining to pursue” Lee's grievance regarding her termination against the State. Lee further alleged that [t]he conduct of the Defendant was malicious[.]

An entry of default was filed against UPW and the State for failure to answer the complaint. Lee then filed a motion for entry of default judgment against both UPW and the State. Subsequently, Lee stipulated with the State to set aside the State's default. The Circuit Court also granted UPW's motion to set aside UPW's default on the condition that UPW pay the necessary and reasonable fees and costs incurred by Lee in pursuing the motion for entry of default judgment as against UPW. The Circuit Court awarded Lee $6.14 in costs and $740 in attorney's fees, which was one-half of the attorney's fees sought by Lee, because [Lee]'s request for entry of default judgment was also initially brought against the State.”

The State and UPW filed motions to dismiss Lee's hybrid-action complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Both argued that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction based on Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 89–14 (1993),2 which grants the HLRB exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies concerning prohibited practices. They further argued that Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), which Lee relied upon as a basis for the Circuit Court's jurisdiction, was inapplicable to Lee's case.

The Circuit Court ruled that under HRS § 89–14, the HLRB had exclusive original jurisdiction over Lee's hybrid action and that Vaca v. Sipes was inapplicable to Lee's case. The Circuit Court granted UPW's and the State's respective motions to dismiss, and it entered a Judgment against Lee and in favor of UPW and the State. Lee appeals from this Judgment.

On appeal, Lee argues that the Circuit Court erred in 1) dismissing her hybrid action against UPW and the State for lack of jurisdiction; and 2) limiting the amount of attorney's fees it awarded to Lee in setting aside the default entered against UPW. We disagree and affirm the Circuit Court.

DISCUSSION
I.

Lee challenges the Circuit Court's dismissal of her hybrid action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard.” Captain Andy's Sailing, Inc. v. Dep't of Land and Natural Res., 113 Hawai‘i 184, 192, 150 P.3d 833, 841 (2006) (citation and alteration omitted).

The central question presented in this appeal is whether the HLRB has exclusive original jurisdiction over the hybrid action brought by Lee, a State public-sector employee We answer this question in the affirmative. We conclude that: (1) the Hawai‘i Legislature, pursuant to HRS § 89–14, has granted the HLRB exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies concerning public-sector prohibited practices; (2) Lee's public-sector hybrid action concerns alleged prohibited practices covered by HRS Chapter 89; (3) Lee's reliance on Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, is misplaced; and (4) HRS § 89–14 does not violate Lee's constitutional rights by conferring exclusive original jurisdiction over Lee's public-sector hybrid action upon the HLRB. Accordingly, Lee's hybrid action was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLRB, and the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction, in the first instance, to entertain Lee's hybrid action.

A.

It is “well-settled that an employee must exhaust any grievance procedures provided under a collective bargaining agreement before bringing a court action pursuant to the agreement.” Poe v. Hawai'i Labor Relations Bd., 105 Hawai‘i 97, 101, 94 P.3d 652, 656 (2004) (hereinafter, “ Poe II ”) (internal quotation marks, ellipsis points, and citation omitted). In certain collective bargaining agreements, such as the one in Lee's case, the grievance procedures provide that the final grievance step, pursing binding arbitration, rests solely with the union. Thus, Lee could not exhaust the grievance procedures under the CBA for her wrongful-termination grievance without UPW's concurrence.

“However, when the union wrongfully refuses to pursue an individual grievance, the employee is not left without recourse.” Id. at 102, 94 P.3d at 657. A “wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action against his [or her] employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance.” Id. (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186, 87 S.Ct. 903).

Such an action, known as a “hybrid action,” “consists of two separate claims: (1) a claim against the employer alleging a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and (2) a claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation.” Id. These two claims are “inextricably interdependent,” in that for an employee alleging wrongful termination to prevail against either the employer or the union, the employee must not only show that his or her termination violated the collective bargaining agreement, but must also show that the union breached its duty of fair representation by not pursuing the employee's grievance. Id.

In order to establish the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, an employee alleging wrongful termination, such as Lee, must do more than show that he or she had been wrongfully terminated. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 193, 87 S.Ct. 903. A union breaches its duty of fair representation “only when [the] union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. 903; see Poe II, 105...

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