Lee v. United States

• Decision Date: 23 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16–327.,16–327.
• Citation: 137 S.Ct. 1958,198 L.Ed.2d 476
• Parties: Jae LEE, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

137 S.Ct. 1958

198 L.Ed.2d 476

Jae LEE, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 16–327.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 28, 2017.

Decided June 23, 2017.

John J. Bursch, Caledonia, MI, for Petitioner.

Eric J. Feigin, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Patrick McNally, Weatherly, McNally & Dixon, P.L.C., Nashville, TN, Matthew T. Nelson, Gaëtan Gerville–Réache, Adam T. Ratliff, Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, Grand Rapids, MI, John J. Bursch, Bursch Law PLLC, Caledonia, MI, for Petitioner.

Noel J. Francisco, Acting Solicitor General, Kenneth A. Blanco, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Francesco Valentini, Attorney, Department of Justice, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, James I. Pearce, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the United States.

Linda A. Klein, American Bar Association, Chicago, IL, A. Marisa Chun, Paul M. Thompson, Erika N. Pont, Matthew M. Girgenti, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Menlo Park, CA and Washington, DC, for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae.

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Jae Lee was indicted on one count of possessing ecstasy with intent to distribute. Although he has lived in this country for most of his life, Lee is not a United States citizen, and he feared that a criminal conviction might affect his status as a lawful permanent resident. His attorney assured him there was nothing to worry about—the Government would not deport him if he pleaded guilty. So Lee, who had no real defense to the charge, opted to accept a plea that carried a lesser prison sentence than he would have faced at trial.

Lee's attorney was wrong: The conviction meant that Lee was subject to mandatory deportation from this country. Lee seeks to vacate his conviction on the ground that, in accepting the plea, he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Everyone agrees that Lee received objectively unreasonable representation. The question presented is whether he can show he was prejudiced as a result.

I

Jae Lee moved to the United States from South Korea in 1982. He was 13 at the time. His parents settled the family in New York City, where they opened a small coffee shop. After graduating from a business high school in Manhattan, Lee set out on his own to Memphis, Tennessee, where he started working at a restaurant. After three years, Lee decided to try his hand at running a business. With some assistance from his family, Lee opened the Mandarin Palace Chinese Restaurant in a Memphis suburb. The Mandarin was a success, and Lee eventually opened a second restaurant nearby. In the 35 years he has spent in the country, Lee has never returned to South Korea. He did not become a United States citizen, living instead as a lawful permanent resident.

At the same time he was running his lawful businesses, Lee also engaged in some illegitimate activity. In 2008, a confidential informant told federal officials that Lee had sold the informant approximately 200 ecstasy pills and two ounces of hydroponic marijuana over the course of eight years. The officials obtained a search warrant for Lee's house, where they found 88 ecstasy pills, three Valium tablets, $32,432 in cash, and a loaded rifle. Lee admitted that the drugs were his and that he had given ecstasy to his friends.

A grand jury indicted Lee on one count of possessing ecstasy with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Lee retained an attorney and entered into plea discussions with the Government. The attorney advised Lee that going to trial was "very risky" and that, if he pleaded guilty, he would receive a lighter sentence than he would if convicted at trial. App. 167. Lee informed his attorney of his noncitizen status and repeatedly asked him whether he would face deportation as a result of the criminal proceedings. The attorney told Lee that he would not be deported as a result of pleading guilty. Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311, 313 (C.A.6 2016). Based on that assurance, Lee accepted the plea and the District Court sentenced him to a year and a day in prison, though it deferred commencement of Lee's sentence for two months so that Lee could manage his restaurants over the holiday season.

Lee quickly learned, however, that a prison term was not the only consequence of his plea. Lee had pleaded guilty to what qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and a noncitizen convicted of such an offense is subject to mandatory deportation. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ; Calcano–Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350, n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2268, 150 L.Ed.2d 392 (2001). Upon learning that he would be deported after serving his sentence, Lee filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence, arguing that his attorney had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.

At an evidentiary hearing on Lee's motion, both Lee and his plea-stage counsel testified that "deportation was the determinative issue in Lee's decision whether to accept the plea." Report and Recommendation in No. 2:10–cv–02698 (WD Tenn.), pp. 6–7 (Report and Recommendation). In fact, Lee explained, his attorney became "pretty upset because every time something comes up I always ask about immigration status," and the lawyer "always said why [are you] worrying about something that you don't need to worry about." App. 170. According to Lee, the lawyer assured him that if deportation was not in the plea agreement, "the government cannot deport you." Ibid. Lee's attorney testified that he thought Lee's case was a "bad case to try" because Lee's defense to the charge was weak. Id., at 218–219. The attorney nonetheless acknowledged that if he had known Lee would be deported upon pleading guilty, he would have advised him to go to trial. Id., at 236, 244. Based on the hearing testimony, a Magistrate Judge recommended that Lee's plea be set aside and his conviction vacated because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The District Court, however, denied relief. Applying our two-part test for ineffective assistance claims from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the District Court concluded that Lee's counsel had performed deficiently by giving improper advice about the deportation consequences of the plea. But, "[i]n light of the overwhelming evidence of Lee's guilt," Lee "would have almost certainly" been found guilty and received "a significantly longer prison sentence, and subsequent deportation," had he gone to trial. Order in No. 2:10–cv–02698 (WD Tenn.), p. 24 (Order). Lee therefore could not show he was prejudiced by his attorney's erroneous advice. Viewing its resolution of the issue as debatable among jurists of reason, the District Court granted a certificate of appealability.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. On appeal, the Government conceded that the performance of Lee's attorney had been deficient. To establish that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, the court explained, Lee was required to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 825 F.3d, at 313 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ; internal quotation marks omitted). Lee had "no bona fide defense, not even a weak one," so he "stood to gain nothing from going to trial but more prison time." 825 F.3d, at 313, 316. Relying on Circuit precedent holding that "no rational defendant charged with a deportable offense and facing overwhelming evidence of guilt would proceed to trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter prison sentence," the Court of Appeals concluded that Lee could not show prejudice. Id., at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted). We granted certiorari. 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 614, 196 L.Ed.2d 490 (2016).

II

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of counsel at "critical stages of a criminal proceeding," including when he enters a guilty plea. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) ; Hill, 474 U.S., at 58, 106 S.Ct. 366. To demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The first requirement is not at issue in today's case: The Government concedes that Lee's plea-stage counsel provided inadequate representation when he assured Lee that he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty. Brief for United States 15. The question is whether Lee can show he was prejudiced by that erroneous advice.

A

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will often involve a claim of attorney error "during the course of a legal proceeding"—for example, that counsel failed to raise an objection at trial or to present an argument on appeal. Roe v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). A defendant raising such a claim can demonstrate prejudice by showing "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id., at 482, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; internal quotation marks omitted).

But in this case counsel's "deficient performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding itself." Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S., at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029. When a defendant alleges his counsel's deficient performance led him to accept a guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do not ask whether, had he gone...