Lee v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of Princeton

• Decision Date: 24 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 18-09257 (MAS) (LHG)
• Parties: GREGORY LEE and ROSEMARIE LEE, Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER OF PRINCETON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

GREGORY LEE and ROSEMARIE LEE, Plaintiffs,
v.
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER OF PRINCETON, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-09257 (MAS) (LHG)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL A. SHIPP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant University Medical Center of Princeton's (the “Hospital”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 52.) Plaintiffs Gregory Lee (“Mr. Lee”) and Rosemarie Lee (“Mrs. Lee”) (together, “Mr. and Mrs. Lee”) opposed (ECF No. 55) and the Hospital replied (ECF No. 61). The Court has carefully reviewed the parties' submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court grants the Hospital's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. and Mrs. Lee are profoundly deaf and communicate primarily through American Sign Language (“ASL”). (Pls.' Statement of Material Facts (“PSMF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 55-4.) On the evening of Sunday, January 7, 2018, Mr. and Mrs. Lee arrived at the Hospital after Mr. Lee had fallen at home, injured his lip, and chipped two teeth. (Def.'s Undisputed Material Facts (“DUMF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 52-4; PSMF ¶ IL) Mr. and Mrs. Lee claim that Mrs. Lee called the

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emergency room (“ER”) at the Hospital prior to their arrival to request an interpreter for Mr. Lee. (PSMF ¶ 11.) Upon their arrival at the ER, the medical staff triaged Mr. Lee, obtained medical information from Mr. and Mrs. Lee using written notes and other means, and then Mr. Lee was taken to a bed in the ER where his lip was attended to by a physician's assistant. (DUMF ¶¶ 2-4; Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“RDUMF”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 55-3.). Mr. and Mrs. Lee also claim that they requested an interpreter upon their arrival at the Hospital. (PSMF ¶ 12.) At 7:30 p.m., Mr. Lee requested an ASL interpreter, indicating that this was his preferred manner of communication. (DUMF ¶ 5.) The Hospital brought a Video Remote Interpretation (“VRI”) machine to Mr. Lee's bedside to connect to an interpreter remotely. (Id. ¶ 6.) The medical staff attempted to communicate with Mr. and Mrs. Lee through the VRI machine, but the machine did not function correctly. (Id.)

At 9:39 p.m., approval was sought to obtain the services of an on-site ASL interpreter, which the medical staff attempted to do. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) The medical records indicate that the nursing supervisor provided approval to contact an interpreter and an operator was notified, (Smit Deel., Ex. C. at 3), though during her deposition, the nursing supervisor could not recall if she or anyone else called the interpreter. (Smit Certification, Ex. J. Emmons Tr. 48:2-8.) Because it was late in the evening, however, the Hospital was not able to secure a live interpreter, but informed Mr. and Mrs. Lee that a live interpreter would be present in the morning. (Id. ¶ 9; Barton Certification Ex. D., Tr. 59:17-23, ECF No. 52-10.) Mrs. Lee exchanged handwritten notes with the medical staff that described Mr. Lee's condition and the cause of injury and the physician assistant described the suturing process. (DUMF ¶ 10; RDUMF ¶ 10.) After finding a tooth remnant in Mr. Lee's lip, the physician assistant sent Mr. Lee for x-rays to make sure there were no additional embedded particles. (DUMF ¶ 11.)

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The Hospital recommended that Mr. Lee stay the night for observation and for additional tests the next morning, for which a live interpreter would be present. (Id. ¶ 13.) Mr. and Mrs. Lee claim, however, that the Hospital only told them that they would “check on it tomorrow, ” in response to their request for a live interpreter. (RDUMF ¶ 13.) Mr. and Mrs. Lee decided to leave the Hospital and subsequently visit Mr. Lee's primary physician, against the Hospital's explicit medical advice. (DUMF ¶¶ 14-15.) The next day, Mr. Lee visited his doctor for treatment of the injury and was treated by his physician without the use of an interpreter. (Id. ¶ 16.) Later, Mr. Lee communicated with his dentist for the treatment of the same injury using handwritten notes, gestures, and drawings. (Id. ¶ 18.) Mr. and Mrs. Lee claim that during both visits to his primary physician and the dentist, Mr. Lee had a difficult time communicating. (RDUMF ¶¶ 16, 18.) Mrs. Lee also communicated with the dentist about major oral surgery concerning Mr. Lee's damaged teeth through handwritten notes. (Id. ¶ 19.) Since his injury, Mr. Lee visited the Hospital once, on November 29, 2019, and utilized an interpreter. (Id. ¶ 27.)

Relevant here, the Hospital maintains a policy, entitled “Services for the Hearing Impaired, ” that explains that effective communication is a patient right. (DUMF ¶ 28.) In addition, the Hospital provides staff training, provides free ASL translation services, and instructs that assistive equipment such as VRI are available for deaf and hearing-impaired patients. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Mr. and Mrs. Lee filed this action against the Hospital on May 15, 2018, alleging causes of action for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), seeking declaratory, compensatory, and injunctive relief. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) On March 1, 2019, Defendant originally moved for summary judgment (see ECF Nos. 14-15), but that motion was administratively terminated pending resolution of a discovery dispute (ECF No. 24).

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On July 9, 2021, Defendant renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 52.) Mr. and Mrs. Lee opposed (ECF No. 55), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 61).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56(a)^[1] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. A dispute is genuine if there is sufficient evidentiary support such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it can “affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

If the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may discharge its burden by pointing to an absence of evidence necessary to support the non-movanf s claim. (Id. at 325.) Alternatively, a moving party may submit affirmative evidence that negates a material element of the non-moving party's claim. Id. If the movant brings affirmative evidence or makes a showing that the non-movant lacks evidence essential to its claim, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The burden of persuasion, however, rests on the nonmoving party to establish each element necessary to succeed on the claims on which it bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322.

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To decide whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must consider all facts, drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423 (citing Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000)). On a motion for summary judgment, ‘The judge's function is not... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Absent a genuine dispute for trial, summary judgment as a matter of law is proper. Id. at 249-50.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court will begin by addressing the Hospital's request to strike the declarations of Christine Sherwood and Joanna Chaitram. Next, the Court will address the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment.

A. The Hospital's Request to Strike the Sherwood and Chaitram Declarations

In opposing Summary Judgment, Mr. and Mrs. Lee submitted the declaration of Christine Sherwood, Vice President of ASL Interpreter Referral Services and Joanna Chaitram, another Deaf patient of the Hospital. (See ECF No. 56-10.) The Hospital objected, arguing that the declaration of Ms. Chaitram and Ms. Sherwood should be stricken under Rule 37(c)(1) because Mr. and Mrs. Lee did not disclose the witness beforehand. (See Defs.' Reply Br. 5.) Absent any explanation by Mr. and Mrs. Lee as to their failure to disclose these witnesses during discovery, the Court ordered an explanation. (ECF No. 62.) Mr. and Mrs. Lee responded on December 15, 2021. (ECF No. 63.)

Rule 37 requires exclusion where a party has “without substantial justification” failed to make required disclosure, and the failure is not “harmless.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). In determining whether or not evidence should be excluded under Rule 37, the Court must consider:

(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified; (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule . . .

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would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or other cases in the court; and (4) bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the district court's order.

Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 719 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Meyers v.

Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 904-905 (3d Cir.1977)). The Court finds that, on balance, consideration of these factors weighs against excluding either declaration. In considering the first factor, prejudice,...