Lee v. Vang
| Decision Date | 21 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 27-CV-08-3011.,27-CV-08-3011. |
| Parties | Mao Lee, Wrongful Death Trustee on behalf of the heirs of Washiseng Yang Plaintiff, v. Mainhia Vang and Som Lor, Defendants. |
| Court | Minnesota District Court |
Gary Larson, Judge of District Court.
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Gary Larson, Judge of Hennepin County District Court, on October 21, 2008, on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Bruce Larson, Esq. appeared for and on behalf of Mao Lee, Wrongful Death Trustee on behalf of the heirs of Washiseng Yang. Patrick Larkin, Esq. appeared for and on behalf of Defendants, Mainhia Vang and Som Lor.
Based upon the files and proceedings herein, the Court makes the following:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
2. The attached memorandum is incorporated herein.
MEMORANDUMOn August 6, 2006, Washiseng Yang, Defendants, Mia Nhia Vang and Som Lor, and others attended a family picnic at the Lake Elmo Park Reserve. Washiseng, the 11-year old son of Mao Lee, ("Plaintiff") arrived at the picnic with his Uncle Kao Lee, while his mother worked. Later in the day, Washiseng and one of his cousins drowned in the pool during the picnic.
According to Plaintiff, Vang called her the day of the picnic to ask her to send her daughter to help Vang with the family picnic. (Plf's Ex. C, p. 23.) Plaintiff asked Vang "whether at the park . . . would there be people to supervise the kids, and she said there would be so there shouldn't be no trouble, no problem." (Id., p. 25.) Plaintiff stated that this was not unusual because Vang and Lor had often taken care of her kids. (Id., p. 40-41.)
At some point during the picnic, Vang watched her little brothers as they played in the shallow end of the pool. According to Bao Yang, Washiseng's 14 year-old sister, Vang told her that she "took the kids," that she "went with the kids to the pool." (Plf's Ex.A, p. 34.) The Defendants were "the only ones that would take [kids] swimming . . . because they were the only ones with swimming suits." (Id., p. 35.) Bao also overheard a phone conversation in which "Vang called Kao Lee on her cell phone and made arrangements for [Kao Lee] to drop off Washiseng Yang and Lao Yang with her [Vang] and Som Lor." (Id., p. 37.) However, at her deposition, Bao stated that she only overheard Vang recite directions to Kao Lee on how to get to the park. (Plf's Ex. A, p. 37-38.)
According to Lao Yang, Washiseng's 16 year-old brother, none of the kids wanted to go to the family picnic until Vang called Kao Lee, and told him that Vang and "was [sic] going to watch us so everyone started to go." (Plf's Ex. B, p.12.) Lao did not remember seeing Washiseng at the picnic, except "when [Vang] came and taking [sic] him to the water." (Id., p. 19.) Lao stated that,
my brother say he didn't want to go swimming because he don't know how to swim. Then I asked her if she's going to watch my brother and she said she will watch my brother go swimming. I asked her if she's going to babysit my brother when he go swimming because he doesn't know how to swim and he also say he can't swim. And [Vang] say she will watch him so I let him go.
(Id., p. 20.) When directly asked if Lao "had heard [Vang] talk to Washiseng to go into the water," Lao said, "Yes." (Id.) Lao stated that he never actually saw Vang take Washiseng to the water, only that he saw them walk toward the beach and then lost sight of them. (Id., p. 20-21.)
The facts show that Defendant Lor had no interaction with Washiseng or his siblings at the park that day. Lor remained in the picnic area, a good distance away from the beach when the drowning occurred. Further, there is no evidence indicating that Lor assumed any responsibility for or had a duty to care for Washiseng.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants claiming that they breached a duty of care to Decedent by allowing him to play and swim in the water without babysitting or supervising him. The parties disagree whether Defendants were responsible for babysitting the deceased. Defendants brought this Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that they had no legal duty of care and that no special relationship existed between them or Decedent to impose such a duty of care.
Rule 56.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the standard for summary judgment:
Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. In a summary judgment motion, the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Offerdahl v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. 1988). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire & Safety Serv., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000).
Material facts are those tending to establish the existence of any element essential to a party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial, inasmuch as the complete failure of proof concerning any essential element of the non-moving party's case renders all other fact issues immaterial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Carlisle v. City of Minneapolis, 437 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party cannot rely upon mere general statements of fact, hearsay, speculation or conjecture. Id.
The non-moving party must present specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn. 1997). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must submit "significant probative evidence . . . [it] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Carlisle v. City of Minneapolis, 437 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
Under Minnesota common law, a person does not have a legal duty to give aid or protection to another person even if he or she realizes that action on his or her part is necessary. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979). However, a special relationship may arise where one person accepts responsibility to protect another, even if there was not an initial duty of care. Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Walsh v. Pagr Air Taxi, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn. 1079)). In order for a plaintiff to establish a special duty, he or she must be in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable power over the plaintiff's welfare." Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n.2 (Minn. 1993).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants assumed or accepted responsibility to watch Washiseng at the water, thus creating a special relationship which imposed a legal duty on Defendants. Defendants deny that they assumed responsibility for Washiseng at the water. As discussed below, there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment against Defendant Vang. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact about whether Defendant Lor assumed a duty of care for Washiseng, summary judgment is appropriate as applied to him.
Material facts are those tending to establish the existence of any element essential to a party's case, and...
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