Lee v. Virginian Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1955
• Docket Number: No. 4367,4367
• Citation: 197 Va. 291,89 S.E.2d 28
• Parties: , 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2670, 28 Lab.Cas. P 69,453 TOM HENRY LEE v. VIRGINIAN RAILWAY COMPANY. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 28

89 S.E.2d 28

197 Va. 291, 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2670, 28 Lab.Cas. P 69,453

TOM HENRY LEE v. VIRGINIAN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Record No. 4367.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

September 14, 1955.

L. S. Parsons and T. Helm Jones, for the plaintiff in error.

Williams, Cocke, Worrell & Kelly, for the defendant in error.

JUDGE: HUDGINS

HUDGINS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Tom Henry Lee filed his motion for judgment against the Virginian Railway Company, alleging that there was due him from defendant the sum of $15,000.00 for its wrongful discharge of him as a locomotive fireman. Defendant filed its grounds of defense and a separate plea, in which it was alleged that under the contract of employment and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153(i), the trial court had no jurisdiction of the case and that plaintiff's sole remedy was to file his petition with the National Railway Adjustment Board. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's contention, plaintiff obtained this writ of error.

It appears from the record that in February, 1945, plaintiff was verbally employed by the defendant as a locomotive fireman that on January 1, 1938, and June 1, 1953, the Brotherhood of Engineers, Firemen and Hostlers, acting on behalf of the plaintiff and other members of the union, made a contract with defendant fixing the terms and conditions of employment, rate of pay, rules and working conditions, and providing that plaintiff would not be discharged without just cause.

In August, 1952, plaintiff became unable to work on account of an attack of malarial fever. On October 1, 1952, he reported for work, but was not assigned any duty because the medical report made by defendant's physician showed he was suffering from high blood pressure. Other physicians examined plaintiff and were of opinion that he was able to return to work. On March 12, 1954, defendant accepted reports as to plaintiff's physical condition, and on his application permitted him to return to work with full seniority rights, and assigned him duties similar to those he had previously performed. On May 10, 1954, when this action was instituted, plaintiff was working for defendant as locomotive fireman with full seniority rights based upon continuous employment from February, 1945, the time he first entered the service of defendant.

The jurisdiction of the court below to try the issues raised depends upon the terms of the contract made between the Brotherhood of Engineers, Firemen and Hostlers and the defendant railway company, and the pertinent federal statute (45 U.S.C. 153) as construed by the federal courts.

The pertinent part of the contract is Article 30(a), which provides: 'No engineer, fireman, or hostler will be suspended, record marked, or discharged from service of the company without just cause. ' The other parts of the section set forth the steps an aggrieved party to the contract must take to determine his rights without resorting to court action.

The statute, 45 U.S.C. 153(i), provides:

'(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.'

Plaintiff contends that the issue is simple; namely, whether defendant breached its contract by discharging him without just cause, and insists that the court had jurisdiction to try this issue. This contention, however, ignores the fact that the relationship existing between the litigants at the time the action was brought was that of employee and employer. In support of his contention, plaintiff relies on Moore v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.ed. 1089. The facts in that case were that Moore had been discharged as an 'unsatisfactory employee'; that is, his relations with the railroad had been definitely terminated before he instituted the action. The Court, in the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Black, held that an employee who had severed his relations with his employer 'was not required by the Railway Labor Act to seek adjustment of his controversy with the railroad as a prerequisite to suit for wrongful discharge.'

The facts in the case now under consideration are distinguishable from the facts in the Moore case, supra. Here the plaintiff was not discharged, but was temporarily denied employment due to the fact that the railroad company had been advised by its physician that he was physically unable to perform the duties of his employment. Later, the physicians decided that plaintiff was physically able to return to work and, upon his application, he was assigned to his former duties and given all seniority rights; that is, his status was that of an employee who had been continuously employed since February, 1945.

These facts bring the case within the influence of the decision in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.ed. 795, decided after the Moore case, supra. The facts in the Slocum case were that the railroad had a separate collective bargaining agreement with two unions. A dispute arose between the unions, each claiming for its members that they were entitled to do certain work. One union moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the Railway Labor Act left the state court without jurisdiction to construe the contract. The Court held that as long as the National Railway Adjustment Board had not acted, neither a state nor a federal court had jurisdiction to adjust the dispute between the railroad and the labor union involving the interpretation of the labor agreement, because the Railway Labor Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the Board. Mr. Justice Black, again speaking for the majority of the Court, said:

'The first declared purpose of the Railway Labor Act is 'To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein.' . . . This purpose extends both to disputes concerning the making of collective agreements and to grievances arising under existing agreements . . ..

. . . The Act thus represents a considered effort on the part of Congress to provide effective and desirable administrative remedies for adjustment of railroad-employee disputes growing out of the interpretation of existing agreements. The Adjustment Board is well equipped to exercise its congressionally imposed functions. Its members understand railroad problems and speak the railroad jargon. Long and varied experiences have added to the Board's initial qualifications . . ..

'. . . Our holding here is not inconsistent with our holding in Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 85 L.ed. 1089, 61 S.Ct. 754. Moore was discharged by the railroad. He could have challenged the validity of his discharge before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back pay. Instead he chose to accept the railroad's action in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such cases.'

Since publication of the decision in the Slocum case, supra, the lower federal courts have applied the principal therein stated in numerous cases.

The...