Leech v. Leech
| Decision Date | 24 November 1913 |
| Citation | 89 A. 51,82 N.J.Eq. 472 |
| Parties | LEECH v. LEECH. |
| Court | New Jersey Court of Chancery |
Petition by Charles W. Leech against Sarah E. Leech for divorce, in which defendant filed an answer and cross-petition. Petition dismissed, and decree in favor of cross-petitioner.
Petitioner seeks a divorce against his wife for desertion. The petition alleges that his wife deserted him by permanently leaving his home December 10, 1908, and that the desertion has been willful, continued, and obstinate for more than two years preceding the commencement of this suit against her. The petition was filed April 6, 1912. The wife in her answer admits that she left petitioner's home December 10, 1908, and has not since returned, but alleges that she was at that time obliged to leave petitioner by reason of his extreme cruelty. By her cross-petition she seeks a divorce from petitioner by reason of his constructive desertion of her in driving her from his home by his cruel treatment, and also by reason of adultery, which she charges that her husband committed prior to her leaving him. By his answer to the cross-petition petitioner denies the charge of constructive desertion, and alleges condonation as a defense to the charge of adultery.
Joseph Beck Tyler, of Camden, for petitioner. Scovel & Harding, of Camden, for defendant and cross-petitioner.
LEAMING, V. C. (after stating the facts as above). There is little doubt touching the essential facts of this case. About seven months before Mrs. Leech left her husband's home she ascertained that he was living in adultery with the woman named as co-respondent in her cross-petition. The evidence at that time brought to her knowledge was the same evidence which she produced at the hearing; that evidence conclusively establishes the husband's guilt. When she learned of her husband's adulterous habits she confronted him with the charge, and he brutally informed her that it was none of her business. Had she left him at that time no question touching her right to a divorce could exist But she did not then leave her husband's home because she could not; she saw no way in which she could support herself and her son, in whom her life was centered. Accordingly she moved from the bedroom which she had theretofore shared with her husband to another bedroom in the same house for the purpose of escaping his embraces. From that time she never returned to his room or voluntarily permitted him to come to her room. But her purpose to deny to her husband sexual intercourse was futile. From time to time her husband would go to her bedroom and demand and receive the sexual privileges he sought. Her reason and only reason for permitting this was because she did not dare refuse him. Her fear of him was well founded. For a long time he had been drinking to excess, and frequently returning to his home in a drunken and irresponsible condition and making himself a terror in the household. When drunk there was no safety in his presence, and at no time does it seem to have been safe for his wife to have resisted his will. She was undoubtedly living in constant fear of his violence, and her fears were fully justified by his conduct. In some of his assaults upon her she would escape physical injury by flight, in others she received severe physical injuries at his hands. This condition continued up to the time she permanently left him. From the time she learned of her husband's adulterous conduct until about a week before she left his home he continued to go to her room from time to time and there have sexual intercourse with her, to which she submitted through fear...
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Sabia v. Sabia, A--398
...was fraudulently obtained of course it could not avail defendant any more than if obtained by force or duress (Leech v. Leech, 82 N.J.Eq. 472, 89 A. 51 infra); but even if defendant were honest at the moment of reconciliation, the condonation was nevertheless conditional. The subsequent and......
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Kirk v. Kirk
...is not shown to have been under any compulsion or duress to submit to the conditions she now complains of. Cf., Leech v. Leech,82 N.J.Eq. 472, 473, 89 A. 51 (Ch.1913). The trial court made no specific finding concerning obstinacy or as to any other factual requisite since it concluded, as n......
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Sperling v. Sperling, A--140
...condonation, being a conditional pardon, was revoked thereby. Bravo v. Bravo, 93 N.J.Eq. 56, 114 A. 790 (Ch.1921); Leech v. Leech, 82 N.J.Eq. 472, 89 A. 51 (Ch.1913); Warner v. Warner, 31 N.J.Eq. 225 The statutory requisites of abandonment and failure to support were amply established by th......
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Holsworth v. Holsworth
...v. Keats, 1 Sw. & Tr. 334, 346; unless the continued living together is compulsory. Gardner v. Gardner, 2 Gray, 434, 441;Leech v. Leech, 82 N. J. Eq. 472, 89 A. 51. Here there was no compulsion. The vehement desire to possess her child which, in large part, underlay the return to the husban......