Leedom v. Leedom
| Decision Date | 15 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | #29092 |
| Citation | 947 N.W.2d 143 |
| Parties | Cindy Bea LEEDOM, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. David Wayne LEEDOM, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
RICHARD L. JOHNSON, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorney for plaintiff and appellee.
THOMAS M. KELLER, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶1.] David and Cindy Leedom divorced in 2004. The divorce court ordered David to pay Cindy monthly alimony in the amount of $3,000. David stopped paying alimony in January 2017, after reaching the age of social security eligibility. Cindy filed a motion to restore alimony in the circuit court (modification court) alleging that David was obligated to pay lifetime alimony of $3,000 per month. The modification court held David's obligation to pay alimony was continuing. The court also determined that he owed accrued alimony from the time he stopped paying until the time of the modification hearing, which totaled $87,000. The court then reduced David's monthly alimony obligation to $1,750 beginning on June 1, 2019. David appeals. We affirm.
[¶2.] Cindy commenced a divorce action against David in March 2003. David and Cindy had been married for 22 years. David was employed in the banking business and earned between $200,000 and $384,000 annually in the four years prior to the divorce. Cindy worked sporadically during the marriage.
[¶3.] A two-day divorce trial was held in May 2004. At the time of trial, Cindy was working part-time at a clothing store, earning approximately $2,000 per month.
David testified his income had been reduced to $125,000 annually because of a downturn in the credit card industry.
[¶4.] The divorce court entered a written memorandum opinion on July 8, 2004, resolving all the issues in the divorce, including Cindy's request for alimony. The memorandum opinion required David to pay Cindy alimony of $3,000 per month, stating:
[¶5.] The memorandum opinion further detailed that:
If Cindy remarries the alimony terminates. If David reaches the age of social security eligibility and chooses to retire, then alimony may be subject to modification due to a change in David's income, if any. If David's income increases substantially over the next fifteen years, then alimony may be modified if Cindy can establish modification is warranted. Of course, alimony modification sought by either party may be warranted if other factors as recognized by South Dakota law are present.
[¶6.] The divorce court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law and a decree of divorce (divorce decree) on August 24, 2004. The divorce court incorporated the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the memorandum opinion into the divorce decree. The divorce decree provided the following with respect to David's obligation to pay alimony:
[¶7.] Over the years, David consistently paid his alimony obligation and neither party moved to modify alimony. In November 2016, David turned 62 and became eligible to draw social security. David also retired from his position at MetaBank in January 2017. He stopped paying monthly alimony after making the December 2016 payment. Cindy texted David in January 2017 after she did not receive the January alimony payment. David responded that he would no longer be paying alimony to her "by the terms of the decree."
[¶8.] Cindy filed a motion to restore alimony in October 2017. The modification court held a hearing on the motion and received evidence from both parties. Cindy argued that the divorce court had ordered David to pay lifetime alimony and David had an ongoing obligation to pay $3,000 per month unless modified by the court. David argued that he was no longer obligated to pay alimony under the divorce decree after he became eligible for social security and retired. David also argued that he was not able to pay alimony because he was no longer earning income.
[¶9.] The modification court entered a written memorandum opinion on May 20, 2019, which was incorporated into a final order. The court determined that David's alimony obligation did not automatically terminate under the divorce decree when David reached the age of social security eligibility and therefore ordered David to pay the accrued alimony of $87,000 to Cindy for the period from January 2017 through May 2019. The court also reduced David's ongoing alimony obligation to $1,750 per month beginning on June 1, 2019.
[¶10.] David appeals raising multiple issues that we state as follows:
[¶11.] "We review alimony determinations under the abuse of discretion standard." Haanen v. Haanen , 2009 S.D. 60, ¶ 12, 769 N.W.2d 836, 841. A circuit court's decision regarding whether to modify an alimony award is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Barton v. Barton , 2012 S.D. 44, ¶ 9, 815 N.W.2d 553, 557. This Court reviews a "circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard" and reviews "conclusions of law de novo." Lowe v. Schwartz , 2007 S.D. 85, ¶ 9, 738 N.W.2d 63, 66-67.
[¶12.] David argues that the modification court erred by considering the divorce court's memorandum opinion in determining that David's alimony obligation did not automatically terminate when he became eligible to draw social security. He also contends that the divorce decree and the memorandum opinion are inconsistent as to when his alimony obligation was to terminate. Finally, David argues that the divorce court intended David's alimony obligation to terminate when he became age eligible for social security, and the modification court erred by concluding otherwise.
[¶13.] SDCL 15-6-52(a) provides in part, "If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, the facts and legal conclusions stated therein need not be restated but may be included in the findings of fact and conclusions of law by reference." The incorporation of a memorandum opinion into a circuit court's findings and conclusions "is clearly permitted by SDCL 15-6-52(a) and has been repeatedly endorsed by this court." Eichmann v. Eichmann , 485 N.W.2d 206, 208 (S.D. 1992) ; see also Speck v. Anderson , 349 N.W.2d 49, 51 (S.D. 1984) (); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre , 357 N.W.2d 250, 253 (S.D. 1984) ().
[¶14.] David points to Moser v. Moser to support his claim that the modification court improperly referenced the memorandum opinion to conclude that alimony did not automatically terminate when David became eligible for social security. In Moser we stated,
422 N.W.2d 594, 596 (S.D. 1988). However, Moser specifically referenced that the memorandum opinion "was not incorporated in the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. Here, the divorce court incorporated the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the memorandum opinion as a part of the divorce decree. Therefore, the modification court properly referenced the divorce court's memorandum opinion in considering whether David's alimony obligation automatically terminated when he reached the age of social security eligibility.
[¶15.] David next argues that the divorce court's memorandum opinion should not have been relied upon because it was inconsistent with the divorce decree. He cites Eichmann , where we remanded an alimony award to the circuit court due to inconsistencies between the court's conclusions of law and incorporated memorandum opinion. 485 N.W.2d at 208. In Eichmann , we held "where the incorporation creates irreconcilable inconsistencies in the findings and conclusions that prohibit meaningful appellate review, remand for clarification is necessary." Id. However, Eichmann is inapplicable here because the divorce decree and memorandum opinion in this case are not inconsistent. Rather, the memorandum opinion is in harmony with the divorce decree and explains the divorce court's intentions concerning future conditions that may impact alimony.
[¶16.] The relevant language of the divorce decree provides, "the defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $3,000 per month alimony until any of the following conditions present themselves: ... b.) Defendant reaches the age of social security eligibility; ..." David interprets such language to mean that his alimony obligation terminated once he reached the age for social security eligibility. However, the language did not provide for termination when David became age eligible for social security. Rather, the language merely described his age as one condition that may impact David's obligation to pay alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month.
[¶17.] The divorce court's memorandum opinion explains the effect on alimony if certain...
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