Leedom v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 20 March 1922
• Docket Number: 141
• Citation: 117 A. 410,274 Pa. 22
• Parties: Leedom et al., Appellants, v. Palmer et ux
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

117 A. 410

274 Pa. 22

Leedom et al., Appellants, v. Palmer et ux

No. 141

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

March 20, 1922

Argued February 7, 1922

Appeal, No. 141, Jan. T., 1922, by plaintiffs, from judgment of C.P. Delaware Co., June T., 1919, No. 699, on verdict for defendants, in case of Margaret L. Leedom et al. v. Alfred W Palmer and E. Mary Palmer, his wife. Affirmed.

Ejectment. Before BROOMALL, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict and judgment for defendants: see 15 Delaware Co. R. 522. Plaintiff appealed.

Errors assigned were various instructions, sufficiently appearing by the opinion of the Supreme Court, quoting record.

The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.

John E McDonough, with him J. Eugene Walker, for appellants, cited: Darlington's Est., 147 Pa. 624; Matthali v. Pownall, 235 Pa. 460; McConville v. Ingham, 268 Pa. 507; Corrigan v. Conway, 269 Pa. 373.

W. Roger Fronefield, for appellees, cited: McLaughlin v. Collins, 138 Pa. 198; Funston v. Twining, 202 Pa. 88; Robinson v. Powell, 210 Pa. 262; Clark v. Clark, 174 Pa. 309; Kleckner v. Kleckner, 212 Pa. 515; Crothers v. Crothers, 149 Pa. 201; Reehling v. Byers, 94 Pa. 316; Doran v. McConlogue, 150 Pa. 98; Barnard v. Kell, 271 Pa. 80.

Before WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:

J. Jones Leedom, a childless widower, died intestate August 14, 1919, at the age of seventy-six. His next of kin were brothers and sisters. From 1888 to 1903 he lived the greater part of the time with his sister and her husband, appellees, and from 1903 to 1915 on his farm, reserving a room therein and boarding with the tenant. He then left the farm and went to live permanently with appellees in Gradyville, Delaware County. April 1, 1916, he arranged for Palmer and his wife to rent the farm, for his board and farm taxes. A few months before this occurred Leedom had a slight stroke, lasting about two weeks, but leaving him physically weakened. Early in 1918 a deed conveying the farm to appellees was executed; it contained a covenant that the grant was "under and subject nevertheless to the express covenant and agreement that the said parties and the survivor of them shall board, nurse, care for and maintain the grantor during the term of his natural life and furnish everything necessary for that purpose at their own proper cost and expense." This action of ejectment was instituted in the court below by two sisters and a niece to recover the three-fourths interest conveyed by the deed. It was averred the deed was defective because the grantor (a) lacked mental capacity, (b) was subjected to undue influence, and (c) the facts disclosed a confidential relationship between the parties.

The court below charged specifically on the first two questions, stating the law "imposed on the grantees the burden of satisfying the jury that it [the deed] was not procured by imposition, deceit, coercion or overreaching . . . ., and the burden was on the plaintiffs to satisfy the jury that the grantor was mentally incompetent and did not know what he was doing." The jury found for appellees. It is now urged the court below failed to instruct on the third ground of defense, that the grantees should establish the grant was the intelligent and understood act of the grantor, fair, conscientious, beyond the reach of suspicion: Greenfield's Est., 14 Pa. 489, 505; Corrigan v. Conway, 269 Pa. 373, 377. The verdict and judgment disposed of the questions of undue influence and mental capacity, and every other element necessary to sustain the validity of the deed, subject, of course, to the question now to be considered.

Our sole inquiry, then, is, Was the third specification of defense sustained by the evidence? Confidential relation is not confined to any specific association of the parties; it is one wherein a party is bound to act for the benefit of another, and can take no advantage to himself. It appears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed; in both an unfair advantage is possible. When these circumstances appear, the law presumes the transaction void, unless the party claiming the benefit of such transaction shows affirmatively that no deception was used and the act was the intelligent and understood act of the grantor, fair, conscientious and beyond the reach of suspicion. No precise language can define the limits of the relation or fetter the power of the court to control these conditions. While not confined to any specific association of parties, it generally exists between trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, and principal and agent. In some cases the confidential relation is a conclusion of law, in others it is a question of fact to be established by the evidence: Hetrick's App., 58 Pa. 477, 479; Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. 263, 267. The mere existence of kinship does not, of itself, give rise to confidential relation such as would impose the burden of proof on the one receiving a gift to assert its validity. A child may take a gift from a parent without being required to furnish explanatory testimony: Clark v. Clark, 174 Pa. 309, 336, wherein the court quoted the English rule announced in Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G., M. & G. 597; Bigelow on Fraud, 368; Worrall's App., 110 Pa. 349, 364; Carney v. Carney, 196 Pa. 34, 38; Compton v. Hoffman, 265 Pa. 257, 263; Neureuter v. Scheller, 270 Pa. 80; Langdon v. Allen, 1 W.N.C. 395, 397; Hiester v. Hiester, 228 Pa. 102, 107. Nor is there confidential relation simply because the parties to the transaction are brothers and sisters: Funston v. Twining, 202 Pa. 88, 90. Where a conveyance of property is to a relative in consideration of support for life, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, it is favored as a family settlement. Under similar conditions, where the grantee was the servant of the donor, and grantee's wife nursed the donor in his last illness, the conveyance was not set aside because of supposed confidential relations: Barnard v. Kell, 271 Pa. 80, 86.

Where undue influence and incompetency do not appear, and the relation between the parties is not one ordinarily known as confidential in law,...