Leedy v. State
| Decision Date | 28 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04–1303–CR–102.,49A04–1303–CR–102. |
| Citation | 998 N.E.2d 307 |
| Parties | Evan LEEDY, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Patricia Caress McMath, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
The State charged Evan Leedy with four felony counts of operating while intoxicated (“OWI”) stemming from an automobile accident in which his girlfriend was killed and another motorist was seriously injured. The defense sought to have him declared incompetent to stand trial, and the trial court found him incompetent and committed him to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction (“DMHA”) pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35–36–3–1. Leedy sought review via interlocutory appeal, and the trial court stayed his commitment pending our review. Finding that the trial court followed the statutory procedure and that the statute does not run afoul of Leedy's due process rights, we affirm.
Late one night in February 2012, Leedy was driving about eighty miles per hour with his girlfriend on an Indianapolis street. His blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was .15, and he ran a red light, colliding with a pickup truck. Leedy's girlfriend died shortly thereafter, and the driver of the truck suffered serious injuries. Leedy suffered a brain injury and was comatose for about a month. The State charged him with class B felony OWI with a BAC of at least .15 causing death, class C felony OWI causing death, class D felony OWI causing serious bodily injury, and class D felony OWI with a BAC of at least .08 causing serious bodily injury.
In May 2012, Leedy filed a motion for competency and sanity evaluation to determine whether he was competent to stand trial.1 He underwent mental evaluations with court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. George Parker and court-appointed clinical psychologist Dr. Shelvy Keglar. The doctors submitted reports to the trial court, which conducted a series of competencyhearings. At the hearings, both doctors testified that Leedy could not understand the nature of the charges and proceedings against him and could not assist his counsel in conducting his defense. The doctors testified concerning Leedy's need of physical and occupational therapy. They further testified concerning the various services available at the state psychiatric hospitals, with the Logansport State Hospital (“Logansport”) focusing on competency evaluations for criminals awaiting trial and housing mostly patients with mental illness and disability rather than those with traumatic brain injuries. Dr. Parker testified that he was not optimistic about Leedy's chances of being restored to competency. Dr. Keglar testified that with a cognitive rehabilitation program, Leedy could possibly be restored to competency within one to two years. The trial court took the matter under advisement and set another hearing to hear testimony from representatives of DMHA.
At a November 2012 hearing, the medical director of Logansport, Dr. Danny Meadows, testified that although most of the patients at the facility suffer from mental illness or disability rather than from traumatic brain injury, he and his colleagues had treated patients similarly situated to Leedy. He also testified that while the success rate for competency restoration is lower for patients with Leedy's type of injury than for mental illness patients, Logansport would be capable of evaluating Leedy and attempting restoration services. Additionally, he reported that any therapeutic services that Leedy would need that were not provided at Logansport would be outsourced to area professionals. He stressed that it would be Logansport's responsibility to meet all of Leedy's clinical needs and that Logansport personnel would transport him for outsourced services. Finally, he testified that while the Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital (“Larue Carter”) in Indianapolis was more geared to handle brain injury patients in need of physical or speech therapy, Logansport was specifically geared toward treating patients awaiting trial on criminal charges and that the Logansport experts could possibly know within six months whether Leedy could be restored to competency.
DMHA chief counsel Katherine Gregory testified concerning the procedures for determining which of the state psychiatric facilities best meets the needs of a given patient. She stated that although Logansport would be the most routine placement for Leedy, DMHA would make an effort to place him where his specific needs could best be met. She also referenced the effect of DMHA's funding constraints on outpatient restoration services.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court determined that Leedy was incompetent to stand trial and committed him to DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35–36–3–1(b). The trial court stayed the commitment order so that the parties could submit briefs concerning Leedy's challenge to the constitutionality of the commitment statute. At a hearing on January 4, 2013, the trial court denied Leedy's motion to declare the statute unconstitutional. However, the court again stayed the commitment order pending Leedy's pursuit of an interlocutory appeal, which we accepted.
Leedy contends that his commitment to DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35–36–3–1 violates his due process rights. Because it presents a question of law, we review a matter of statutory interpretation using a de novo standard. Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ind.2011). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent in promulgating it. Ryan v. State, 900 N.E.2d 43, 44–45 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). Thus, we begin by examining the language of the statute, presuming that the words were selected to express their common and ordinary meanings. Id. at 45. Where the statute is unambiguous, we accord each word and phrase its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, without having to resort to rules of construction to decipher meanings. Id.
Leedy essentially raises due process challenges to both the statute itself and the trial court's action in committing him pursuant to the statute. Indiana Code Section 35–36–3–1 provides a mechanism for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, stating in pertinent part,
(a) If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to the court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has that ability. The court shall appoint two (2) or three (3) competent, disinterested:
(1) psychiatrists;
(2) psychologists endorsed by the Indiana state board of examiners in psychology as health service providers in psychology; or
(3) physicians;
who have expertise in determining competency.
.... The individuals who are appointed shall examine the defendant and testify at the hearing as to whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the defendant's defense.
(b) At the hearing, other evidence relevant to whether the defendant has the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the defendant's defense may be introduced. If the court finds that the defendant has the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the defendant's defense, the trial shall proceed. If the court finds that the defendant lacks this ability, it shall delay or continue the trial and order the defendant committed to [DMHA]. [DMHA] shall provide competency restoration services or enter into a contract for the provision of competency restoration services by a third party in the:
(1) location where the defendant currently resides; or
(2) least restrictive setting appropriate to the needs of the defendant and the safety of the defendant and others.
(Emphasis added.)
Although Leedy acknowledges the mandatory language contained in subsection (b), he asserts that after the trial court made the incompetency finding, 2 it nonetheless violated his due process rights by ordering his commitment to DMHA. In this vein, Leedy essentially asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.
Involuntary commitment is a clear deprivation of a defendant's liberty and can only be justified on the basis of legitimate state interests. Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1153 (Ind.2011).
The State has dual interests in committing an incompetent defendant: (1) to restore the accused to competency due to the right of the public and the defendant to the prompt disposition of criminal charges pending against him and (2) to protect the defendant against being required to answer to charges that [he] lacks the capacity to understand or to assist [his] attorney in defending against [the charges].
Id. at 1154 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Commitment of an accused thus focuses on the State's interest in the accused's restoration to competency and necessarily entails a finding of probability that the accused can be so restored.” State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ind.2008).
The statute clearly states that the determination concerning the probability of restoring a defendant's competency is made by DMHA or contracted third party service provider. Indiana Code Section 35–36–3–3(a) gives the superintendent of the institution where the defendant is committed or the director of the third party contractor ninety days to certify to the trial court “whether the defendant has a substantial probability of attaining the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of...
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