Leen v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:12-cv-01627-TLN-DMC |
| Citation | 611 F.Supp.3d 955 |
| Parties | Irvine H. LEEN and Aleta Leen, Plaintiffs, v. Harold M. THOMAS; Michael Ramsey; John Lane; and Does 1-20, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Keith B. Ebright, Therese Y. Cannata, Juna Kim, Zachary E. Colbeth, Cannata, O'Toole, Fickes & Almazan, LLP, Kimberly A. Almazan, Withers Bergman LLP, San Francisco, CA, Marsha A. Burch, Marsha A. Burch, Attorney At Law, Grass Valley, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Bruce S. Alpert, Butte County Counsel, Oroville, CA, Stephen E. Horan, Derek Joseph Haynes, Kevin M. Kreutz, Robindeep Singh Basra, Porter Scott, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on remand from the Ninth Circuit regarding Defendants Michael Ramsey ("Ramsey"), John Lane ("Lane"), and Harold Thomas's ("Thomas") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint ("FAC"). (ECF No. 116.) This Court previously granted Defendants' motion and dismissed the FAC with prejudice. (ECF No. 120.) Plaintiffs Irvine and Aleta Leen (collectively, "Plaintiffs") appealed. (ECF No. 122.) The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to this Court with instructions. (ECF No. 127.) After carefully considering the Ninth Circuit's instructions and the parties' arguments, the Court again GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
Plaintiffs own property where they graze cattle. (ECF No. 113 at ¶ 13.) The property contains an irrigation ditch, fed from upstream properties. (Id. ) Plaintiffs have a water license from the California State Water Resources Control Board, Division of Water Rights (the "Board"), which allows them to divert water from the irrigation ditch at a location specified in the license for the purpose of irrigating their property. (Id. )
In October 2002, a California Department of Fish and Wildlife ("CDFW") deputy reported observing individuals clearing out debris and brush from the irrigation ditch. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Thomas, an employee of CDFW, and Ramsey, the Butte County District Attorney, were involved in the investigation. (Id. ) On October 15, 2003, Thomas and Ramsey filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff Irvine Leen ("Leen") related to the incident. (Id. )
Leen alleges that even after he was acquitted of all charges in 2011, Thomas attempted to misuse his authority to convince the Board to unlawfully withhold an amendment to Plaintiffs' water license, for which Plaintiffs had submitted a petition for change in June 2008. (ECF No. 113 at ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs' goal in the petition was to amend the point of diversion and place of use conferred by the existing water license. 1
(ECF No. 72 at 38–44.) In July 2009, the CDFW filed a protest to the petition. (Id. ) This protest and Defendants' alleged actions opposing Plaintiffs' petition for change are the subject of the instant action.
In May 2012, Plaintiffs brought the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants in their individual capacities based on alleged constitutional violations.2 (ECF No. 113.) In a previous, uncontested order, this Court found that any events occurring prior to May 16, 2010, were barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 110 at 11.) In their FAC, Plaintiffs take issue with Defendants' actions opposing the amendment for the period between March 2011, when Leen was acquitted of the criminal charges, and "potentially" concluding in February 2013, when the Board finally granted the change petition. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
On November 4, 2015, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 116.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition on November 25, 2015. (ECF No. 117.) Defendants replied on December 3, 2015. (ECF No. 118.) As discussed, this Court previously granted Defendants' motion and dismissed the FAC with prejudice. (ECF No. 120.) Plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to this Court with instructions. (ECF No. 127.)
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block , 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim ... is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto , 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn , 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6, 83 S.Ct. 1461, 10 L.Ed.2d 678 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege " ‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
Nevertheless, a court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose , 788 F. 2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant–unlawfully–harmed–me accusation." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the ... laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters , 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).
Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 697, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Only where a plaintiff has failed to "nudge[ ] [his or her] claims ... across the line from conceivable to plausible," is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This plausibility inquiry is "a context–specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, "[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith , 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States , 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) ); see also Gardner v. Martino , 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (). Although a district court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), "the court's discretion to deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint." Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. , 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp. , 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004) ).
Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated their procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In its mandate, the Ninth Circuit instructs this Court to discuss (1) Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim, (2) Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, (3) Plaintiffs' equal protection claim, (4) Ramsey's individual liability, and (5) qualified immunity. (ECF No. 127.) The Court will address each issue in turn.
"A procedural due process claim has two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections." Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist. , 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998).
Defendants argue Plaintiffs cannot succeed in their due process claims because Plaintiffs cannot allege a property interest in a water license or in an amendment to a water license. In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have a property interest in their validly approved water license. This Court previously agreed with Defendants and found that Plaintiffs did not possess a constitutionally protected property interest in either their water license or an amendment to that...
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