Leet v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 1953
• Docket Number: No. 32,32
• Citation: 100 A.2d 789,203 Md. 285
• Parties: LEET v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 285

203 Md. 285

100 A.2d 789

LEET v. STATE.

No. 32.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 4, 1953.

Harry M. Leet, pro se.

Ambrose T. Hartman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Edw. D. E. Rollins, Atty. Gen and Walter W. Dawson, State's Atty. Montgomery Co., Rockville, on the brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ.

SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.

From a conviction in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County under Section 316 of Article 81, 1951 Code, which punishes the wilful failure to file an income tax return, this appeal is taken. The appellant contends that not all the necessary elements of the offense are sufficiently set forth in the indictment; that the evidence is insufficient to show that his failure was wilful; and that the jury's verdict of conviction should be set aside because it is repugnant to a verdict of the same jury finding him not guilty on a count for wilful failure to pay the income tax due for the same year.

The appellant is a lawyer employed by the government of the United States, who works in the District of Columbia but lives in Montgomery County, Maryland. The count upon which he was convicted alleged as follows:

'The Grand Jurors of the State of Maryland for the body of Montgomery County, upon their oath and affirmations, present that Harry M. Leet late of said County, on the 15th day of April in the year of our Lord Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-Two at the County aforesaid, being a married resident of the State of Maryland, living with his wife, and not being a fiduciary, received a gross income for the taxable year of 1951 in excess of Two Thousand Dollars and not having been granted an extension of time by the Comptroller of the State of Maryland for the filing of the return, did unlawfully and wilfully refuse to file an income tax return with the Comptroller of the State of Maryland, stating specifically the items of his gross income and the items he claimed as deductions, exemptions and credits allowable by law, contrary to the form of the Act of the Assembly in such case made and provided, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State.'

The appellant concedes that the indictment adequately alleged that his income in the year 1951 was sufficient to require filing a return on April 15, 1952, but he insists that it does not sufficiently allege his residence in Maryland for all or any part of 1951. He contends, therefore, that as it does not appear from the indictment that he was subject to the tax or to the obligation of filing a return, it is defective.

I.

It has been stated frequently that an indictment is sufficient if it informs the person charged of the accusation against him, as required by the Declaration of Rights, Article 21, and if the charge is made with sufficient definiteness to prevent the accused from being charged again with the same offense in a future prosecution. State v. Edwards, 124 Md. 592, 595, 92 A. 1037, 1038; State v. Warfield, 139 Md. 74, 77, 114 A. 835, 836; State v. Petrushansky, 183 Md. 67, 74, 36 A.2d 533, 536; Imbraguglia v. State, 184 Md. 174, 178, 40 A.2d 329, 330; State v. Carter, Md., 89 A.2d 586, 591.

A reading of the indictment discloses with fair certainty that the obligation to file a return on April 15, 1952, is predicated upon the appellant's residence in the State in the year 1951. The draftsman of the indictment, following immemorial custom, undertook to allege all the elements of the offense in a single sentence. This resulted in a language structure that is somewhat archaic and should not be insisted upon in mid-twentieth century. Prosecutors should perhaps be encouraged to develop forms of criminal pleading better attuned to modern literary usage, but we cannot say that such an indictment as we have before us is improper. Its meaning is clear, and this alone is important. Captious and insubstantial quarrels with mere form of expression in an indictment, where the intended meaning is clearly manifest, are not favored. Article 27, § 692, 1951 Code; State v. Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 50, 63 A.2d 644, 647; Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 409, 84 A.2d 76, 78. Mere differences in style and preferences in sentence structure or punctuation, even errors in punctuation where meaning is not obscured, do not vitiate a criminal indictment. Edwards v. State, 220 Ind. 490, 44 N.E.2d 304; State v. Kaner, 338 Mo. 972, 93 S.W.2d 671; State v. Ruble, 119 W.Va. 356, 193 S.E. 567, The words, 'being a married resident of the State of Maryland, living with his wife, and not being a fiduciary, received a gross income for the taxable year of 1951 in excess of Two Thousand Dollars * * *' constitute a definite statement that in 1951 the traverser was a resident of this state and received the necessary gross income to subject him to the obligation of the income tax law. The quoted language is set off by commas, and the words 'for the taxable year of 1951' which are embraced therein relate to both residence and income. If the challenged count were to embrace within parantheses what is included in these commas, the intent of the draftsman would perhaps be made more graphic, but this would not be necessary to make clear the draftsman's purpose to charge both a requisite residence and income in the year 1951. We find no merit in the contention that 'the taxable year of 1951' should be read as pertaining only to the income allegation and not to residence. At the hearing in this court the appellant in fact acknowledged--as he necessarily must--that he knew he was indicted for failure to file a return for the year 1951, and the first requirement is thus fully satisfied.

II.

We think there is no greater merit in the suggestion that the indictment is so general in its language that the appellant may be subjected to future prosecution for the same offense, for he need only point to the indictment now before us in asserting a plea of former jeopardy.

Moreover, as this Court held in Cunningham v. State, 190 Md. 578, 59 A.2d 337, the accused, if he were again charged with the same offense, could by producing the record in this case, support his plea in bar of the later prosecution.

III.

With respect to the contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to justify a finding that the defendant had knowledge of his duty to file the tax return, this is a matter which since the 1949 amendment to Article 15, § 5, of the Constitution of Maryland, and Chapter 596 of the Acts of 1949 (now Article 27, § 700, 1951 Code) can be reviewed in this Court if properly raised. Rule 5A of the Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure repeats the substance of Article 27, § 700:

'Rule 5A. Directed Verdict * * *

'(a) At the conclusion of the evidence for the State the accused may request an instruction that the evidence is insufficient in law to justify his conviction. If the instruction is refused, he may offer evidence on his own behalf without having reserved the right to do so, but by so doing, he withdraws his request for such instruction. The request for such an instruction may be renewed at the and of the whole case.'

The appellant did not make this point seasonably at the close of the evidence, as required by Rule 5A, but attempted to raise the question nearly two months after conviction by what may be likened to a Motion for a Judgment N.O.V., a step not recognized in the criminal procedure of this state. See Strahorn, 12 Md. Law Review, 68, at 84. Indeed, this Court, speaking through Judge Henderson, has held: 'It is prefectly clear from the constitutional amendment and the supplementary statute that appellate review is predicated upon the refusal of an instruction offered and a ruling thereon by the trial court. In this respect the statute and the rule follow the analogy to Rule 9 of the Rules Respecting Appeals, of long standing and general applicability, and Rule 4 of the Trial Rules of Practice and Procedure applicable in civil cases. Cf. Wright v. Baker , 79 A.2d 159, 161, Smith v. Carr, 189 Md. 338, 339, 56 A.2d 151 and Schley v. Merritt, 37 Md. 352, 360. In the absence of any request for an instruction there can be no review of the sufficiency of the evidence.' Auchincloss v. State, Md., 89 A.2d 605, 607. See also Hendrix v. State, Md., 90 A.2d 186, 191.

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