Lefebure v. Boeker
| Decision Date | 26 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 17-1791-SDD-EWD |
| Parties | PRISCILLA LEFEBURE v. BARRETT BOEKER, Assistant Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary, individually and in his official capacity, WEST FELICIANA PARISH, SAMUEL D. D'AQUILLA, 20th Judicial District, individually and in his official capacity, District Attorney, J. AUSTIN DANIEL, Sheriff, West Feliciana Parish, INSURANCE CO. DOES 1-5, DOES 6-20 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss1 filed by Defendant, Barrett Boeker, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Warden for the Louisiana State Penitentiary ("Defendant" or "Boeker"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively, Motion for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). Plaintiff, Priscilla Lefebure ("Plaintiff" or "Lefebure"), filed an Opposition2 to this motion. The Court heard Oral Argument on this motion on March 25, 2019, and the Court granted in part and denied in part Boeker's motion, with detailed written reasons to be assigned.3 These reasons are assigned below.4
Plaintiff filed a Complaint5 and First Amended Complaint6 seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 and under the laws of Louisiana against Barrett Boeker, Assistant Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary, individually and in his official capacity; Samuel C. D'Aquilla, District Attorney for the 20th Judicial District, individually and in his official capacity ("the DA"); J. Austin Daniel, Sheriff, West Feliciana Parish ("Sheriff Daniel"); and various unknown insurance companies and unknown defendants.
Plaintiff claims that Boeker raped her on December 1, 2016 at his home on the grounds of the Louisiana State Penitentiary.7 Plaintiff further claims that Boeker sexually assaulted her a second time at his home on December 3, 2016.8 Subsequent to these alleged attacks, Plaintiff had a rape kit administered and completed on December 8, 2016 at Woman's Hospital in Baton Rouge.9 Plaintiff alleges that the report on the rape kit noted bruising in the pattern of fingers and hand prints and a red and irritated cervix. Photographs were also taken.10 Plaintiff pleads the facts and circumstances of the alleged rape and sexual assault, the rape kit findings, and her alleged damages in great detail in her Complaint and First Amended Complaint.11
Boeker was arrested for second degree rape on December 20, 2016; however, he was never indicted or convicted.12 Plaintiff alleges she was denied equal protection and due process under the law by the Defendants' collective conduct, specifically, the failureof the DA and Sheriff Daniel to investigate the alleged crimes and obtain the rape kit, their disproportionate treatment of women and sexual assault victims, and their conspiracy to protect Boeker.
Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Boeker: civil conspiracy to violate her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985;13 abuse of process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;14 and state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"), assault, battery, false imprisonment, rape, and sexual battery.15
In the motion before this Court, Boeker seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Alternatively, Boeker seeks a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). In response, Plaintiff opposes Defendant's motion, arguing that she has sufficiently and specifically pled plausible causes of action adverse to Boeker.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the "court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."16 The Court may consider "the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice."17 "Tosurvive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"18 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.19 "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."20 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely "tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'"21 However, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."22 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."23 "Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not 'strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.'"24 On a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."25
"In order to prevail on a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy."26 Regarding the first element: "To establish a cause of action based on conspiracy a plaintiff must show that the defendants agreed to commit an illegal act."27 "Mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts, survive a motion to dismiss."28 "[M]ore than a blanket of accusation is necessary to support a § 1983 claim."29 Plaintiff must make "specific allegation[s] of fact tending to show a prior agreement has been made."30
Nevertheless, a Section 1983 conspiracy "claim need not [meet] a 'probability requirement at the pleading stage; [plausibility] simply calls for enough fact [s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.'"31 Plaintiff's "facts, when 'placed in a context . . . [must raise] a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.'"32
As to the second element, "[r]egardless of whether or not [a defendant's] actions alone actually caused a constitutional violation, liability can still be imposed on himthrough his alleged membership in the conspiracy."33 That is, "[a] conspiracy allegation under § 1983 allows a plaintiff to 'impose liability on all of the defendants without regard to who committed the particular act.'"34
"A conspiracy may be charged under section 1983 as the legal mechanism through which to impose liability on all of the defendants without regard to who committed the particular act, but 'a conspiracy claim is not actionable without an actual violation of section 1983.'"35 For example, "in a case alleging both Fourth Amendment violations and a § 1983 conspiracy, the proper order of review is first whether Plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation that is objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established Fourth Amendment law, and only if that is the case should the court then consider whether Plaintiffs have alleged a conspiracy."36 Thus, in Hale, the Fifth Circuit found that, because all of the alleged conspirators were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's First Amendment claim, the conspiracy claim was not actionable.37
The Court has previously held that Plaintiff has alleged a viable constitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause;38 thus, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to state a claim for a Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim.
Plaintiff has also asserted a civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2) and (3). "Section 1985 prohibits a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights."39 In order to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must allege the following: "(1) a conspiracy by thedefendants, (2) with a purpose of depriving the plaintiff of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the law, (3) a purposeful intent to discriminate, (4) action by the defendants under color of state law or authority, and (5) injury to the person or property of the plaintiff or his deprivation of a right or privilege as a citizen of the United States resulting from actions in furtherance of the conspiracy."40 Additionally, the plaintiff must assert "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."41
The district court for the Northern District of Texas explained how the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court have interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3):
The first clause of § 1985(2) "prohibits conspiracies to deter witnesses from attending court or testifying, punishing witnesses who have so attended or testified, or injure jurors." Bryant v. Military Dep't of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 687 n. 6 (5th Cir. 2010). The clause has been read as protecting any party, witness, or juror from intimidation regardless of any racial animus on the part of the defendant. Montoya, 614 F.3d at 149 (citing Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 723-27, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). The second clause of § 1985(2) "prohibits conspiracies to deny any citizen equal protection of the laws or injure a citizen for his efforts to ensure the rights of others to equal protection." Bryant, 597 F.3d at 687. Since the equal protection language in the second clause of § 1985(2) parallels the equal protection language in § 1985(3), the race or class-based animus...
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