LeFever v. Castellanos
| Decision Date | 04 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:20CV3066 |
| Parties | LUKE LEFEVER, Plaintiff, v. IVAN CASTELLANOS, Dawson County Deputy, in his official and individual capacities; JEROME KRAMER, Lincoln County Sheriff, in his official and individual capacities; DEPUTY ROLAND KRAMER, Chief Deputy, in his official and individual capacities; BRETT SCHMIDT, Deputy, in his official and individual capacities; CARLOS TREVINO, Nebraska State Patrol Trooper, in his individual capacity; and ELWOOD, Nebraska State Patrol Trooper Sgt., in his individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Plaintiff, Luke LeFever ("LeFever") a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution, filed three separate actions on June 11, 2020. The actions were consolidated on the court's own motion on June 15, 2020, as involving common questions of law or fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 42, and LeFever was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis with the obligation to pay only a single filing fee under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The court conducted an initial review of LeFever's three Complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and, in a Memorandum and Order entered on August 3, 2020 (Filing 7), concluded the Complaints were subject to preservice dismissal. However, on the court's own motion, LeFever was given leave to file a single amended complaint in this case. After obtaining a 90-day extension, LeFever timely filed his Amended Complaint (Filing 10) on November 23, 2020.
In granting LeFever leave to amend, the court warned him that an amended complaint would supersede, not supplement, his prior pleadings. (See Filing 7 at 25.) Accordingly, the court will review only the allegations of the Amended Complaint, and will not consider any additional allegations that may be contained within the three original Complaints.
LeFever alleges that on June 4, 2018, he had a roadside encounter with Deputy Ivan Castellanos of the Dawson County Sheriff's Office, and was searched with his consent. After being told he was not under arrest, LeFever began to walk away but was tased in the back by Deputy Castellanos. LeFever fell to the ground and was given repeated shocks, but was able to regain his feet, pull out the taser wires, and run away. Deputy Castellanos discharged his sidearm at the fleeing LeFever, but missed. Plaintiff alleges Deputy Castellanos then made radio reports in which he falsely claimed LeFever had weapons and there had been "shots fired." As a result of these allegedly false radio reports, LeFever claims other law enforcement officers pursued and apprehended him using deadly force. Those officers fired 68 rounds of ammunition into a vehicle LeFever was driving, and he was struck with 9 of these rounds.
LeFever alleges he wound up in a pasture, where the vehicle he was driving was intentionally T-boned by Trooper Carlos Trevino of the Nebraska State Patrol ("NSP"), who drove through a fence with his patrol truck. When LeFever's vehicle began moving again, Trooper Trevino and three officers from the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office, including Sheriff Jerome Kramer, Chief Deputy Roland Kramer, and Deputy Brett Schmidt, began firing their weapons at the vehicle. It is also alleged that Sergeant Elwood of the NSP later lied about calling Dawson County dispatch to confirm the "shots fired" report.
The court is required to conduct an initial review of "a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). On such initial review,the court must dismiss the complaint if it: "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(b). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) ().
"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ().
"A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that "if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006).
Liberally construing the allegations of LeFever's Amended Complaint, he is claiming Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution, and he is bringing suit under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, LeFever is asserting various tort claims under Nebraska law. Because LeFever does not allege that his citizenship lies outside of Nebraska, this court's ability to entertain the state-law claims cannot be predicated on § 1332, but instead must depend upon 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides that "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."1
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law. Id. at 50.
It is reasonable to infer from LeFever's allegations that all Defendants were acting under color of state law when they allegedly violated his constitutional rights, and all are sued in their individual capacities. The county law enforcement officers are also sued in their official capacities, which effectively makes Dawson County and Lincoln County parties to the action. See Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 923(8th Cir. 2007) ().
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality (or other local government unit) can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Id. at 691. "To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must first show that one of the municipality's officers violated her federal right." Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007)). "If that element is satisfied, then a plaintiff must establish the requisite degree of fault on the part of the municipality and a causal link between municipal policy and the alleged violation." Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1989)).
To prevail on a claim alleged against Dawson County or Lincoln County, LeFever must show that the constitutional violation resulted from (1) an official "policy," (2) an unofficial "custom," or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016). "Official policy involves 'a deliberate choice to follow a course of action ... made from among various alternatives' by an official who has the final authority to establish governmental policy." Jane Doe A By & Through Jane Doe B v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cty., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). "Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish municipal liability through an unofficial custom of the municipality by demonstrating '(1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the...
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