LeFevre v. Space Communications Co. (Spacecom)
| Decision Date | 20 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-2041,84-2041 |
| Citation | 771 F.2d 421 |
| Parties | Lonnie LeFEVRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SPACE COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (SPACECOM), Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Glenn B. Neumeyer and Richard C. Cauble, Las Cruces, N.M., for plaintiff-appellant.
Philip R. Higdon of Sutin, Thayer & Browne, Santa Fe, N.M., for defendant-appellee.
Before McKAY, LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), Tenth Circuit R. 10(e). The cause is therefore submitted without oral argument.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff's claim for intentional interference with plaintiff's employment contract.
Defendant Spacecom holds a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to operate a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System in New Mexico. TRW, plaintiff's employer, held a subcontract with Spacecom to assist it at the facility. TRW employed plaintiff at the site as a senior electronics technician. In November 1982, Spacecom directed TRW to bar plaintiff from the facility, citing plaintiff's alleged failure to follow security procedures as the reason for its order. As a result, plaintiff could no longer work for TRW at the site in New Mexico, and was transferred to another TRW project in California.
Plaintiff brought suit against Spacecom, alleging that the defendant had improperly interfered with his contract with TRW. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the company had demonstrated that its interference was privileged as a matter of law. Plaintiff makes two claims on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court applied the incorrect law in resolving the summary judgment motion. In addition, he argues that summary judgment was improper because the case involves disputed issues of material fact.
The trial court relied on Williams v. Ashcraft, 72 N.M. 120, 381 P.2d 55 (1963) and Wolf v. Perry, 65 N.M. 457, 339 P.2d 679 (1959), which hold that liability for interference with existing contractual relations may be imposed only where the interference was without justification or privilege. Plaintiff asserts that Williams and Wolf no longer state the law in New Mexico, and that the court should have applied the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 766 of whether the interference was "improper." However, while the New Mexico Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement test for interference with prospective contractual relations, M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 94 N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 (1980), Williams and Perry remain the law on the tort of interference with existing contracts. Speer v. Cimosz, 97 N.M. 602, 642 P.2d 205 (N.M.App.1982). As the trial court correctly stated, liability thus may not be imposed unless the interference was without justification or privilege. Williams, 381 P.2d at 56.
Plaintiff also asserts that the court improperly relied on the test for interference with prospective contracts set forth in M & M Rentals, 612 P.2d at 246, in deciding this existing contract case. The basis for this assertion is the court's statement that summary judgment was appropriate because plaintiff did not prove that Spacecom's sole motive was to harm the plaintiff. However, the reference to sole motive is proper in the context of a suit for interference with existing contractual relations. Williams made clear that a defense of privilege is not absolute, but may be defeated if the actor's sole motive in taking the otherwise privileged action was to harm the plaintiff. 381 P.2d at 57. Thus, the trial court found that defendant had established a privilege, and that the plaintiff had not made a showing of sole motive sufficient to overcome that privilege. The court applied the correct law in resolving the summary judgment motion.
The next issue is whether it was proper for the court to resolve this case on a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff asserts that motive and intent are essential elements to the cause of action, and preclude...
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...there is no genuine dispute as to material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See LeFevre v. Space Communications Co., 771 F.2d 421 (10th Cir.1985); Charczuk v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 771 F.2d 471 (10th Cir.1985); Weir v. The Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1......
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...and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990); accord LeFevre v. Space Comm. Co., 771 F.2d 421, 423 (10th Cir.1985). The Supreme Court has observed that "discredited testimony is not normally considered a sufficient basis for drawing a......
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