Leffler v. Smith
| Decision Date | 27 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1489,79-1489 |
| Citation | 388 So.2d 261 |
| Parties | Paul W. LEFFLER and Meredith Enterprises, Inc., Appellants, v. Earl M. SMITH and Ruth A. Smith, his wife et al., Appellees. /T4-640. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Phillip H. Logan of Shinholser, Logan & Moncrief, Sanford, for appellant Leffler.
Fred M. Johnson and Baya Harrison, III, of Fuller & Johnson, P. A., Tallahassee, for appellant Meredith Enterprises, Inc.
William M. Rowland, Jr., of Rowland, Bowen, Thomas, Bruggeman & Brown, P. A., Orlando, for appellees.
Meredith Enterprises, Inc., and Paul Leffler appeal from a final judgment in favor of the Smiths, as representatives of a class of property owners, declaring the existence of a recreational easement in favor of the property owners over two lots in Meredith Manor, and ordering Meredith Enterprises and the Lefflers to remove fences placed on those lots and enjoining their interference with the property owners' recreational easement in the future.
Inez Meredith originally owned a large parcel of land in Seminole County. In 1953 she caused a portion of the land to be platted as the Gene Gables Section of Meredith Manor. Block "E" consisted of six lots on Lake Brantley. She conveyed 26 of the 29 lots platted to Meredith Enterprises. The 1953 deed contained the following critical language:
5. All of Lot 1, Block "E", is reserved for the exclusive use of resident property owners of record as a park and bathing beach.
In 1954, Inez Meredith platted an additional portion of her land, 73 lots recorded as Nob Hill Section, Meredith Manor. Lot 15, Block "A", fronts Lake Rena. Thereafter, Inez Meredith conveyed to Meredith Enterprises all of the lots in the Nob Hill Section. Between 1954 and 1976, Meredith Enterprises sold many of the lots in the Gene Gables and Nob Hill Sections of Meredith Manor. In approximately fifty-one of those deeds there is language to the effect that the grantees therein are to have the use and privilege of all "resident only parks and beaches" or language of similar import. The trial court found that in its dealings and negotiations with potential purchasers, Meredith Enterprises held out and represented to potential purchasers that Lot 1, Block "E", of the Gene Gables Section (the Lake Brantley lot) and Lot 15, Block "A", of the Nob Hill Section (the Lake Rena lot) were set aside for the use of residents of the development: the Lake Brantley lot for park and bathing use, the Lake Rena lot for boat ramp use. The Meredith Manor property owners used Lot 1, Block "E" on Lake Brantley as a park and bathing beach until 1977. In August of 1976, Meredith Enterprises sold to defendant Leffler all of Lot 1, Block "E", except the south 50 feet. In the spring or summer of 1977, the Lefflers enclosed their portion of the lot with a fence. In addition, the residents of Meredith Manor used Lot 15, Block "A", on Lake Rena until Meredith Enterprises erected a fence in 1977.
The trial court found that Inez Meredith intended to give to the resident property owners of the Gene Gables Section of Meredith Manor the use of Lot 1, Block "E", as a park and bathing beach. The trial court found that Meredith Enterprises ratified the intent of Inez Meredith when it placed language in many deeds to property owners of the Gene Gables Section of Meredith Manor referring to the earlier grant of the park and beach areas to resident property owners. In addition, the trial court found that Meredith Enterprises gave the property owners the use of Lot 15, Block "A", as well. The trial court held that the grantor's intent would prevail over the ancient common-law rule that a reservation in a third party, not a party to a deed, is invalid.
As to Lot 1 on Lake Brantley, appellants argue that the reservation in the 1953 deed was invalid under the common-law rule that prohibits a reservation in favor of a stranger to a deed. The common law of England down to the 4th day of July, 1776, is in force in this state unless inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state. § 2.01, Fla.Stat. (1979). However, it is not necessary now to determine the continued vitality of this ancient rule. Cf. Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 1 So.2d 480 (1941).
We uphold the result reached by the trial court, on the ground that appellants, Meredith Enterprises, and its successor in interest, Leffler, are estopped from questioning the validity of the reservation.
Legal estoppel or estoppel by deed is defined as a bar which precludes a party to a deed and his privies from asserting as against others and their privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted therein.
Cook v. Katiba, 190 So.2d 309, 311-312 (Fla.1966).
In Dade County v. Little, 115 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), the court applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed to a conveyance containing a reservation of a right of way to the state in a deed from a drainage district. The court held that the present landowners were estopped from claiming the reservation was ineffective where the deed was of record at the time the present landowners received conveyance of the land. The court cited the general rule from 31 C.J.S., Estoppel § 38(f):
The grantee in a deed will be concluded by recitals therein limiting the quantity or extent of the interest conveyed and making reservations in favor of the grantor or third person. (emphasis added).
Dade County v. Little, 115 So.2d at 22.
The court also cited 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel § 21:
Estoppel of the grantee of a deed, viewed generally, is of the nature of equitable estoppel rather than technical estoppel by deed, since the estoppel is not predicated primarily on the execution of a formal written instrument which cannot be denied or rebutted, but rather on the inability of a person, in the eyes of the law, to acquiesce in, and enjoy the benefits of a transaction and at the same time reject the accompanying burdens. A person cannot claim under an instrument without confirming it. He must found his claim on the whole, and cannot adopt that feature or operation which makes in his favor, and at the same time repudiate or contradict another which is counter or adverse to it.
Appellant Leffler suggests that there was not sufficient evidence to put him on notice that the plaintiffs were claiming an easement on his property. However, under Florida's recording act, the...
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