Lefler v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11cv220-LAB (POR) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | DAVID LYLE LEFLER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JERRY CONRAD, Agent, and OTHER UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, Defendant. |
Plaintiff David Lefler, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action, filed a verified complaint seeking damages in connection with the seizure of his motor home by federal authorities.
Lefler entered the United States at the Andrade, California port of entry on November 27, 2005, driving his motor home. U.S. customs officials at the port questioned him, searched his vehicle, and found 556.97 pounds of marijuana concealed in it. Officials arrested him and confiscated both the marijuana and the vehicle. He later pleaded guilty to importing the marijuana, in case 05cr2313, United States v. Lefler. He was held in custody from the time of his arrest until his sentence was completed, on July 16, 2010. Beginning in August of 2009, he attempted to file a series of motions in the criminal docket seekingreturn of his motor home. The Court ultimately rejected his motion for filing, but on appeal the Ninth Circuit held it should have been treated as a civil complaint. Following remand, the Court therefore opened a civil docket, granted Lefler leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), and directed him to file a complaint. On May 19, 2011, he filed his verified complaint.
Because Lefler is proceeding IFP, the Court is required to screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and to dismiss it to the extent it fails to state a claim. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (); see also id. at 1129 ().
In conducting the screening, the Court applies the same standard as for motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court therefore accepts as true all allegations of material fact and construes those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). "However, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).
The complaint seeks relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 et seq.), and under a Bivens theory, for violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendment rights. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This is based solely on Lefler's claim that the federal agents unreasonably searched and seized his motor home and wouldn't give it back to him. The Court is not required to, and does not, accept Lefler's conclusory allegation that U.S. officials' search and seizure his vehicle was unreasonable.
Lefler's own allegations, under penalty of perjury, establish that he used the motor home to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States. The motor home therefore fits easily into the forfeiture provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), and under § 881(b) is subject to seizure in the manner set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 981(b). Under § 981(b)(2), no warrant is required forthe seizure and forfeiture if it is made pursuant to a lawful arrest. Again, Lefler's own allegations establish beyond doubt the motor home was seized pursuant to an arrest. Under § 881(c), the motor home remains in the custody of the Attorney General until disposed of as provided under law; it is not subject to being returned to Lefler.
Before Lefler's property was actually forfeited (as opposed to merely seized), both the forfeiture statutes and due process required that he be given notice and an opportunity to be heard, so that he could contest the forfeiture. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 163-64, 167 (2002) (). Because the value of the motor home was well under $500,000, § 1607(a) required both notice by publication, and written notice sent to Lefler. Lefler alleges he never received notice of the forfeiture or an opportunity to contest it. But all that is required both statutorily and constitutionally is that the notice be sent, not that Lefler have actually received it. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170 and n.5. No additional efforts to give notice were required merely because Lefler was in custody at the time. Id.
Even if Lefler could show notice was never sent, and that he would have contested the forfeiture if it had been sent, a Bivens action would not lie because Lefler has a remedy under § 983(e). See King v. D.E.A., 2009 WL 6849443, slip op. at *1 (D.S.C., Feb. 3, 2009) (); Bermudez v. City of N.Y. Police Dept., 2008 WL 3397919 at *2 n.6 (); North Carolina ex rel. Haywood v. Barrington, 256 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (M.D.N.C., 2003) (). See also 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(5) ()
There is no reason, however, to allow Lefler to amend his complaint so as to transform it into a § 983(e) motion, because such a motion would fail. Lefler knew, or at the very least, had reason to know of the seizure within a sufficient time to file a timely claim. See § 983(e)(1)(B) () Lefler immediately knew of the motor home's seizure, however. Most obviously, he knew because the seizure happened in his presence, when he was arrested. (See Compl., ¶ 7 () See In re Sowell, 2009 WL 799570, slip op. at *3 (E.D.Mich., Mar. 19, 2009) (citing cases for the principle that § 983(e)(1)(B)'s requirement cannot be met when claimants were present at the time of the seizure). Second, the financial affidavit Lefler signed and filed in his criminal case the day...
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