Legette v. National RR Passenger Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 76-2448. |
| Citation | 478 F. Supp. 1069 |
| Parties | E. Moses LEGETTE v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION a/k/a AMTRAK. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Joseph Smuckler, Meyer, Lasch, Hankin & Poul, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Richard L. Goerwitz, Jr., Swartz, Campbell & Detweiler, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
This action is before the Court on plaintiff's post trial motion for a new trial. At the conclusion of an eight day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding: (1) negligence on the part of defendant (AMTRAK); (2) contributory negligence of 55% on the part of plaintiff (LEGETTE); and (3) total damages in the amount of $40,000. Accordingly, judgment was entered. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a post trial motion for a new trial. A hearing was held to determine the merits of the motion.
I have decided to deny plaintiff's motion for a new trial. "Where, as here, the case turns on controverted facts and the credibility of witnesses, the case is peculiarly one for the jury." Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653, 67 S.Ct. 598, 600, 91 L.Ed. 572 (1947). I hold that the evidence presented at trial raised substantial questions of fact, thus making the case "peculiarly one for the jury." Since there was a reasonable basis for the verdict which the jury returned, I will not disturb their findings.
Briefly, the facts of this case1 stated in a light most favorable to the verdict winner2 are as follows: Plaintiff, a trackman for the defendant railroad at the time of the accident, was working as part of a track crew replacing railroad ties. On June 17, 1976, at approximately noon, Mr. Legette stopped his work and walked down the tracks to get a drink of water. The water container was located on or behind defendant's tie handler machine. After obtaining his drink, and while returning to his work, Mr. Legette was struck and injured by the swinging boom of the tie handler machine. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital, where he was x-rayed, treated and discharged. In addition, plaintiff has since undergone additional medical treatment for his injuries.
Plaintiff has advanced the following grounds by way of brief and oral argument in support of his motion for a new trial:
Motions for a new trial require the exercise of discretion by the Court, whose "duty is essentially to see that there is no miscarriage of justice." 6A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 59.085 at 59-160 (footnote omitted) (2d ed. 1974); Thomas v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471, 474-75 (3d Cir. 1973); Morgan v. Bucks Assoc., 428 F.Supp. 546, 548 (E.D.Pa.1977). However, "when a party calls into question the collective wisdom of the jury, the Court must exercise its power to grant a new trial circumspectly so as not to unduly disregard the limits of its own function and interfere in that which is peculiarly within the province of the jury." Silhol v. Levengood, 55 F.R.D. 304 (E.D.Pa.1972) (emphasis added). Thus, a jury's verdict may be set aside only if manifest injustice will result if it were allowed to stand. A court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury merely because the court would have reached a different conclusion. Having these principles in mind, I now direct my discussion to plaintiff's assertions.
Plaintiff's ground no. (1) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's determination of gross damages. Plaintiff's ground no. (2) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's determination of the degree to which plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Since both of these challenges are to the sufficiency of the evidence, I shall consider them together.
In deciding a motion for a new trial based on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. 6A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 59.086 at XX-XXX-XX (2d ed. 1974). "It is the duty of the Court to be certain that the verdict was not influenced by partiality or prejudice and that there is no miscarriage of justice." University Marketing & Consulting, Inc. v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 413 F.Supp. 1250, 1262 (E.D.Pa.1976).
Where a party is questioning the decision of a jury as to the amount of damages awarded, the Court must exercise its sound discretion so as not to interfere with the fact finding functions of the jury. Determination of the degree of contributory negligence of a party is a matter for the jury. It is the duty of "the jury to measure the risks involved, and to determine the extent, if any, to which the party was contributorily negligent." McGlothan v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 170 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1948).
This Court may only interfere with a jury verdict when, "considering the elements involved, it is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court." Silhol v. Levengood, 55 F.R.D. 304, 305 (E.D.Pa.1972) (emphasis in original); Peterson v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 296 F.Supp. 8 (E.D.Pa. 1969). In applying these principles to the facts of the case sub judice, it is apparent to this Court, in accordance with legal standards and sound discretion, that the findings of the jury should not be disturbed. Hard v. Stevens, 65 F.R.D. 637 (E.D.Pa. 1975).
Plaintiff offered evidence that some of his injuries persisted up to the time of the trial and that he was unable to return to his former work. (N.T. 1-55; 1-57). However, there was conflicting expert medical testimony as to the actual extent of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff's doctor testified that he diagnosed muscle spasms of the back and prescribed a back brace and therapy. (N.T. 2-137; 2-93, 97; 1-45, 48). However, defendant's medical witnesses testified that they found low back pain and administered a myelogram, a diagnostic test, which was negative. (N.T. 4-46, 47). In addition, one of defendant's witnesses also testified that plaintiff could have returned to work at any time. (N.T. 3-41, 42, 49).
Defendant also introduced testimony as to the contributory negligence of Mr. Legette. Testimony elicited at trial indicated other routes that plaintiff could have taken back to his work after getting his drink of water. (N.T. 4-23). Defendant offered testimony to the effect that plaintiff, as a trackman, had the duty himself to avoid the tie handler machine, as opposed to the machine operator having a duty to look out for the workers. (N.T. 4-67). Furthermore, the defendant maintained that the accident could not possibly have occurred in the manner alleged by plaintiff. (N.T. 4-66). The issues raised by this conflicting testimony presented questions of fact for the jury and I will not circumvent their findings.
On the issue of damages, plaintiff sets forth in his brief in support of his motion for a new trial, that he incurred, at the time of trial, $33,000 in lost wages and benefits. Plaintiff's Brief at 15. The existence and extent of damages are peculiarly questions of fact and hence great deference is due the determination of the factfinder. Mainelli v. Haberstroh, 237 F.Supp. 190, 192 (M.D.Pa.1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1965).
The jury returned a damage award of $40,000, which, when reduced by 55%, the degree to which the jury found the plaintiff contributorily negligent, was neither "shocking to the conscience" of the Court, nor so excessively low as to be inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial.
The evidence here was clearly conflicting. Therefore, it is the duty of the jury, after listening to all the testimony, to determine which facts it believes to be correct. "The credibility of witnesses is peculiarly for the jury and the Court cannot grant a new trial merely because the evidence was sharply in conflict." University Marketing & Consulting, Inc. v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., supra, 413 F.Supp. at 1262. Even plaintiff has acknowledged that the "jury had the right to accept the opinions of the various physicians which were expressed to them." Plaintiff's Brief at 11. I conclude that the jury did just that.
This Court will not interfere with the decision of the jury which, as is its particular function, made a determination of the damages due plaintiff and the degree to which plaintiff was contributorily negligent, for to do so would be a "denigration of the jury system." Mainelli v. Haberstroh, 237 F.Supp. 190, 192 (M.D.Pa.1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1965). For the foregoing reason, I find that plaintiff's grounds number (1) and (2) do not warrant ordering a new trial.
Plaintiff asserts in ground number (3) that the issue of contributory negligence was not raised at trial and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S. A.
...were accorded jury trials despite the sovereign character of the owner of the defendant corporation. 6 Legette v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 478 F.Supp. 1069 (E.D.Pa.1979) (U.S.); Washington v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 477 F.Supp. 1134 (D.D.C.1979) (U.S.); see also MacDona......
-
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., Civ. A. No. 76-3952.
...90 F.R.D. 134 (E.D.Pa.1981); Larsen v. International Business Mach. Corp., 87 F.R.D. 602 (E.D.Pa.1980); Legette v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 478 F.Supp. 1069 (E.D.Pa.1979). However, "the jury's verdict may be set aside only if manifest injustice will result if it were allowed to stand.......