Legg v. Mayor, Counsellor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis

Decision Date12 March 1875
Citation42 Md. 203
PartiesJAMES LEGG, WILLIAM T. IGLEHART AND GEORGE WELLS, JR. v. THE MAYOR, COUNSELLOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF ANNAPOLIS.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

The appellees by their petition, filed on the 15th of June, 1874 represented that they were the corporate officers of the City of Annapolis, a city incorporated in 1708--that the charter of the city had been amended from time to time; the last time by the Act of 1870, ch. 202, and that under that charter the petitioners and their predecessors had exercised the rights and powers and performed the duties of a municipal corporation; and in the exercise of such powers they had appointed a police force which was then in the discharge of its duties.

The petitioners further represented that the Governor of Maryland had undertaken to appoint the appellants, under the title of "The Board of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City," claiming the right so to do under a pretended law, entitled "An Act to add sub-sections to Article II of the Code of Public Local Laws, title Anne Arundel County sub-title Annapolis, to provide a Board of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City," chapter 421, which purports to have been approved by the Governor on the 11th of April, 1874, in the presence of the Speaker of the House of Delegatcs, and the President of the Senate; and the petitioners charged that said pretended law was not a law the same never having been passed or approved as required by the Constitution of the State of Maryland, to give validity thereto.

They charged that a bill, having for its object the appointment of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City, was introduced in the House of Delegates, at the late session of the General Assembly of 1874, and was passed by the House of Delegates on the 30th of March, 1874, and sent to the Senate; that it was reported from a committee of the Senate, on the 3rd of April 1874, to the Senate, but that on or about the 6th of April 1874, before any vote had been taken on said bill by the Senate, it was lost, or mislaid or purloined, and removed from the Senate Chamber, and was never afterwards before the Senate for its action. That after the removal of the said bill had been discovered, a draft of another bill for the appointment of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City was prepared, and upon the said draft of a bill entries were made, professing to be in conformity with the action of the House of Delegates upon the bill which had been lost or mislaid, &c., and also entries professing to be in conformity with the action of the Senate; that the said draft thus prepared, was presented to the Senate, and the Senate afterwards passed the same by yeas and nays; that the said draft of a bill thus passed by the Senate, was not the bill which had been passed by the House of Delegates, but was different in fact and in its contents therefrom; and that the bill, or draft of a bill, thus passed by the Senate alone, was afterwards submitted to the Governor, and was that which it was alleged was approved by him on the 11th of April, 1874.

They further charged that the bill which as aforesaid passed the House of Delegates, was different in many particulars from that which passed the Senate, that the said House bill never passed the Senate, and never was approved by the Governor, and that neither the one nor the other of said bills, or drafts of bills, nor any other bill having reference to the appointment of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City, passed both the Senate and the House of Delegates, at its recent session, and therefore that the General Assembly of the State of Maryland passed no bill conferring or attempting to confer the power of appointment so as aforesaid claimed to have been exercised by the Governor. The petitioners filed an authenticated copy of the pretended law, so as aforesaid signed by the Governor, and the original draft of a law, which passed the House of Delegates and was, as heretofore charged, lost or mislaid, &c., which original draft of the bill in the envelope now surrounding the same and directed to the Counsellor of the City of Annapolis was received by him through the postoffice of Annapolis, on the 14th of May, 1874, but from what source the same was received, was wholly unknown to the petitioners.

The petitioners further charged that the said draft of a bill so substituted in and passed by the Senate of Maryland, was not signed by the Governor of Maryland on the 11th of April, 1874, in the presence of the Speaker of the House of Delegates, and the President of the Senate, as was endorsed thereon; and the said draft of a bill was not signed by the Governor, "in the presence of the presiding officers and chief clerks of the Senate and House of Delegates," as required by the provisions of section 30, of Article 3 of the Constitution of the State of Maryland. They also charged that the said draft of a bill so substituted in and passed by the Senate, was not signed at all by the Governor, either in or out of the presence of said officers, until Tuesday, the 14th of April, 1874, and after the time limited by the Constitution of the State of Maryland, for the signing and approving by the Governor of bills passed by the General Assembly of Maryland, had expired. And they further charged that the signature and approval of the Governor endorsed upon said draft of a bill could not, under the circumstances before mentioned, constitute the same a law or give any validity thereto, even if the same had been passed by the General Assembly of Maryland, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution of this State. And further, that the pretended law was unconstitutional also, in that it embraced two or more subjects not described in its title.

The petitioners charged that by "sub-section A," of the pretended law, it was provided as follows: "On the first Monday of May, 1874, the Governor of the State shall appoint three persons, residents of the City of Annapolis, one for two years, one for four years, and one for six years, to serve without compensation as a Board of Police Commissioners for said city," &c. And they believed that it was under the authority, intended to be conveyed and granted by this sub-section, that the Governor of the State claims to have acted in making the appointments aforesaid, but the petitioners averred that he did not make them on the said first day of May, but that in fact said appointments were not made until the 11th of June, 1874.

And the petitioners insisted that the designation of the time named in the said sub-section was imperative, and was intended as a limitation upon the power of the Governor in making said appointments, for one reason, among others, because the city tax levy was usually made shortly after the first day of May in each year, and it was expedient that the Corporation of Annapolis should know before-hand what sum they would be required to levy upon the property in said city to meet the probable expense of police, among other charges, for the year. And that the time having passed at which the Governor was required to make said appointments, if at all, he had, at the time of said appointments, no power in the premises to make the same, even if the said pretended law had been passed by the General Assembly, and signed and approved by the Governor in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution of Maryland.

The petitioners also charged, that the appellants had accepted the appointments so attempted to be conferred on them as aforesaid, or intended to accept the same, and had announced their purpose and intention, and undoubtedly proposed and designed, unless restrained from so doing, to exercise all and singular the powers pretended to be conferred on them as a Board of Police Commissioners by said pretended law.

The petitioners thereupon prayed the Court to lay a rule upon the appellants requiring them to show cause, within a time to be specified, why a writ of mandamus should not issue, and that upon the return of the said rule, a writ of mandamus might issue, commanding the said appellants to surcease and desist from exercising, or assuming to exercise in any manner, any power or authority, or jurisdiction under the said pretended Act of 1874, ch. 421, by the appointment of police or otherwise; and might be further commanded to abstain from interfering or attempting to interfere with the police and Police Department established by the petitioners under their charter and ordinances, and from hindering, obstructing, resisting or opposing the executive officers of said city, in the exercise of their lawful powers, and in the discharge of their official duties.

An order was passed requiring the appellants to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue as prayed, on or before the 25th of June, instant, & c.

On the 25th of June the appellants filed their answer, by which they admitted that the petitioners were the corporate officers of the City of Annapolis, and had heretofore exercised the rights claimed in the first part of their petition.

They also admitted that the respondents had been appointed the Board of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City by the Governor of the State, under the Act of 1874, ch. 421, which is the only law in force in reference to the police of the City of Annapolis.

As to sundry of the averments of the petition, the respondents charged that they could not lawfully be enquired of by the Court in this proceeding.

The respondents denied the averment in the petition that said law was unconstitutional, in that it embraced two or more subjects.

As to so much of the petition as charged that the law requiring the Governor to appoint, on the first...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • Philip Morris v. Angeletti
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 16 d2 Maio d2 2000
    ...to supply a remedy where, for the want of a specific one, there would otherwise be a failure of justice. Id. at 449; accord Legg v. Annapolis, 42 Md. 203, 226 (1875). Yet, we do recognize that although mandamus allows a court to afford relief where otherwise none would be forthcoming, the c......
  • Rash Below v. Benjamin B. Allen, Complainant Below. Howard D. Ross, Below v. Charles M. Allmond, Complainant Below
    • United States
    • Delaware Superior Court
    • 7 d2 Junho d2 1910
    ... ... D. 1909), to ... "The Council" of The Mayor and Council of ... Wilmington, commanding the ... review the proceedings of said City Council, if it has the ... power to do so under ... R. R. Co., 41 Md. 446; Legg ... vs. Annapolis, 42 Md. 203; Strauss vs ... ...
  • Union Bank of Richmond v. Commissioners of Town of Oxford
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 17 d2 Novembro d2 1896
    ...537, 20 S.W. 901. Louisiana: Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 223, 12 So. 1. Maryland: Berry v. Railroad Co., 41 Md. 446; Legg v. Mayor, etc., 42 Md. 203. Southworth v. Railroad Co., 2 Mich. 287; Green v. Graves, 1 Doug. 351; People v. Township Board of La Grange, 2 Mich. 191; People ......
  • Redwood v. Lane
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 18 d5 Novembro d5 1949
    ...etc., of City of Annapolis v. Harwood, supra; Thrift v. Towers, supra; Berry v. Baltimore & Drum Point R. Co., supra; Legg v. Mayor, etc., of City of Annapolis, supra; quotes from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (Sixth Edition), from Black's Constitutional Law, (Third Edition) and discu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT