Leggatt v. Prideaux

• Decision Date: 20 May 1895
• Citation: Leggatt v. Prideaux, 16 Mont. 205, 40 P. 377 (Mont. 1895)
• Parties: LEGGATT v. PRIDEAUX.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

40 P. 377

16 Mont. 205

LEGGATT v. PRIDEAUX.

Supreme Court of Montana

May 20, 1895

Appeal from district court, Beaverhead county; Frank Showers, Judge.

Action by John B. Leggatt against Henry Prideaux. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

W. S Barbour and Robt. B. Smith, for appellant.

Cullen & Toole, for respondent.

HUNT J. (after stating the facts).

The first question presented is whether a justice of the peace who collects fees exceeding those allowed him by law, is liable in a civil action for a penalty of 10 times the amount of such fees, without regard to any corrupt motive or intent in collecting them. The facts of this case show an admitted violation of the letter of the law, and a prima facie liability under its provisions. Lydick v. Palmquist (Neb.) 47 N.W. 918. That the justice of the peace believed he had a legal right to charge the fees he did, and acted in good faith in taxing and collecting the fees constitute no defense. It would be most dangerous to the welfare of society if an officer elected to administer the law could violate it to his own pecuniary advantage, and escape the consequences of his act by pleading ignorance of the statute he had violated. That ignorance of the law is no excuse is a postulate of law, but, unless the maxim is upheld, there would be innumerable problems presented to courts, and he who knew the least might fare the best; or, as is said by the supreme court of California (People v O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 P. 45) "the denser the ignorance the greater would be the exemption from liability." The case is not one where there was a mistake of fact. The court of appeals of New York, in Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299, say: "Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. The rule on the subject appears to be that in acts mala in see the intent governs, but in those mala prohibit the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?" People v Brooks, 1 Denio, 457; Beckham v. Nacke, 56 Mo. 546; Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6; Carr v. Trainor, 36 Ill. App, 587; Roberge v. Burnham, 124 Mass. 277; People v. Monk (Utah) 28 P. 1115. The receiving of the illegal fees is the gist of the wrong under the statute, and, when such fees are deliberately accepted, the law is violated, and the liability attaches. No less eminent a judge than Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania, in an early case (Coates v. Wallace, 17 Serg. & R. 75), wherein a justice of the peace was sued for a penalty in having exacted illegal fees, wrote as follows: "The penalty imposed by this act may be incurred by exacting fees which are supposed at the times to be legally demandable. By the very words of the prohibitory clause, the taking is the gist of the offense. Ignorance of the law will not excuse in any case; and this principle is applicable, and with irresistible force, to the case of an officer selected for his capacity, and in whom ignorance is unpardonable. The very acceptance of the office carries with it an assertion of a sufficient share of intelligence to enable the party to follow a guide provided for him with an unusual attention to clearness and precision. On any other principle a conviction would seldom take place, even in cases of the most flagrant abuse, for pretexts would never be wanting. Sound policy, therefore, requires that the officer should be held to act at his peril; and we are of opinion that the absence of a corrupt motive, or the existence of an agreement by the party injured, furnishes no justification for doing what the law forbids." The case of State v. Gardner, 5 Nev. 312, relied upon by respondent, was a criminal action, where the defendant, who confessedly bad no criminal intent, was indicted and convicted of a felony in violating a law for improperly issuing licenses. A majority of the court held that a criminal intent was a necessary ingredient of the offense charged, which was a felony, not a misdemeanor. And the opinion, when scrutinized, is based upon the ground that in considering the fearful consequences imposed if a mere violation of the letter of law would necessitate a conviction, it was impossible to believe that the general rules of the criminal law requiring an evil intent were to be ignored. The case therefore differs from the one at bar. We note, too, that the Nevada ruling is not generally approved of. The court of appeals of New York, in criticizing the opinion, say: "It is evident that a majority of the court struggled to relieve the defendant from a harsh punishment for a comparatively innocent act." Gardner v. People, supra. The supreme court of California also decline to follow it. People v. O'Brien, supra.

The defense of the silence of the appellant, Leggatt, in not informing respondent of the fact that his fees as justice were excessive, cannot obtain. The very statement of the proposition that an unsuccessful litigant is bound to advise the...