Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass'n, Inc.
Decision Date | 04 April 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 28495,28495 |
Parties | James A. LEGGETT et al. v. MACON BAPTIST ASSOCIATION, INC. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., H. Perry Michael, Richard L. Chambers, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, Sell, Comer & Popper, E. S. Sell, Jr., Macon, for appellants.
Mincey & Kenmore, David L. Mincey, Sylvia G. Haywood, David L. Mincey, Jr., Macon, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
The controlling issue to be decided in this case is whether the real property owned and used by the Macon Baptist Association, Inc., is a 'place of religious worship,' as that term is used in the Georgia Constitution and implementing statute, so as to exempt the Association from the payment of ad valorem taxes. The trial court determined, on motion for summary judgment, that the Association is exempt, and the taxing authorities have now brought that judgment here for review.
Article VII, Sec. I, Par. IV of the 1945 Constitution of Georgia (Code Ann. § 2-5404) authorizes the General Assembly to exempt from taxation 'places of religious worship or burial and all property owned by religious groups used only for residential purposes and from which no income is derived . . . all intangible personal property owned or irrevocably held in trust for the exclusive benefit of religious . . . institutions, no part of the net profit from the operation of which can inure to the benefit of any private person.' (Emphasis supplied.) The implementing statute found in Code Ann. § 92-201 uses the same language to exempt property of a religious institution from ad valorem taxation although neither specifically defines 'places of religious worship,' the provision under which the tax exemption is claimed in the present case. These broad provisions have been interpreted generally to mean, however, that, 'if the property is used primarily for either profit or purposes other than the operation of the institution, it is not exempt from taxes.' Church of God v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 662, 119 S.E.2d 11, 13. We, therefore, draw from the Dalton decision the general rule that, in applying the exemption authorized by basic Georgia law to the facts in the individual case, we must look to the use of the property, not merely its ownership, and we must also look to the primary use of the property to determine whether it is exempt from taxation. In addition, we are mindful, in applying these principles, that all tax exemptions are to be strictly construed since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. Brandywine Townhouses, Inc. v. Joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors, 231 Ga. 585, 203 S.E.2d 222.
It is from this background that we proceed to the specific issue presented. Is the primary use of this property shown to be as a place of religious worship? The facts are not disputed and the trial court's clear and well-stated findings show the following:
' The sign outside the building says,
We have said we have no authoritative definition of the words 'places of religious worship' under the law of Georgia. The phrase itself appeared the Georgia Constitution of 1877, but the debates of the constitutional convention thereon shed no light upon the framers' intended meaning of these words, and the subsequent inclusion of the same provision in later Constitutions similarly added no illumination to their meaning. Prior decisions of the two appellate courts of our State are helpful but also do not provide a specific definition of 'places of religious worship.' In Amorous v. State, 1 Ga.App. 313, 316, 57 S.E. 999, 1001, the Court of Appeals said (with reference to a criminal statute making it a misdemeanor to carry a weapon to a place of public worship)...
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