Legler et al. v. Legler

Decision Date08 November 1949
Citation187 Or. 273,211 P.2d 233
PartiesLEGLER ET AL. <I>v.</I> LEGLER
CourtOregon Supreme Court

7. A grantor, by availing himself of statute dealing with an estate in entirety, and by signing a deed calling for only half the fee, can create an estate whereby, at the time of his death, his widow will acquire the entire fee, and before death, husband and wife, being in legal contemplation one, hold title as a whole and not by moieties. O.C.L.A. § 63-210.

Deeds — Competency — Grantor — Deed — Will

8. A grantor is required to possess greater competency in executing a deed than a testator is required to possess in executing a will.

Deeds — "Mental capacity" — Test

9. The test of "mental capacity" to execute a deed lies in capacity to understand the nature of the act and to apprehend its consequences, and one possessing such capacity may execute a valid deed, though mentally weak or infirm, in absence of attendant circumstances of an inequitable character, though one lacking such capacity may not execute a valid deed, even though he is not totally bereft of understanding.

See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Mental Capacity".

Deeds — Mental capacity — Date of execution and delivery

10. The mental capacity of a grantor to execute a deed should be measured as of date of the execution and delivery of the deed.

Deeds — Presumption of undue influence or fraud

11. Where the grantee has maintained intimate relations with the grantor, or has drafted or advised the terms of the deed, a presumption of undue influence or fraud on part of the grantee may arise under certain circumstances.

Trusts — Property — Transferred — Fraud, duress, undue influence — Constructive trust

12. Where owner of property transfers it because induced by fraud, duress or undue influence of the transferee, the transferee holds the property on a constructive trust for the transferor.

Gifts — Undue influence — Burden of proof — Fiduciary relationship

13. Ordinarily, burden of proving undue influence rests on party alleging it, but where a fiduciary relationship exists between donor and donee, there is a presumption of undue influence, and donee must produce evidence sufficient to establish that gift was free and voluntary act of donor and that transaction was fair and equitable.

Deeds — Gifts — Confidential or fiducial relationship — Conveyance set aside — Grantee — Transaction fair and without fraud or undue influence

15. When a confidential or fiducial relationship exists, and donee or grantee is supposed to exercise an unusual and commanding influence over grantor, courts will set aside conveyance unless grantee can show that transaction was fair and without fraud or undue influence.

Deeds — Undue influence — Incompetent

15. Evidence established that when 88 year old grantor who was suffering from paralysis executed a deed three months before his death, creating an estate in entirety between himself and wife, to exclusion of his children by a former marriage, he was incompetent, and that undue influence was exercised on him, warranting cancellation of deed. O.C.L.A. § 63-210.

Costs — Expert medical witness fees

16. In action for cancellation of deed, on ground that grantor was incompetent and that undue influence was exercised, successful plaintiffs were not entitled to an extra allowance of $50 each for their expert medical witnesses. O.C.L.A. §§ 10-906, 87-962.

                  See 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 54
                

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.

D.N. MACKAY, Judge.

B.G. Skulason, of Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.

Lloyd V. Weiser, of Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was C.C. Hall, of Portland.

Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, ROSSMAN, BAILEY and HAY, Justices.

George A. Legler and others brought suit against Vernie K. Legler for cancellation of a deed, on ground that grantor was mentally incompetent at time of execution of deed to defendant, and that defendant had exercised undue influence.

The Circuit Court of Multnomah County, D.N. Mackay, J., rendered a decree cancelling the deed and granting the plaintiffs extra allowance of $50 for each of its expert medical witnesses, and the defendant appealed.

The Supreme Court, Rossman, J., affirmed the decree after eliminating therefrom the allowance of extra compensation for expert medical witnesses, holding that evidence established that grantor was mentally incompetent at time of execution of deed and that deed was induced by undue influence.

ROSSMAN, J.

This is an appeal by Vernie K. Legler, one of the defendants, from a decree of the Circuit Court which cancelled a deed that her husband, George Legler signed February 6, 1947, three months prior to his death, and which conveyed to her a half interest in a city lot which we shall later describe. Immediately prior to the delivery of the deed, George Legler was the sole owner of the lot. The deed, which evidently was patterned upon the provisions of § 63-210, O.C.L.A., expressed a purpose to create an estate in entirety between husband and wife. We may hereafter refer to Vernie K. Legler as the appellant and to her deceased husband as Mr. Legler. The latter died testate May 5, 1947, at the age of 88 years. The attacked decree held that Mr. Legler, at the time of signing the deed, was incompetent and the victim of undue influence. It cancelled the deed.

The plaintiffs, who are now the respondents, are three in number. One of them, Margaret Legler Anderson, was the daughter of Mr. Legler. The other two, George A. and Fred W. Legler, were his sons.

The complaint alleges that when Mr. Legler signed the deed he was "of the age of approximately ninety years, and was unsound of mind to such an extent as to be wholly incapable of transacting his own business, and never to the day of his death knew that he had made such a deed." It also says: "The said Vernie K. Legler paid no consideration for said deed, * * * and taking advantage of her close and intimate relation with her said husband, and by the exercise of undue influence, procured him to execute and deliver said deed to her without the knowledge of the plaintiffs and other defendants herein."

April 11, 1936, when Mr. Legler was a widower, 77 years of age, and the appellant was 41, they were married. The children whom we have mentioned were the offspring of Mr. Legler's first marriage. At the time of the second marriage Mr. Legler owned and was living upon a ranch in Eastern Oregon which was worth about $7,000 or $8,000. The ranch is not affected by this suit. In the same year he inherited a city lot located at the intersection of Northeast Twenty-seventh Street and Sandy Boulevard in Portland. That lot, to which we shall refer as the city lot, is the subject matter of this suit. It is improved with a store building and a small dwelling house. At one time Mr. Legler owned another item of property, but parted with it prior to his death. At the time of his decease he owned only the city lot and the ranch.

A few moments before Mr. Legler signed the attacked deed he executed a will. The respondents do not challenge it. Both instruments were drafted by Mr. Bruce Cameron, an attorney whose offices are in Portland. Since the two instruments were prepared simultaneously, we shall mention briefly the will. It devises the ranch as follows: To the son Fred, a one-third interest; to the daughter Margaret, a one-third interest; and to the children of the son George, the remaining one-third. The appellant swore that her husband intended to devise to her an interest in the ranch, but that she dissuaded him from so doing under a belief that the ranch should descend to his children. We shall presently mention other provisions of the will. If the deed is valid, § 63-210, O.C.L.A., renders the appellant the sole owner of the city lot. If the deed is invalid, and if the appellant elects to accept under the provisions of the will, there will be applicable the residuary clause of that instrument which devises to her a one-fourth interest in the residue which will consist of the city lot. The same clause devises to the testator's son Fred a one-fourth interest; to his daughter Margaret a one-fourth interest, and to the children of his son George the remaining one-fourth. We mentioned the fact that the respondents do not challenge the will, although its execution was almost coincident with that of the deed. Mr. Legler had executed a previous will on May 31, 1939, when his competency was conceded, which expressly mentioned the Sandy Boulevard property and directed that it "be sold as soon as advisable and...

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16 cases
  • Andersen's Estate, In re
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 26 September 1951
    ...the will rested, as did the proponents in the instant case, on the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the will. In Legler v. Legler, 187 Or. 273, 211 P.2d 233, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rossman, did not take much stock in the testimony of an attorney who was a subscrib......
  • MARRIAGE OF DAVIS
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 28 April 2004
    ...and entering into a contract is the same. See Gore, 268 Or. at 528, 522 P.2d 212. 6. Similar statements appear in Legler et al. v. Legler, 187 Or. 273, 308, 211 P.2d 233 (1949), and Miller et al. v. Jeffery et al., 129 Or. 674, 687, 278 P. 946 7. In several subsequent cases, the Supreme Cou......
  • Hilterbrand v. Carter
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 11 July 2001
    ...570-71, 403 P.2d 12 (1965); Halleck, 216 Or. at 40,337 P.2d 330, and mother could not unilaterally revoke it, see Legler et al. v. Legler, 187 Or. 273, 299, 211 P.2d 233 (1949). Mother and plaintiffs were thus cotenants, and, as the court held in Halleck, the "power to defeat the survivorsh......
  • In re Estate of Walker
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • 1 December 2023
    ... ... 1984); ... Perry v. Aldrich , 196 So.2d 521 (Miss. 1967); In ... re Will of Franks , 231 N.C. 252, 56 S.E.2d 668 (1949); ... Legler et al. v. Legler , 187 Or. 273, 211 P.2d 233 ... (1949); Storbeck v. Fridley , 240 Iowa 879, 38 N.W.2d ... 163 (1949); Baker v. Spears , 357 Mo ... ...
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