Legoff v. Trustees of Boston University
| Decision Date | 28 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 97-11981-NG.,Civ.A. 97-11981-NG. |
| Parties | Laurie A. LEGOFF, Plaintiff, v. TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY, Averill C. Haines, and Gary Strickler, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Jeffrey P. Petrucelly, Petrucelly & Nadler, Boston, MA, for Laurie A. Legoff, plaintiff.
Lawrence S. Elswit, Office of the General Counsel, Boston, MA, for Boston University, defendant.
Plaintiff, Laurie LeGoff ("LeGoff") brought this action against defendants, the Trustees of Boston University ("the University"), Averill C. Haines ("Haines"), and Gary Strickler ("Strickler"), alleging that they violated her rights under the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 ("Title IX"). She also brings three pendant common law claims of constructive discharge, negligence, and tortious interference with advantageous relations. The defendants move this Court to dismiss this action arguing that all of the plaintiff's claims are time-barred. For the reasons set out below, the defendants' motion is DENIED.
On a motion to dismiss, I must take as true all of the allegations in the complaint and draw inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Northeast Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine, 15 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1994). Therefore, the following facts are stated as presented by LeGoff.
LeGoff filed a complaint with this Court on August 29, 1997, against the University, Haines, and Strickler. On December 10, 1997, she filed an amended complaint.
In her amended complaint LeGoff asserts that defendants (1) violated her rights under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), by willfully and intentionally discriminating against her on the basis of sex by paying her unequal wages and (2) violated her rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. § 1681, by discriminating against her on the basis of sex.
This action stems from events that occurred while LeGoff was employed as head softball coach and assistant field hockey coach at the University. LeGoff was hired by the University beginning in August 1989 under a ten month contract, paid over twelve months. LeGoff's employment continued, she asserts, until August 31, 1994.1 As University policy is to pay employees once a month at the end of the month, the defendants concede that she probably was sent her last paycheck on that date.
During her employment at the University, LeGoff argues, the University discriminated against her on the basis of sex by paying her at a lesser rate and giving her more responsibilities than men in the department. No male coaches were required to coach two sports at the same time.
In May 1992, the plaintiff approached Strickler, the University's Athletic Director, regarding her lower rate of pay and greater job responsibilities than her male counterparts. Strickler said he would look into this discrepancy but in fact took no action to correct it. Following this initial exchange, Strickler and LeGoff continued to discuss the disparity in wages and job duties between male and female coaches until the plaintiff was allegedly pressured to resign just over two years later.
In July 1994, LeGoff spoke with Haines, the Assistant Athletic Director, about the disparity in wages and job duties between herself and her male colleagues. In the same meeting, LeGoff also stated that "someone should seek relief outside of Boston University." (Complaint, ¶ 11). Haines responded that if LeGoff filed a formal complaint about the matter either within or outside the University, she would be terminated from her employment and "would never work in the Northeast again." (Id.)
LeGoff alleges that as a result of the University's failure to alter the terms and conditions of her employment to make them equal to those of her male colleagues, as well as Haines' threat to fire her should she formally complain, She was "forced to resign" effective August 31, 1994. (Complaint, ¶ 12).
After resigning, the plaintiff learned that the University had made her former position into two separate jobs as the result of an investigation by the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education (OCR). In November, LeGoff applied for one of these positions but was rejected, despite her five-year record of successful coaching and positive performance reviews. LeGoff argues that the University did not hire her because of her prior complaints to Strickler and Haines about the defendants' discriminatory acts.
LeGoff alleges that since her employment at the University, she has been unable to secure employment at any educational institution.
Now before the Court is the defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants allege that all counts set forth by the plaintiff are time-barred by the appropriate statute of limitations period. In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, LeGoff asserts that her August 29, 1997 complaint was timely, given that the violations continued until her employment ended on August 31, 1994. Her retaliation claim, moreover, is based on the defendants' failure to rehire her in November 1994, less than three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requires that the Court "take the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, extending plaintiff every reasonable inference in [her] favor." Pihl v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1993). A motion to dismiss should be granted "`only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.'" Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1990)).
As each count of the plaintiff's complaint is governed by a different statute of limitations, I will address each in turn. There is, however, a common threshold issue with respect to all but the Equal Pay Act claim: when LeGoff's employment at the University ended.
LeGoff asserts in her complaint that she was employed by the University until August 31, 1994, so that any discrimination that continued until the end of her employment would have occurred within three years of her August 29, 1997, filing date. The defendants, on the other hand, urge me to convert their motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and to take into consideration two documents they have submitted, a letter from LeGoff to Strickler, dated August 22, 1994, which expresses her intent to resign from the University, and LeGoff's complaint to the E.E.O.C., which lists her "constructive discharge" as occurring on August 21.
Both of the documents offered by the defendants suggest that LeGoff's employment ended prior to August 29, 1994, and thus more than three years before she brought this suit. Their meaning and their accuracy, however, have been disputed by LeGoff. She asserts that the letter to Strickler was an expression of her anguished indecision about whether to continue at the University while the date in the E.E.O.C. complaint was merely a typographical error. LeGoff further muddies the waters by submitting a memo from Strickler, dated August 23, 1994, which she characterizes as demanding her decision about whether to continue at the University, but which appears on its face to inform her that she has been terminated.
I decline to convert the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment on the basis of such a record. Such crucial factual disputes are best reserved for summary judgment or trial, not prematurely disposed of on the basis of three disputed documents. Therefore I must take all of LeGoff's allegations as true and treat the final date of her employment with the University as August 31, 1994.
The purpose of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) is to prohibit employers from discriminating in the payment of wages on the basis of sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To establish a prima facie case under the EPA "a plaintiff must show that her employer was subject to the Act, and that she was paid less than her male counterparts who were performing work requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions." McMillan v. Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 298 (1st. Cir.1998).
LeGoff has set forth facts allowing one to conclude that she was discriminated against in violation of the EPA, given that LeGoff's wages were less than her male colleagues and her job responsibilities, although of a similar kind, were greater. The motion to dismiss this count therefore turns entirely on whether her complaint was timely.
The EPA incorporates the statute of limitations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), under which actions must be brought
within two years after the cause of action accrued ... except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the action accrued.
29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
Willfulness under FLSA is not susceptible to clear-cut rules and abstract determinations. It is determined by whether "the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute...." McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988); accord, Reich v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 44 F.3d 1060, 1079 (1st Cir. 1995). Recklessness involves more than mere awareness of the existence of a governing federal law, or negligence in complying with it, McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 134-35, 108 S.Ct. 1677, yet less than "voluntary," "deliberate," or "intentional" conduct. Andover Newton Theological School,...
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