Lehi City v. Meiling, City Recorder
| Decision Date | 16 July 1935 |
| Docket Number | 5676 |
| Citation | 48 P.2d 530,87 Utah 237 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | LEHI CITY v. MEILING, City Recorder |
Original mandamus proceeding by Lehi City against J. O Meiling, as City Recorder of Lehi City.
WRIT OF MANDATE MADE PERMANENT.
A. V Watkins and R. Holbrook, both of Provo, Fisher Harris and Grant Macfarlane, both of Salt Lake City, and A. J. Evans, of Lehi, for plaintiff.
Ingebretsen Ray, Rawlins & Christensen, of Salt Lake City, for defendant.
OPINION
This is an original proceeding in this court to test the validity of the Metropolitan Water District Act. Lehi City, a municipal corporation, applied for a writ of mandate directed to the defendant as city recorder of Lehi City, requiring him, in his official capacity, to cause to be transmitted forthwith by registered mail to the chief executive officer of each of the cities and towns named therein a certified copy of an ordinance enacted by the city council of Lehi City April 9, 1935, and which became effective April 11, 1935, entitled:
"An ordinance of Lehi City declaring that public convenience and necessity require the incorporation of a metropolitan water district, naming the cities proposed to be included therein, fixing the estimated cost of incorporation, and organizing the proposed district, and apportioning such cost among the municipalities proposed to be included within such district."
It is alleged this was a duty specifically enjoined on the defendant by the ordinance and by statute, but that the defendant has refused to transmit such ordinance forthwith, or at all, to the chief executive officer of the cities of Pleasant Grove and Midvale and the towns of Lindon, Orem, and Sandy, the cities and towns other than Lehi City named in the ordinance, and that he has based his refusal on the ground that the provisions of the statute under and pursuant to which the city council of Lehi City had passed the ordinance, known as the Metropolitan Water District Act, Laws Utah 1935, c. 110, p. 204, is void as in violation of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States.
An alternative writ of mandate was issued by this court. Defendant showed cause by filing a general demurrer to the petition. The cause is now before us on petition of plaintiff, demurrer of defendant, and briefs and oral arguments of the attorneys representing the respective parties. We are required to determine whether or not the Metropolitan Water District Act is a valid and constitutional law. The title to the act is as follows:
"An Act Providing for the Incorporation, Government and Management of Metropolitan Water Districts, Authorizing Such Districts to Incur Bonded Debt and to Acquire, Construct, Operate and Manage Works and Property, Providing for the Taxation of Property Therein and the Performance of Certain Functions Relating Thereto by Officers of Counties, Providing for the Addition of Area Thereto and the Exclusion of Area Therefrom and Authorizing Municipal Corporations to Aid and Participate in the Incorporation of Such Districts."
The act provides for the organization of Metropolitan Water Districts for the purpose of acquiring, appropriating, developing, storing, selling, leasing, and distributing water for, and devoting water to, municipal and domestic purposes, irrigation, power, milling, manufacturing, mining, metallurgical, and any and all other beneficial uses, which districts may be formed of the territory "included within the corporate boundaries of any one or more municipalities, which need not be contiguous." Section 3. The term "municipality" as used in the act is deemed to mean and include any incorporated city and town in the state of Utah. Section 2. The district when incorporated "shall be a separate and independent political corporate entity" and shall have and exercise such powers as are expressly granted by the act "together with such powers as are reasonably implied herefrom and necessary and proper to carry out the objects and purposes of such incorporated districts." Section 3. The act provides the method of inception, organization, and incorporation of such districts as follows:
"Such metropolitan water district shall be organized and incorporated in the following manner:
On the taking effect of the initiatory ordinance, the clerk of the legislative body of such initiating city or town is required to "forthwith transmit a certified copy thereof by registered mail to the chief executive officer of each of the other municipalities named therein." Within 60 days after receipt of a certified copy of such ordinance by any municipality named therein, the legislative body shall approve or reject such ordinance without alteration or amendment. Failure to act within such time is deemed a rejection of the ordinance. Each municipality approving the ordinance shall promptly pay over to the initiating municipality its share of the preliminary cost of any expenses of the incorporation and organization of the district. Within 120 days, but not until each municipality named shall have acted on the ordinance, or the 60-day period for action has expired, the legislative bodies of all the municipalities within the proposed district shall call for the holding of a special election, at which election the proposition of the corporation of such Metropolitan Water District shall be submitted to the electors residing within such municipalities for ratification or rejection. The ordinance calling such election must contain the date relating to the election as specifically set forth in the act. Such election may be held separately or may be held concurrently with any other election authorized by law. The result of the election in each city must be certified by a canvassing body to the governing body of the initiating city, and the governing body of the initiating city must certify to the secretary of state the proceedings had together with the result of the election in the cities or towns voting affirmatively. To be effective the total assessed valuation of the approving cities must be not less than two-thirds of the total assessed valuation within the district as originally proposed. The secretary of state thereupon must issue a certificate of incorporation naming the municipality or municipalities of which the district shall be composed.
Section 18 of the act provides with much detail the powers with which the incorporated district and its officers are vested. It has the power of perpetual succession, to sue and be sued, to adopt a corporate seal, to have the same powers, rights, and privileges of eminent domain as a municipal corporation; to construct and maintain works in streets, highways, and public lands on stated conditions; to make contracts, employ officers, attorneys, agents, and employees; to buy, sell, lease, and hold property of all kinds, including water and water rights; to incur debts, borrow money, and issue bonds, and to invest surplus moneys, to co-operate with other corporations, to incur joint and several obligations, and to levy and collect taxes.
The exercise of such powers, privileges, and duties is, by the terms of the act, to be intrusted to and performed by and through a board of directors which shall consist of at least one representative from each municipality where two or more municipalities compose a district, the vote of the members of the board to be on the basis of assessed valuation of taxable property for district purposes in the city or town represented by him. Any city or town may at its option designate several representatives, but such representatives shall cast the vote to which such city or town would otherwise be entitled as a majority shall determine.
Before any indebtedness or obligation in excess of the annual income or revenue of the district is incurred, the proposition to create such indebtedness must be submitted to a vote of the qualified electors who shall have paid a property tax in the year preceding such election, and such debt or obligation may be incurred only after a majority of such electors have voted in favor thereof, and in no event may the district become indebted to a sum which in the aggregate shall exceed 10 per cent of the value of the taxable property therein. Any tax which may be levied is limited to 25 cents on each $ 100 of assessed valuation in addition to any tax levied to meet bonded indebtedness and interest on indebtedness or interest owing to the United States by the district or for the payment of which the district shall be liable. Within such limits the district may levy in any year a tax sufficient to cover any deficit that may have resulted from delinquencies in any preceding year.
On this hearing we are concerned merely with such questions as arise upon the...
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