Lehman v. Coulter
| Citation | 40 N.D. 177,168 N.W. 724 |
| Parties | LEHMAN v. COULTER. |
| Decision Date | 19 July 1918 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Where one brings an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage, and the answer admits all of the allegations of the complaint, all of the equity matters in such case are disposed of, and there is nothing before the court further to be considered in such equity proceedings; and where the answer, in addition to admitting all the allegations of the complaint in such equity proceedings, pleads two counterclaims for specific amounts for the recovery of money only, and at the time of the trial defendant demands a jury trial, such jury trial cannot be denied to him, and he is entitled to such jury trial as a matter of strict legal right.
Where a case is remanded for a jury trial, the costs in the trial court to await the determination of the new trial and then to be taxed against the losing party, the decision of the appellatecourt was in appellant's favor, the judgment of the lower court being reversed, and appellant is entitled to tax the statutory costs on appeal.
Appeal from District Court, Stark County; W. C. Crawford, Judge.
Suit by Henry Lehman against L. T. Coulter on a promissory note and to foreclose a mortgage. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
F. C. Heffron, of Dickinson, for appellant. L. A. Simpson, of Dickinson, for respondent.
This action is brought for the purpose of obtaining judgment for a promissory note in the foreclosure of a certain chattel mortgage given to secure such note, and thereby have the property described in such chattel mortgage sold and the proceeds thereof applied on the judgment. The answer admitted the execution of the note and chattel mortgage, in that it admitted all the allegations of the complaint.
The proceeding to foreclose the chattel mortgage was an equitable action, triable to the court. The answer having admitted all of the allegations of the complaint, all of the matters in equity in such case were disposed of, and there remained nothing for the court to do, except to give judgment for the relief demanded in the complaint. The defendant, after admitting all of the allegations of the complaint as above, pleaded two certain counterclaims, in which the defendant affirmed the right to recover certain specific amounts of money against the plaintiff. The first counterclaim was for the sum of $62.50, and the second counterclaim was for the sum of $2,090. Each of said amounts of money the defendant claimed to be due him on account of commissions by reason of making sales or procuring purchasers for certain horses owned by plaintiff. Defendant alleged that plaintiff and defendant entered into a verbal agreement, by the terms of which the defendant was authorized to sell, or secure purchasers for the plaintiff for, 200 head of horses, more or less. Defendant further alleges in his counterclaims that in pursuance of such agreement he secured a purchaser for one certain stallion for $250, and that the reasonable commission for securing such purchaser was 25 per cent. of the purchase price, or $62.50. In his second counterclaim he alleges the securing of a purchaser for 209 head of horses at $100 per head, in all $20,900, and that the reasonable commission for securing such purchaser was 10 per cent. of the purchase price, or $2,090. The defendant at the time of the trial demanded a jury trial. This was denied by the court, and this presents the only question in this appeal, which is that the court erred in denying defendant's demand for a jury trial.
[1] The defendant's counterclaim was a cause of action against the plaintiff, in which the relief sought consisted in the recovery of money only. The answer having admitted all of the allegations of the complaint, it must appear that at the time of the trial there were no equitable issues before the court upon which there was any dispute. All the matters in equity had been admitted by the answer. At the time of the trial there was nothing for the court to do, except to try the issue presented by the counterclaims, which was for the recovery of money only. In such case there can be no doubt but that the defendant was entitled to have the issues presented by his counterclaims submitted to the jury, the relief demanded by his counterclaims being for the recovery of money only, and it was reversible error for the court not to grant such demand when timely made. Under the circumstances of this case there is no doubt, under the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the state enacted in pursuance thereof, but that the right of trial by jury is preserved to the defendant. It is unnecessary in this case to enter into a fuller discussion of when the right of trial by jury is preserved in civil actions; it being certain in this case that the defendant was entitled to have the issues submitted by his counterclaims submitted to a jury, the relief demanded being for the recovery of money only, and all equitable issues having been admitted in the answer.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for trial by jury only upon the issues presented by the counterclaims, all costs to await the determination of such retrial, and then to be taxed against the losing party.
I am unable to concur in the majority opinion prepared by Mr. Justice GRACE. The instant case is one to foreclose a mortgage. The defendant in his answer admits the cause of action alleged in the complaint, and sets up two counterclaims for commissions claimed to be due him for services performed in selling certain horses belonging to the plaintiff. It is conceded that the cause of action set forth in the complaint is one properly triable to the court without a jury; but it is asserted that, inasmuch as the cause of action set forth in the complaint was admitted in the answer, there remained no equitable issues to try, that the only issues remaining were the legal ones raised upon the counterclaims, and that defendant was entitled to have these tried to a jury. The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the defendant is entitled to a jury trial of the issues raised by the counterclaims.
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Dobervich v. Central Cass Public School Dist. No. 17
...See 50 C.J.S. Juries § 23. This State has been more liberal than most in construing the guarantee of jury trial. See Lehman v. Coulter, 40 N.D. 177, 168 N.W. 724 (1918), and Annotation in 17 ALR3d Generally, where both damages and an injunction are sought, the parties are entitled to a jury......
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Landers v. Goetz, 9401
...and asserted legal counterclaims, only issues at law remained, and the defendant was entitled to a jury trial. Lehman v. Coulter, 40 N.D. 177, 168 N.W. 724 (1918). In the case before us, the fact that two cases were consolidated for trial has no bearing on the right to a jury trial in one o......
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General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Richman, 10432
...admits all of the allegations and pleads a counterclaim for the recovery of money only cannot be denied a jury trial. Lehman v. Coulter, 40 N.D. 177, 168 N.W. 724 (1917). See also, Landers v. Goetz, supra. If a plaintiff in an action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien brings in a third p......
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Merchants Fire Assur. Corp. v. Watson
......The counterclaim was obviously one presenting facts in an action at law rather than in equity. An identical case is that of Lehman v. Coulter, 40 N.D. 177, 168 N.W. 724, where the court said: “Where one brings an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage, and the answer admits all ......