Leibas v. Dart
| Decision Date | 19 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19 C 7592 |
| Parties | IRMA G. LEIBAS, FRANK DONIS, BARBARA TAGUE, LUCY DIGIOIA, and TAMIKA BARKER, Plaintiffs, v. THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity, REBECCA REIERSON and COUNTY OF COOK, a unit of local government, as indemnitor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Irma Leibas, Frank Donis, Barbara Tague, Lucy DiGioia, and Tamika Barker are employed as Correctional Officers or Deputy Sheriffs at the Cook County Sheriff's Office ("CCSO"). In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants subjected them to "sham" ADA accommodation processes that were in fact fitness-for-duty examinations designed to guarantee a determination that they cannot perform their essential job functions. (First Am. Compl. ("FAC") [10] ¶ 4.) Defendants are Thomas J. Dart in his official capacity as Cook County Sheriff; Rebecca Reierson, the Director of Employee Services in the Bureau of Human Resources of the CCSO, in her individual capacity; and Cook County as indemnitor.
All Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendant Dart for discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Count I). They also assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Dart and Reierson for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Counts II, III). Additionally, Plaintiff DiGioia brings claims against Defendant Dart for retaliation and interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (Count IV); Plaintiffs Barker and Leibas bring claims against Defendant Reierson for violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Count V); and all Plaintiffs assert claims for indemnification against Defendant Cook County (Count VI).
Defendants now move to dismiss all claims. As explained here, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs Leibas, Donis, Tague, and DiGioia have been employed with the CCSO since May 2010, February 2006, November 1994, and October 1998, respectively. (FAC ¶¶ 10-13.) The FAC does not identify Plaintiff Barker's start date. (See id. ¶ 14.) Each Plaintiff allegedly "has a disability, a record of disability, and is perceived to have a physical disability." (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff Leibas alleges that she has scleroderma, lupus, and Raynaud's syndrome, "which are skin and circulatory conditions that require her to wear gloves and a jacket at all times." (Id. ¶ 38(a).) She has allegedly performed the essential functions of her position for more than 10 years with accommodations for her conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff DiGioia has had fibromyalgia since 2013, making it "more difficult for her to breathe," resulting in a "medical restriction" that prevents her from wearing a vest at work. (Id. ¶ 38(b).) Plaintiff Tague alleges that since 2015 she has had "shoulder arthritis that makes it more difficult for her to qualify with a firearm." (Id. ¶ 38(c).) Plaintiff Donis alleges that he "has restrictions on his right knee resulting from an on-the-job injury." (Id. ¶ 38(d).) As a result, he has "medical restrictions on prolonged kneeling, squatting, standing, and running/walking long distances." (Id.) Plaintiff Barker allegedly "has a chronic migraine condition that can be induced by stress." (Id. ¶ 38(e).) Like Leibas, Plaintiffs DeGioia, Tague, and Baker have at all times been able to perform their essential job functions with an accommodation. (Id. ¶¶ 38 (b), (c), (d), (e).)
Plaintiffs allege that starting in or around August 2018, Defendant Reierson informed them for the first time that "they could not perform the essential functions of their job[s]." (Id. ¶ 39.) Ina letter,1 Defendant Reierson allegedly advised Plaintiffs that they had three options: (1) "[p]resent updated medical documents to [Human Resources] indicating you no longer have restrictions that prevent you from performing the essential functions of your position with or without an accommodation"; (2) request a reasonable accommodation under the ADA; or (3) "[i]f you are not able to perform the essential functions of your position under 1 or 2 above, take a skills assessment to determine if you qualify for another vacant position at the CCSO." (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs allege that before the fall of 2018, none of them had "ever received a letter/phone call such as this," despite that their medical restrictions had been "in place for a substantial period of time." (Id. ¶ 41.)
In response, each Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation under the ADA and completed ADA accommodation paperwork. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 43-45, 50.) Defendants did not grant their requests for accommodation, Plaintiffs allege, and instead determined based on their responses that they "are unable to perform the essential functions of the job." (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs conclude that the three options Defendant Reierson offered them were a "sham" and that Defendants are "using Plaintiffs' completed ADA accommodation request paperwork" as a disguised fitness-for-duty examination. (Id. ¶¶ 43-45; see also, e.g., id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege, further, that the fitness-for-duty examinations are designed to prove that they cannot perform their essential job functions. (See id. ¶ 4(b) (); id. ¶ 44 (similar).)
As part of the ADA accommodation process, Plaintiffs allege, they were required to complete checklists stating whether they could perform the listed essential job functions. (Id. ¶ 48.) According to Plaintiffs, the checklists do not "reflect the actual . . . experience ofoccupants of [their] job titles" and are "specifically designed" to be so "broad and vague" that Defendants can determine that nearly every employee with a medical restriction is unable to perform essential job functions. (Id. ¶ 51(a), (b).) Thus, the checklists allegedly include "marginal functions that are not essential"; do not "account for the consequences of employees performing or not performing certain job duties"; and do not "account for the amount of time or importance of a listed function." (Id. ¶ 51(d)-(f).) Likewise, the checklists allegedly are not "based on input from front-line supervisors" to ensure that they "reflect[ ] the actual tasks being performed by Deputy Sheriffs/Correctional Officers." (Id. ¶ 51(i).)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants developed the checklists in 2017 or 2018 (id. ¶ 52), change them regularly (id.), and "tailor[ ]" them to "fish out" employees with disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 56.) For example, Plaintiffs allege that for Tague, whose medical restriction makes it difficult for her to "qualify with a firearm" (id. ¶ 38(c)), Defendants "applied the Essential Functions Checklist to her as requiring that she be able to qualify annually with a duty weapon." (Id. ¶ 53.) According to Plaintiff, "dozens of Sheriff's Officers have not been doing so for years and there are dozens of assignments where duty weapons are not required." (Id.) Notably lacking from the FAC, however, is an allegation that essential functions checklists given to other Sheriff's Officers did not include qualifying with a firearm. Plaintiffs also allege that although both Plaintiffs Leibas and Barker were Correctional Officers, the checklists they were directed to complete (included as screen shots in the FAC) differed. (See id. ¶¶ 54-56.) The FAC does not state whether Leibas and Barker ever worked as Correctional Officers at the same time, however. And although the FAC alleges that Leibas and Barker received the checklists in or after August 2018 (see, e.g., id. ¶ 39), it does not specify whether they received the checklists at the same time. Nor have Plaintiffs identified the specific differences between the checklists. The court observes that Plaintiff Leibas's checklist contained 12 items, unranked as to importance, while Plaintiff Barker's contained just 10 items, each rated as "High," "Medium," or "Low." (See id. ¶¶ 54-55.) The extra items on Leibas's checklist were: "Work any shift and location and be available to work additional consecutive shiftsbased on operational needs," and "Participate in all training, annual qualifications and other testing required by the Sheriff's Office or state law to maintain correctional officer certification." (Compare id. ¶ 54 with id. ¶ 55.)
Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the "sham" ADA accommodation process, they have "lost pay and benefits, including overtime opportunities, have been segregated and transferred to non-bid positions,2 have been forced onto disability under the Cook County Pension Fund, and have suffered . . . extreme stress and anxiety." (Id. ¶ 59.) Plaintiffs assert that they were targeted for this mistreatment, in that Defendant Reierson "offered alternative job positions at the same rate of pay to some disabled employees, but not to [them]." (Id. ¶ 64.) Plaintiffs also allege that "there are dozens of assignments" where they could have been placed, "including External Operations, Records, Sanitation, Central Kitchen, Division 5," and others. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants do not dispute, that they have exhausted their administrative remedies for their discrimination claims. FAC ( ) [12]; Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ( ) [26]).
Plaintiff DiGioia alleges that Defendant Dart retaliated against her for requesting FMLA leave and interfered with her FMLA rights. (See id. ¶¶ 81-82.) DiGioia submitted "a completed FMLA certification packet for a family member" to the CCSO's Human Resources...
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