Leibowitz v. Cornell University

• Decision Date: 21 April 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 05-0868 CV.
• Citation: 445 F.3d 586
• Parties: Margaret Sipser LEIBOWITZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Edward J. Lawler, Ronald Seeber, Ann W. Martin, Esta R. Bigler and Nick Salvatore, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

445 F.3d 586

Margaret Sipser LEIBOWITZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Edward J. Lawler, Ronald Seeber, Ann W. Martin, Esta R. Bigler and Nick Salvatore, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 05-0868 CV.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: October 17, 2005.

Decided: April 21, 2006.

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David Marek, Liddle & Robinson, LLP (Jeffrey L. Liddle on the brief), New York, New York, for Appellant.

Wendy E. Tarlow, Office of the University Counsel (Nelson E. Roth, Valerie L. Cross on the brief), Cornell University Ithaca, New York, for Appellee.

Before: KEARSE, MINER, HALL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

On February 24, 2003, Margaret Sipser Leibowitz filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), claiming gender and age discrimination arising out of Cornell University's decision not to extend her contract for an additional five-year term. The charges were ultimately dismissed and the EEOC issued Leibowitz a right to sue letter. On December 16, 2003, Leibowitz filed the instant action, asserting claims for age and gender discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), as well as state and municipal laws. Leibowitz also sought damages for breach of contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and quantum meruit. On February 3, 2005, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.) granted Cornell University's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. On appeal, Leibowitz challenges the dismissal of her complaint, arguing that the district court erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard and erred in finding that she could not establish an adverse employment action.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, with instructions to the district court to allow Leibowitz to amend her Complaint if she so chooses, and vacate and remand in part, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

The description that follows is drawn from Leibowitz's complaint. Leibowitz was hired by Cornell University and the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations (collectively "Cornell") in 1978 as a Research Associate; she worked in that position for one academic year. In 1983, she returned to Cornell as an Extension Associate I. Extension Associates are professors at one of Cornell's extension offices. In 1987, Leibowitz was promoted to Senior Extension Associate II. She believed that such a position was the functional equivalent of a tenured professorship and alleges that she was told by two associate deans that she could not be fired except for cause or budget exigencies. She also asserts she was told that Cornell had never fired a Senior Extension Associate II other than for those reasons and that documentation of such a policy exists. From 1987 until Leibowitz was terminated, Cornell continued automatically to reappoint her every five years.

In July 2002, Cornell sent a letter to Leibowitz notifying her that, because of budget exigencies, she would not be offered a new five-year contract when the current one expired in October 2002. Cornell did, however, offer to extend Leibowitz's existing contract until May 2003, an offer she reluctantly accepted. In December 2002, however, Leibowitz took advantage of an early retirement package offered by Cornell in conjunction with the State of New York.

Leibowitz subsequently commenced this action. In her complaint, she alleged in substance that Cornell has an unofficial policy of treating Senior Extension Associate IIs as tenured professors¹ and that Cornell had violated this policy by refusing to renew her employment because of her age and gender, in violation of Title VII and the ADEA, as well as state and municipal law. See Compl. ¶¶ 56-79. Additionally, Leibowitz alleged a number of other causes of action. She first alleged that Cornell paid her lower wages than it paid to male employees, although she performed equal, if not superior work, in violation of the Equal Pay Act. See id. ¶¶ 80-84. She further alleged that Cornell breached its employment contract with her, see id. ¶¶ 88-89, or alternatively, breached an implied-in-fact contract, under which she was guaranteed lifetime employment, see id. ¶¶ 93-98. Finally, Leibowitz alleged that she continued to perform work for Cornell after accepting early retirement, see id. ¶ 54, and that Cornell owed her wages for that time period under a theory of either implied-in-fact contract, see id. ¶¶ 101-103, or alternatively, quantum meruit, see id. ¶¶ 107-108. Indeed, Leibowitz asserts that she only accepted the early retirement package because Cornell refused to guarantee the lifetime employment she believed she had been given as a Senior Extension Associate II, and so that she could preserve many of the employment benefits she enjoyed in that position.²

In response, Cornell moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint arguing that its official policy, as contained in the "ILR Faculty Personnel Policies: Guidelines and Practices" and the "Cornell University Faculty Handbook," requires Senior Extension Associate IIs to be hired for five-year terms, and the official policy provides that these are not considered lifetime tenured positions. For those reasons, Cornell argued, Leibowitz had suffered no adverse employment action, and she therefore could not prevail on an employment discrimination claim, nor could Cornell have breached a contract where none existed. Further, Cornell argued that Leibowitz had failed adequately to allege a breach of implied-in-fact contract, an action for quantum meruit, or a violation of the Equal Pay Act.

The district court ruled in favor of Cornell and dismissed the complaint. See Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., No. 03-9976, 2005 WL 267560, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.3, 2005). In its ruling, the district court focused in large part on what had been presented as a statement of Cornell's official policies and guidelines, without taking into account the allegations in Leibowitz's Complaint that there existed an unofficial policy that gave her life tenure. Id. at *4. In particular, regarding the employment discrimination claim, the district court relied upon McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), holding that "[u]nder the McDonnell [Douglas] framework, a plaintiff must initially prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination." Id. at *3. Applying McDonnell Douglas to its analysis of the Complaint and of Cornell's official policy, the district court found that Leibowitz had failed to establish two elements of the prima facie case: (1) she failed so show that she had suffered an adverse employment action, and (2) she failed to show causation. Specifically, it held that

Defendants did not terminate plaintiff's employment. Rather, they chose not to renew her appointment for another five-year term. Defendants extended plaintiff's employment for an additional year after the term of her reappointment expired, and plaintiff's salary and benefits remained unchanged. Plaintiff agreed to continue her employment. She then voluntarily chose to resign and accept an early retirement package in December, even though her employment was guaranteed to continue at least until the end of May. By electing to accept early retirement, plaintiff terminated her own employment. Thus, she was not the subject of an adverse employment action. . . . Since defendants did not terminate plaintiff's employment, she did not suffer an adverse employment action as alleged in her complaint. Accordingly, the [discrimination] causes of action are dismissed.

Id. at *5 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Likewise, the district court dismissed Leibowitz's other causes of action finding in substance that her conclusory assertions were insufficient to state viable claims. Id. at 5-8. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

"We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir.2001)). A court may not dismiss an action "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

III. Discussion

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only that complaints contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Indeed, the Rules set forth a pleading standard under which a plaintiff is required only to give a defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Accordingly, "[t]he complaint . . . need not `set out in detail the facts upon which' the claim is based." Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99).

A. Employment Discrimination Causes of Action

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), which addresses the pleading requirements for employment discrimination claims, is directly on point. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 5 Fed.Appx. 63 (2d Cir.2001) (unpublished order), this Court had affirmed the...