Leibsohn v. Hobbs
Decision Date | 20 September 2022 |
Docket Number | CV-22-0204-AP/EL |
Citation | 79 Arizona Cases Digest 16,517 P.3d 45 |
Parties | Seth LEIBSOHN, an individual; Center For Arizona Policy Action, a nonprofit corporation; Arizona Free Enterprise Club, a nonprofit corporation; Goldwater Institute For Public Policy and Research, a nonprofit corporation; and Americans For Prosperity, a nonprofit corporation Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Katie HOBBS, in her capacity as the Secretary of State of Arizona, Defendant/Appellee, Voters’ Right To Know, a political committee, Real Party in Interest/Appellee. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Kory Langhofer, Thomas Basile, Statecraft PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Seth Leibsohn, Center for Arizona Policy Action, Arizona Free Enterprise Club, Goldwater Institute for Public Policy and Research and Americans for Prosperity
Joshua D. Bendor, Joshua J. Messer, Travis C. Hunt, Annabel Barraza, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, and Spencer G. Scharff, Scharff P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Voters’ Right to Know
Amy B. Chan, Noah T. Gabrielsen, Arizona Secretary of State's Office, Phoenix, Attorneys for Katie Hobbs
Timothy A. La Sota, Timothy A. La Sota, PLC, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Direct Contact, LLC
Dominic E. Draye, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Governor Doug Ducey, Senate President Karen Fann, and Speaker of the House Russell "Rusty" Bowers
¶1 Our state constitution grants the people of Arizona the right to propose and enact laws by initiative. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1)–(2). Under Arizona's Voter Protection Act, enacted by initiative in 1998, the legislature cannot repeal or easily amend laws enacted by initiative, and the governor cannot veto them. Id. § 1 (6)(A)–(C). The legislature retains its authority to reasonably regulate the initiative process, see id. § 1 (14), but a regulating statute is permissible only if it "does not unreasonably hinder or restrict" the constitutionally granted right to the initiative process but instead "reasonably supplements" its purpose. Stanwitz v. Reagan , 245 Ariz. 344, 348 ¶ 14, 429 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2018) (quoting Direct Sellers Ass'n v. McBrayer , 109 Ariz. 3, 5, 503 P.2d 951, 953 (1972) ). Exercising this authority and motivated by the impact of the Voter Protection Act, the legislature in 2017 enacted A.R.S. § 19-102.01(A), which requires proponents of statewide initiative measures to "strictly comply" with petition requirements and requires courts to "strictly construe[ ]" those requirements. See 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 151, § 3(A) (1st Reg. Sess.) ( ).
¶2 Before us is a challenge to the "Voters’ Right to Know Act," also known as "Stop Dark Money," a proposed statewide initiative for the November 8, 2022 general election ballot. The issue here is whether signatures collected by some initiative petition circulators must be disqualified because those circulators failed to strictly comply with two statutory registration requirements. See A.R.S. § 19-118(B). We conclude that circulators failed to strictly comply with one statutory requirement. Ordinarily, this would require the Secretary of State to disqualify signatures gathered by these circulators. See § 19-118(A). But the registration process, which the Secretary alone is statutorily tasked with devising and implementing, prevented compliance with the statute. Under these circumstances, enforcing the statutory disqualification requirement would "unreasonably hinder or restrict" the constitutional right to engage in the initiative process. Stanwitz , 245 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 14, 429 P.3d at 1142 (quoting Direct Sellers Ass'n, 109 Ariz. at 5, 503 P.2d at 953 ). We therefore decline to disqualify any signatures as a result of the circulators’ failure to strictly comply with § 19-118(B).
¶3 We previously issued a decision order affirming the trial court's judgment rejecting objections based on this issue.1 We now explain our reasoning in greater detail.
¶4 The Voters’ Right to Know Act initiative seeks to enact statutes eliminating "dark money" practices by requiring public disclosure of the original sources for certain campaign contributions made during an election cycle. In May 2021, the Secretary of State determined that the political action committee sponsoring the initiative (the "Committee") must gather 237,645 petition signatures by July 8, 2022, to place the initiative on the November 8, 2022 ballot.
¶5 The Committee used people serving as "circulators" to gather petition signatures. Paid and out-of-state petition circulators of statewide initiative measures, like the one here, must properly register with the Secretary of State before circulating petitions or the Secretary will disqualify all signatures collected by that circulator. § 19-118(A). Among other things, the registration application must include the circulator's "residence address" and a notarized affidavit avowing both the person's eligibility to be a circulator and the accuracy of all registration information provided. § 19-118(B).
¶6 On July 7, 2022, one day before the deadline, the Committee filed petition sheets with the Secretary containing 393,490 signatures. The Secretary reviewed the sheets for statutory compliance pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-121.01(A) and determined that 355,726 signatures were eligible for verification. The Secretary then randomly selected a 5% sample (17,787 signatures) for signature verification by county recorders in the counties where signatories in the sample claimed to be qualified electors. See § 19-121.01(B). The outcome of that process would produce a validity rate that the Secretary then could apply to the 355,726 eligible signatures. See id. ; § 19-121.04(A)(3). A validity rate of at least 66.81% was required to result in a sufficient number of valid signatures to qualify the initiative for the ballot.
¶7 On July 29, before completion of the signature verification process, Appellants ("Challengers") filed this lawsuit challenging the legal sufficiency of certain circulator registrations. Challengers sought to disqualify the signatures gathered by those circulators and enjoin placement of the initiative on the ballot for lacking a sufficient number of supporting signatures. See § 19-118(F) ( ); A.R.S. § 19-122(C) ( ). After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied most of Challengers’ objections and entered an interlocutory judgment pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which permitted this expedited appeal.
¶8 The issues here are (1) whether circulators who live in multi-unit housing must list a unit number in the "residence address" required for the registration application, and (2) whether they must submit a new affidavit for each petition they intend to circulate.
¶9 Challengers argue that § 19-118(B)(1) requires a circulator living in multi-unit housing to state a unit number as part of the "residence address" listed on the registration application. Because the Committee did not "strictly comply" with this requirement when registering circulators, see § 19-102.01(A), Challengers argue the trial court erred by refusing to disqualify the signatures gathered by the affected circulators. The Committee responds that § 19-118(B)(1) does not explicitly require a unit number, and the trial court therefore properly refused to add that requirement.
¶10 We review the interpretation of § 19-118(B)(1) de novo. See Leach v. Reagan , 245 Ariz. 430, 438 ¶ 33, 430 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2018). If the statute has only one reasonable meaning when considered in context, we apply that meaning without further analysis. Id. ; see also S. Point Energy Ctr. LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 253 Ariz. 30, 34 ¶ 14, 508 P.3d 246, 250 (2022). If the statute has more than one reasonable meaning, we apply secondary interpretive principles, including considering the statute's subject matter and purpose, to identify legislative intent. S. Point Energy Ctr. LLC , 253 Ariz. at 34 ¶ 14, 508 P.3d at 250.
¶11 Section 19-118(B)(1) requires a circulator registration application to contain "[t]he circulator's full name, residence address, telephone number and email address." 2
The legislature neither defined "residence address" nor specified the need for a unit number. Strictly construing the term, as we must, see § 19-102.01(A), we conclude a unit number is not required as part of a "residence address."
¶12 The plain meaning of "residence" is "the place where one actually lives." Residence , Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residence (last visited Sept. 15, 2022). And "address" plainly means "a place where a person or organization may be communicated with." Address , Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/address (last visited Sept. 15, 2022). The "residence address" therefore requires sufficient information to describe where a circulator lives and can be found to communicate with. A street name and number for a structure within an adequately described area (e.g., a city, township, or zip code) sufficiently identifies a residence address because it describes where a circulator lives and can be found. The legislature did not require a more complete address, which could include a unit number. See A.R.S. § 16-152(A)(3) ( ); see also A.R.S. § 12-991(I) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial