Leister v. State

• Decision Date: 17 June 1920
• Docket Number: 20.
• Citation: 111 A. 78,136 Md. 518
• Parties: LEISTER v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

111 A. 78

136 Md. 518

LEISTER v. STATE.

No. 20.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 17, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Carroll County; Wm. Henry Forsythe, Jr. Judge.

Vernon Kenny Leister was convicted of bastardy, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE and OFFUTT, JJ.

Guy W Steele, of Westminster, for appellant.

Alexander Armstrong, Atty. Gen. (Theo. F. Brown, State's Atty., of Westminster, on the brief), for the State.

OFFUTT J.

The appellant was convicted of bastardy by a jury in the circuit court for Carroll county, and sentenced to give bond to the state in the penalty of $500 to secure the payment of $12 per month for the maintenance of his illegitimate child until it reached the age of 12 years. From that judgment this appeal is taken. The record contains ten exceptions, one of which relates to the court's ruling on a prayer offered by the appellant in the course of the proceeding, one to the court's refusal to strike out a statement by the state's attorney, and the others to questions of evidence.

The indictment in the case charged in the usual form that the appellant had begotten at Carroll county an illegitimate, male child, which was afterwards born alive. To this indictment the appellant interposed what is described in the record as a "plea to the jurisdiction," in which he stated that the fornication referred to in the indictment did not take place in Carroll county. This pleading was not a plea to the jurisdiction as that term is usually understood, but was a mere traverse of one of the material averments of the indictment, and possessed none of the indicia or elements of a technical plea to the jurisdiction, as that plea is known to the law of this state. A technical plea to the jurisdiction is something more than a mere allegation that the traverser is not guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, and that is all the "plea to the jurisdiction" in this case amounts to. Unless the state proved that the fornication referred to in the indictment occurred at Carroll county, the traverser would be acquitted; if it did prove it, he would be convicted; and whether the state did or did not prove it could only be determined by a jury or the court sitting as a jury. A plea, therefore, that the fornication did not occur at Carroll county, was in effect equivalent to the general issue plea of "not guilty," and therefore bad in law. A technical plea to the jurisdiction must allege facts from which it may be inferred that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, or over the person of some party to the proceeding, as, for instance, that the alleged offense was not an offense against the laws of the state of the forum, but against a federal or foreign statute or law, or that some party to the proceedings was for some reason not subject to prosecution in the particular forum. It cannot be questioned that the circuit court for Carroll county had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the proceeding, that is, of the particular offense charged in the indictment, and it is not suggested that the appellant enjoyed any special privileges or status which prevented his prosecution in that court. The demurrer to this plea should therefore have been sustained. Bishop's New Cr. Proc. ph. 736; Trem. P. C. 271; Hoch. Cr. Law, par. 119; State v. Mitchell, 83 N.C. 674.

The demurrer was, however, overruled and the plea traversed. The issue thus made up was tried before the court, which found its verdict thereon against the appellant. At the conclusion of the testimony in that trial, the appellant submitted a prayer, in which the court was asked to instruct itself (sitting as a jury in a criminal case) that there was no evidence legally sufficient to prove the allegations of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, and that its verdict should be for the defendant. The court refused this prayer, and this ruling is the subject of the first exception.

From what has already been said that trial was wholly irregular and it is difficult to see just how any verdict the court might render in it could affect any right or interest either of the state or of the traverser, unless, indeed, it could be assumed that the trial before the court as a jury was the final trial for the determination of the guilt or innocence of the traverser. While there would be some reason for that contention in the fact that the issue tried there was the identical issue which was later tried before a jury, nevertheless, as it...