Leitz v. Hohman

• Citation: 56 A. 868,207 Pa. 289
• Parties: LEITZ v. HOHMAN.
• Decision Date: 04 January 1904
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

56 A. 868
207 Pa. 289

LEITZ
v.
HOHMAN.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 4, 1904.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County.

Action by William Leitz against John W. Hohman. From a judgment of the superior court reversing a judgment discharging a rule to set off a judgment against a judgment, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL, BROWN, and POTTER, JJ.

J. W. Brown and D. McMullen, for appellant.

I. C. Arnold and B. F. Davis, for appellee.

MITCHELL, C. J. It is settled and unquestionable law that the setoff of one judgment against another is not a legal right, even under our defalcation act, but is allowed by the courts under their inherent powers in the administration of justice, and is governed by the principles of equity. In Wellock v. Cowan, 16 Serg. & R. 318, it is said, per curiam: "Set-off had no existence at the common law, relief being had only in equity. Since the statute, this branch of chancery jurisdiction has not been exercised where relief might be had at law; although, for a particular equity not provided for, chancery will go beyond the statute, and allow of what is called an equitable setoff by virtue of its original powers. Courts of common law have long exercised the same powers in setting judgments against each other —a matter not provided for in the statute, and therefore constituting, perhaps, the only equitable jurisdiction which those courts possess." In Ramsey's Appeal, 2 Watts, 228, 27 Am. Dec. 301, Chief Justice Gibson says: "There is a fallacy in supposing defalcation in a case like the present to be a legal right. Judgments are set against each other, not by force of the statute, but by the inherent powers of the courts immemorially exercised. * * * An equitable right of setting off Judgments, therefore, is permitted only where it will infringe on no other right of equal grade." And in Burns v. Thornburgh, 3 Watts, 78, it is again said, per curiam, the power to set one judgment against another "is not a legal power, nor its exercise demandable of right."

But though the principle in general has been thus clearly and frequently declared, its limits and practical application between the original parties have been little discussed, most of the cases from Jacoby v. Guier, 6 Serg. & R. 448, down to Clement v. Philadelphia, 137 Pa. 328, 20 Atl. 1000, 21 Am. St. Rep. 876, having arisen on disputes as to the rights of assignees. Some few rules, or, at least, presumptions, may be gathered from the incidental...