Lekens v. Swifty Farms, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:20-cv-00228-SEB-DML |
| Parties | CHELSIE LEKENS, JACOB LEKENS, OLIVIA LEE, ROBIN BANKS, Plaintiffs, v. SWIFTY FARMS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of Indiana) |
W Brent Gill SMITH LAW SERVICES PC
JOHN H. HASKIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
Jason M. Smith SMITH LAW SERVICES, P.C.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs Chelsie Lekens ("Mrs. Lekens"), Jacob Lekens ("Mr. Lekens"), Olivia Lee ("Ms. Lee") and Robin Banks ("Ms. Banks") initiated this action on November 10, 2020, charging Defendant Swifty Farms, Inc. ("Defendant") with claims of sex discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as well as state law claims of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Dkt. 1.] On February 2, 2021, Defendant moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Dkt. 20.] For the reasons detailed in this entry, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs' claims are based on the following factual allegations, which we accept as true in ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Lekens and Mrs. Lekens, a married couple, were employed by Defendant from June through September 2018. Ms Lee was also hired by Defendant to work during this same time. [Compl. ¶ 12.] As part of their employment, Mr Lekens, Mrs. Lekens, and Ms. Lee were required to maintain residence on Defendant's premises, a horse farm located in Jackson County, Indiana. [Compl. ¶ 9.] Mr. Lekens, Mrs. Lekens, and Ms. Lee all met or exceeded the legitimate employment performance expectations of Defendant. [Compl. ¶ 11.]
On or about October 2018, Defendant hired David Brent Taylor ("Mr. Taylor") as a farm laborer, who subsequently moved onto Defendant's premises near Mr. Lekens, Mrs. Lekens, and Ms. Lee's residences. [Compl. ¶ 13.] Mr. Taylor had recently been released from prison and was on parole at the time of his employment. [Compl. ¶ 19.] Sometime after his hiring, Mr. Taylor began engaging in discriminatory and harassing behavior against Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee. [Compl. ¶ 14.] These behaviors included unwanted physical touching of the women's upper thighs, unwanted propositions for sex and dates, and threatening statements regarding weapons that Mr. Taylor owned. [Compl. ¶ 15.] Mr. Taylor also caused Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee to fear for their safety by sometimes physically cornering and isolating them. Id. He threatened retribution in the event that Mrs. Lekens or Ms. Lee ever reported the harassment. Id. All of Mr. Taylor's discriminatory and harassing behavior was based on Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee's female gender identity. [Compl. ¶ 16.]
After several such incidents of discriminatory and harassing behavior by Mr. Taylor, Mrs. Lekens consulted Mr. Lekens, who recommended that she and Ms. Lee complain to Defendant. [Compl. ¶ 17.] Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee thereafter lodged verbal complaints with Defendant on at least two occasions. Id. Defendant took no action to address Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee's concerns. [Compl. ¶ 18.] Following Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee's complaints to Defendant, Mr. Taylor cornered Mrs. Lekens in a barn and directly threatened her. Id.
When Defendant failed to take any corrective action against Mr. Taylor, Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee contacted Mr. Taylor's parole officer and informed him of their concerns, [Compl. ¶ 19.], and approximately one week after Mrs. Lekens and Ms. Lee contacted Mr. Taylor's parole officer, several police officers arrived at Defendant's property. [Compl. ¶ 20.] Thereafter, the officers searched Mr. Taylor's home and arrested him. Id. Mr. Taylor was preliminarily charged with multiple parole violations. [Compl. ¶ 21.] However, Mr. Taylor's charges were eventually dropped, and he was released from jail. Id.
Mr. Taylor returned to Defendant's property to resume his residency there, and almost immediately, Defendant terminated Ms. Lee. [Compl. ¶¶ 21, 22.] Approximately one week later, Defendant also terminated Mr. Lekens and Mrs. Lekens. Id. Though initially giving no reason for the terminations, Defendant later claimed that they were due to Plaintiffs' filing of false reports with law enforcement. Id.
After learning of the terminations, Ms. Banks, who was Mrs. Leken's mother, contacted Defendant and left a message stating that she believed Defendant's actions were unlawful and that Plaintiffs would be hiring an attorney and pursuing claims for sex discrimination and retaliation against Defendant. [Compl. ¶ 25.] Before Plaintiffs were able to do so, however, Defendant filed a lawsuit against Plaintiffs. [Compl. ¶ 26.] Two of the Defendant's claims were dismissed, and the remainder are pending. [Compl. ¶ 26.]
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))[1]. At minimum, a plaintiff is required to support its complaint with “‘some specific facts.'” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to withstand the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. How much specificity is required may vary from case to case, but “‘the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.'” McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)).
A party moving to dismiss nonetheless bears a weighty burden. “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (). In addressing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we treat all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and we construe all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Defendant moves for dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims against it. We analyze the sufficiency of each of Plaintiffs' claims below.
Title VII prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit has categorized employment termination as an "actionable, materially adverse employment action[]" within the meaning of Title VII. Nichols v. S. Ill. University-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has specified that "a complaint alleging sex discrimination need only aver that the employer instituted a (specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the basis of her sex." Luevano v. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) ()
Defendant seeks dismissal of this claim on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that it committed any specific discriminatory acts. Rather, according to Defendant, Plaintiffs have conflated Mr. Taylor's alleged acts of harassment with allegedly discriminatory actions taken by an employer, thus mandating dismissal of this claim. The complaint is devoid of details supporting a claim of sex discrimination, says Defendant, though we do not agree with Defendant's assessment.
The Supreme Court has made clear that in the context of sex discrimination, a plaintiff need not plead specific factual allegations. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992 (2002). Though, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, "there is some unresolved tension between Swierkiewicz and the [Supreme] Court's later decisions in Twombly and Iqbal," it has nonetheless affirmed its previous holdings that "a complaint alleging sex discrimination need only aver that the employer instituted a (specified) action against the plaintiff on the basis of her sex." Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084 ().
Accordingly we hold Plaintiffs have satisfied this threshold requirement here by alleging that in October 2018, their employer, Swifty Farms, fired them on the basis of their sex. Id. See, e.g., Herndon v. Hous. Auth. of South Bend, Ind., 670 Fed.Appx. 417, 418 (7th Cir. 2016) (...
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