Leland v. Isenbeck

• Decision Date: 01 January 1873
• Citation: 1 Idaho 469
• Parties: Alonzo Leland, Appellant, v. Charles Isenbeck And Godfrey Gamble, Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

1 Idaho 469

Alonzo Leland, Appellant, v. Charles Isenbeck And Godfrey Gamble, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 1, 1873

SHERIFF'S SALE-SHERIFF'S DEED.-In order to uphold a sheriff's deed, it must appear that a valid judgment was obtained against the party whose property is sought to be conveyed by it, and that the property was sold upon an execution issued upon such judgment.

JUDGMENT.-A judgment which is void ab initio, may be attacked collaterally, without appealing therefrom to this court.

QUITCLAIM DEED-NOTICE.-A purchaser of real estate who takes a quitclaim deed from the grantor is presumed to have notice of any defects in his grantor's title; and he purchases at his own risk.

EVIDENCE-ERROR-It is not error for the court below to admit improper evidence such as a sheriff's deed, without first showing a valid judgment, unless objection be made to its introduction.

INSTRUCTIONS.-A purchaser of real estate taking a quitclaim deed therefor not being a bona fide purchaser without notice, it was erroneous for the court, by its instructions, to leave that question to be decided by the jury, from the evidence.

ESTOPPEL-INSTRUCTIONS-PLEADING.-A party to an action cannot avail himself of the benefits of an estoppel, unless he plead it. It is error for the court to submit such question to the jury by instruction, unless it be pleaded.

INSTRUCTIONS.-It is error for a court, in its instructions to a jury, to assume that material disputed facts have been proven. It is for the jury to find the facts from the evidence.

ESTOPPEL.-In order to create an equitable estoppel, there must be an admission, act, or declaration intended to influence the conduct of another; and actually leading him into a line of conduct which would be prejudicial to his interests, unless the party estopped be cut off from the power of retraction.

APPEAL from the First Judicial District, Idaho County.

Curtis & Barbour, for the Appellant. A. E. Isham, for the Respondents.

HOLLISTER J.,

delivered the opinion.

WHITSON J., concurred. NOGGLE, C. J., dissented.

This is an appeal from a judgment recovered by the defendants against the appellant, in the district court of the county of Idaho, in which the appellant brought his suit for the recovery of the possession of certain premises described in his complaint, and which, he alleged, was unlawfully withheld from him by the defendants. On the trial the plaintiff showed title to the premises in controversy, and the defense relied upon was, that his title had been devested by a sale by the sheriff of said county of the property, to Alexander & Co., on an execution issued upon a judgment against the appellant, in their favor, and from whom the defendants derived their title. The defendant, Gamble, also pleaded an estoppel, which will be hereafter noticed.

For the sake of perspicuity we will proceed to consider the case as to the defendants separately, for their defense in some respects rests on different grounds. Isenbeck's defense is made to depend entirely upon the question whether the title derived by Alexander & Co. under the sale on execution is good or not, and whether, if not good, he purchased in good faith, and without notice.

His answer denies the ownership of the premises by the plaintiff; denies that he (the defendant) holds possession unlawfully and willfully; denies that the issues and profits are as stated in the complaint; denies the plaintiff's damages, and that he is injured as he alleges.

The evidence shows a sale of the property of E. B. Johnson et al. to Alexander & Co., who were the plaintiffs in the execution, and the conveyance to them of the property by the sheriff by deed, and a conevyance from them by quitclaim, to this defendant, but it fails to show any judgment to support the sale to Alexander & Co. It is unquestionable that such evidence does not show even a prima facie title in Alexander & Co. In order to uphold and give validity to a sheriff's deed, it must appear that a valid judgment was obtained against the party whose property is sought to be conveyed by it, and that the property was sold upon an execution issued upon such judgment. These prerequisite proofs must be produced before a prima facie title can be established under the deed.

It is urged, however, that he was a purchaser in good faith, and even if Alexander & Co.'s title was not good, he could be protected notwithstanding. In answer to this, it is claimed that the judgment of Alexander & Co. against the plaintiff was ipso facto void, and that neither they nor their grantees could take any title under it as against the defendant in execution.

That the judgment was void had been decided by this court at the January term, 1872. This was the judgment of this court as to the validity of that judgment, the effect of which was not that it was void only from the time the decision was made, but that it was void ab initio. As such it could have been attacked in any collateral proceeding without appealing the question to this court. We are not disposed to discuss the question as to the effect of a sale under a void judgment, upon the title of one who purchases in good faith from a party who takes his title directly from the sheriff. That point was not considered in the argument, nor is it necessary to the decision of the case. The defendant purchased with notice of the defects of Alexander & Co.'s title, because he took his title by quitclaim deed. In such cases the law presumes that the purchaser had notice of the defects of his grantor's title, and that he purchased at his own risk. There was no error, however, in admitting the deeds in evidence, because no objection was made by the plaintiff to their introduction. But it is objected that the court erred in giving certain instructions at the request of the defendants. These instructions are as follows:

2. "The sheriff's deed to Alexander & Co. gave color of title, and the deed to Alexander & Co. conveying to Isenbeck gave color of title in Isenbeck; and if the jury believe from the evidence that Isenbeck went into possession of the property in good faith, believing such title to be good, and that he, or he and the defendant Gamble, expended large sums of money in developing the mines or in making valuable improvements thereon, with the knowledge of plaintiff, under such circumstances that plaintiff might have necessarily notified them of his claim to the property, and that plaintiff did not give such

notice, then it makes no difference whether the sheriff's deed was good or bad, the plaintiff is estopped from setting up or claiming any right or title whatever to the property."

"If the jury believe, from...