Leli v. V2X, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 May 2023
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-02427-TWP-TAB
• Parties: MAJ. JAMES LELI As Personal Representative of the Estate of KelliAnn Leli, Plaintiff, v. V2X, INC., VECTRUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, VECTRUS, INC., ARI TAYLOR, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

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MAJ. JAMES LELI As Personal Representative of the Estate of KelliAnn Leli, Plaintiff, v. V2X, INC., VECTRUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, VECTRUS, INC., ARI TAYLOR, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-02427-TWP-TAB

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

May 16, 2023

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND

Hon Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Remand filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442, and 1446 by Plaintiff Major James Leli, as Personal Representative of the Estate of KelliAnn Leli (the "Estate") (Filing No 14). The Estate initiated this action in state court after Defendant Ari Taylor ("Taylor"), while acting in the scope of his employment for Defendants V2X, Inc., Vectrus Systems Corporation, and Vectrus, Inc. (together, the "Vectrus Defendants"), struck and killed Captain Dr. KelliAnn Leli ("Capt. Leli") (Filing No 1-2). The Vectrus Defendants removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and the Estate contends remand is required. For the following reasons, the Court determines that removal is appropriate and the Estate's Motion for Remand is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The Vectrus Defendants are all Indiana corporations (Filing No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 2-4). At the time of the incident giving rise to this suit, the Vectrus Defendants were government contractors for the United States Air Force (Filing No. 1 at ¶ 16). Under their services contract with the Air Force, they provided "personnel, labor, vehicles, supervision, training, tools, equipment, safety equipment and other items necessary to support" certain installation services for the Air Force at the Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. Id. at 16; see (Filing No. 1-4 (services contract)). Those installation services included the delivery of potable water and the provision of forklift support for water delivery (Filing No. 1 at ¶ 19). At all relevant times, Taylor was an employee of the Vectrus Defendants who operated a commercial forklift to deliver water at the Al Dhafra Air Base.

On the morning of November 27, 2020, Capt. Leli was walking at the Al Dhafra Air Base in an area designated for both pedestrian and vehicle traffic (Filing No. 1-2 at ¶ 7). At the same time, Taylor was driving a forklift in the course and scope of his employment for the Vectrus Defendants. Id. at ¶ 6-8. Taylor and Capt. Leli were traveling on perpendicular paths, heading toward one another. Id. at ¶ 9. However, Taylor did not see or yield to Capt. Leli because he was texting while driving the forklift. Id. at ¶ 11, 13-14. Tragically, Taylor struck Capt. Leli and, unaware that he had struck someone, drove over Capt. Leli, killing her. Id.

On November 15, 2022, Capt. Leli's husband, Maj. James Leli, as the Personal Representative of her Estate, initiated this action in the Marion (Indiana) Superior Court 2, asserting state law tort claims against Taylor and the Vectrus Defendants. Id. At 2. On December 19, 2022, the Vectrus Defendants timely removed this action to federal court asserting federal jurisdiction over the Estate's tort claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), commonly referred to as the "Federal Officer Removal Statute" (Filing No. 1 at ¶ 7-8). On January 18, 2023, the Estate filed a motion seeking to remand this action back to the Marion Superior Court 2 (Filing No. 14). The Estate's Motion for Remand is now ripe for the Court's review.^[1]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based." Id. § 1446(b)(1).

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

"The party seeking removal bears the burden of proving the grounds for its motion." Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Shah v. Inter-Continental Hotel Chi. Operating Corp., 314 F.3d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 2002); Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Vectrus Defendants removed this action under the federal officer removal statute, which provides that a civil action "commenced in a State court . . . against or directed to" an officer of the United States "may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). The federal officer removal statute requires that a party seeking removal show: (1) it was a "person"; (2) it was "acting under" the United States, its agencies, or its officers; (3) it has been sued "for or relating to any act under color of such office," and (4) it has a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff's claims. Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1180-81.

"Unlike the general removal statute, the federal officer removal statute is to be broadly construed in favor of a federal forum." In re Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Couns. Against or Directed to Defender Ass'n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 466-67 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The Supreme Court's jurisprudence teaches that the policy in favor of federal officer removal 'should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of § 1442(a)(1).'" Baker v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 962 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969)).

The Estate does not dispute that the Vectrus Defendants satisfy the first two requirements of the federal officer removal statute. The Estate argues only that the Vectrus Defendants were not acting "under color" of federal authority and that they have no colorable federal defense to the Estate's claims. The Court will address these two arguments in turn.

A. Vectrus Defendants Were Acting Under Color of Federal Authority.

In their Notice of Removal, the Vectrus Defendants contend they were acting "under color" of federal authority because the incident occurred on the Al Dhafra Air Base and, absent their services contract with the Air Force, their employee, Taylor, would not have been operating the forklift that struck Capt. Leli (Filing No. 1 at ¶¶ 24-25). The Estate contends that these allegations are not enough and that the Vectrus Defendants must further demonstrate a "'causal connection, between the charged conduct and asserted official authority.'" (Filing No. 14 at 4 (quoting Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1181). In response, the Vectrus Defendants argue that courts have interpreted the "causal connection" requirement expansively, and that their water delivery services at the Air Base satisfy a the more relaxed "causal connection" test (Filing No. 23).

The parties' references to "causal connection" are misplaced. In Baker v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 962 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2020),^[2] the Seventh Circuit abandoned the "causal connection" test and "join[ed] all the courts of appeals that have replaced causation with connection and expressly adopt[ed] that standard as [its] own." Id. at 944. Under the "connection" test, "it is 'sufficient for [defendants] to have shown that their relationship to [the plaintiff] derived solely from their official duties.'" Id. (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409). "Simply stated, the [Vectrus Defendants] did not need to allege 'that the complained-of conduct itself was at the behest of a federal agency. It is sufficient for the "color of authority" inquiry that the allegations are directed at the relationship' between the [Vectrus Defendants] and the federal government." Id. at 945 (emphasis in original) (quoting Def. Ass'n of Philadelphia, 790 F.3d at 470).

The Baker court explained that a "connection" test is appropriate in light of Congress's 2011 amendments to the federal officer removal act and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute:

Before 2011, removing defendants "were required to demonstrate that the acts for which they were being sued occurred at least in part because of what they were asked to do by the Government. In 2011, however, the statute was amended to encompass suits for or relating to any act under color of federal office." Since then, three . . . circuits have concluded that, in the Removal Clarification Act, "Congress broadened federal officer removal to actions, not just causally connected, but alternatively connected or associated, with acts under color of federal office." . . . This position better comports with the Supreme Court's decisions, which have never utilized a rigid causation standard for removal. Indeed, long before the Removal Clarification Act of 2011, the Court had opined that 'the statute does not require that the [lawsuit] must be for the very acts which the [defendant] admits to have been done . . . under federal authority. It is enough that [the] acts . . . constitute the basis . . . of the state [lawsuit]."

Baker, 962 F.3d at 943-44 (emphasis in original) (quoting Def. Ass'n of Philadelphia, 790 F.3d at 471; Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926)).

The "connection" test is plainly satisfied here. The Estate alleges that the incident arose during Taylor's...