Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of America, Inc.

• Citation: 156 N.J.Super. 441,383 A.2d 1220
• Parties: Joseph A. LEMALDI, II, Plaintiff, v. DE TOMASO OF AMERICA, INC., Lincoln-Mercury Division of Ford Motor Company, De Tomaso Automobile S.p.A. and Clairidge Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Defendants.
• Decision Date: 30 January 1978
• Court: Superior Court of New Jersey

Page 441

156 N.J.Super. 441

383 A.2d 1220

Joseph A. LEMALDI, II, Plaintiff, v. DE TOMASO OF AMERICA, INC., Lincoln-Mercury Division of Ford

Motor Company, De Tomaso Automobile S.p.A. and

Clairidge Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Defendants.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

Jan. 30, 1978.

Gary A. Werner, Hackensack, for plaintiff.

Richard L. Plotkin, Morristown, and Daniel Ellis, Livingston, for defendants (Pitney, Hardin & Kipp, Morristown, attorneys).

LANDAU, J. S. C.

Following the jury verdict in this matter, defendants (hereinafter referred to as "Ford") moved in the alternative for judgment n. o. v., new trial or remittitur, limited to that part of the verdict which awards $8,000 to plaintiff for "mental anguish."

At the close of plaintiff's case I denied defendant's motion for dismissal of the claim. On the question of liability the jury had to determine whether such "mental anguish" was proximately caused and reasonably to be foreseen arising out of actions or failure to act of Ford regional personnel in dealing with plaintiff's complaint of continued uncorrected malfunctions of his defective Pantera sports car.

Ford's motions test whether, absent wanton or malicious conduct, an automobile manufacturer can be held liable for tortiously inflicting mental anguish through such action or inaction in any circumstance, and if so, whether the evidence in this case supports the jury finding, either as to causation or extent of damages.

Plaintiff initially sought recovery from Ford on counts of negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty and fraud under N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, and for punitive damages arising out of wanton and willful conduct. He dropped a request for rescission prior to trial, and his claim against the dealer was settled prior to selection of the jury. Following plaintiff's case certain motions for involuntary dismissal were granted, leaving in the case only the question of liability for repair and replacement costs, and the mental anguish issue. Ford does not here question the jury's award of $4,000 for repair and replacement costs.

The respective standards governing motions for judgment, new trial and remittitur under R. 4:40-2(b) and R. 4:49 have been reviewed most recently in Baxter v. Fairmount Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 379 A.2d 225 (1977), and earlier in Taweel v. Starn's Shoprite, 58 N.J. 227, 276 A.2d 861 (1971), and Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 258 A.2d 706 (1969). In the case of defendant's motion for judgment n. o. v. the motion must be denied if, accepting as true all of the evidence supporting plaintiff's position, and affording to plaintiff the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be made therefrom, reasonable minds could differ.

As to the new trial motion, a process of weighing is involved which requires a canvassing of the record, not only respecting the proofs, but with a view towards elements such as the demeanor of witnesses and "the feel of the case," sufficient to convince the court that there is a miscarriage of justice under the law.

With respect to the request for a remittitur, trial judges are cautioned not to interfere with the quantum of damages assessed by a jury unless it is so clearly disproportionate to the injury as to shock one's conscience and to convince the judge that to sustain the award would be manifestly unjust. Baxter v. Fairmount Foods, supra. There must be a pervading sense of wrongness, including factors such as manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, obvious overlooking or undervaluation of crucial evidence, or a clearly unjust result.

Having in mind the foregoing standards, a brief review of the proofs is warranted.

Plaintiff was a personable young man, who convincingly recounted an unrebutted sequence of automotive horrors which commenced when he bought an expensive new sports car on the occasion of his birthday. The Pantera, imported from Italy, is a Ford product.

Lemaldi testified that on the very first day he drove the car, it pulled to the right. This condition persisted, defying correction. He recounted a total breakdown and towing ¹ only three weeks after he got the car. Three months after he bought the car it required a valve job and had transmission problems.

During the warranty period the air conditioner fell out in the street; bushings continually burned out; the windshield leaked, the windshield wiper malfunctioned. The car continually overheated, leading to severe mechanical failures; the seat tore repeatedly under normal usage; the transmission ground; the radiator leaked; there were clutch problems, and the pulling to the right was never corrected. These and other problems, plaintiff testified, kept his car in the shop for repairs an average of two times a month during the initial one-year warranty period.

Thereafter, the car continued to overheat, malfunction and breakdown, requiring constant towing, repair and parts replacement. Dozens of repair bills and the unrebutted testimony of several foreign car experts supported the jury finding that approximately $4,000 in post-warranty repair bills were attributable to defects in Pantera design and manufacture. Having been forced to rent cars on many occasions, Lemaldi ultimately had to purchase another car. The Pantera, beautiful but unusable, now rests in state in a carpeted garage which, plaintiff, testified, looks "better than his room."

Although defendants argue that plaintiff's testimony respecting his contacts with Ford personnel were limited to one conversation in which a representative became hostile to Lemaldi, plaintiff in fact testified to a number of unsatisfactory contacts with various Ford personnel from the Teterboro office.

Even the testimony of Ford's sole witness supported plaintiff's case. Among the several defects found by Ford on a field visit were prematurely worn bearings, the prevention of which was the subject of bulletins to Ford dealers. There was no evidence that Ford did anything to remedy the defects which it found, or that it advised plaintiff earlier of preventative or corrective measures.

There was unrebutted proof of two years in which plaintiff's $12,000 dream car became a nightmare of expense and breakdown. Against this background the jury reasonably could have determined that when Ford regional personnel, aware of plaintiff's problems with the Pantera's Ford-caused defects, failed to take or advise him of corrective action or to honor his claims, and responded to Lemaldi varyingly from open hostility to inattention; in the already exasperating circumstances such conduct would aggravate an ordinary man to the point of "mental anguish."

The defendant would have this court determine that Ford owed no duty to this plaintiff to avoid exposing him to unreasonable aggravation and mental distress, and that unless willful malicious conduct is shown, our law affords him no recompense for such injury. I do not agree. Duty is largely grounded in the natural responsibilities of social living and human relations, such as have the recognition of reasonable men; fulfillment is had by a correlative standard of conduct. Wytupeck v. Camden...