LeMaster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
Decision Date | 16 September 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 85-3156,85-3156 |
Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,069 James LeMASTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Sanford A. Meizlish, Andreoff & Ricketts, Columbus, Ohio, Clifford Farrell (argued), for plaintiff-appellant.
Nicholas J. Pantel, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.
Before KRUPANSKY, NELSON and RYAN, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a district court judgment affirming a final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying claimant LeMaster's application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. Claimant alleges that since August of 1980 he has been permanently and totally disabled because of an inability voluntarily to control alcohol intake. He also contends that if he is not found to be disabled on account of alcoholism alone, we should find him disabled based on the combination of the alcoholism with three other impairments: (1) a passive-aggressive personality disorder; (2) loss of sight in one eye; and (3) chronic arthritis. We have concluded that the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence, and we shall affirm the judgment of the district court.
The evidence is clear that claimant is an alcoholic, drinking about two "fifths" (750 ml. each) of liquor each week. In 1979 he was treated for a liver disorder. In June of 1981 claimant admitted himself to the hospital after his wife found him passed out and "foaming at the mouth." He was diagnosed as having acute and chronic alcoholism and alcoholic liver disease. After four days in the "detoxification" phase of the hospital's treatment, he was told that he was ready to begin the "rehabilitation" phase of the program. Claimant checked himself out of the hospital, against the advice of his doctors and his wife's intervention notwithstanding. In December of 1981 and March of 1982 claimant was treated for alcoholic gastritis, the doctor observing on the latter occasion that claimant had alcohol on his breath.
In the opinion of the examiner, Mr. LeMaster is impaired in his ability to maintain his attention to perform simple repetitive tasks.
In the opinion of the examiner, Mr. LeMaster is unable to withstand the stress and pressures associated with day-to-day work activity. He is able of managing his own funds."
Dr. Cherry recommended that claimant participate in an in-patient alcohol program lasting at least six weeks.
The alleged eye problem seems spurious. The examination of one Dr. Belisle shows that claimant's right eye is a bit weak at 10/200, but another examination puts the right eye at 20/30. But even Dr. Belisle rates the corrected vision in both eyes when used together at 20/30.
Claimant has been treated for arthritis on several occasions. In July 1979 it was recorded that "[t]he patient has also had problems with chronic arthritic pains for which he takes Butazolidin and has for a long period of time." The same report indicates that claimant "admits to drinking frequently" and that he had an enlarged liver. He was working at this time and he continued to do so until August of 1980; it thus appears that claimant was an arthritic alcoholic for some time without its impairing his ability to work. In 1981 he was put on 400 mg. of Motrin for arthritic pain in his left shoulder. He was still taking Motrin for left shoulder and left hip arthritic pain in 1982. Even in 1982, however, the "[r]ange of motion of the lumbosacral spine, left hip and left shoulder was all within normal limits."
Claimant also complains of dizziness and blackouts. Dr. Cherry seems to believe that this is related to claimant's alcohol abuse. Claimant filed for disability benefits on November 18, 1981. His application was denied by the agency staff and by the ALJ, and the Appeals Council, a U.S. Magistrate, and District Judge Rice all declined to grant relief. Like the district court, this court reviews the Secretary's denial of Social Security Disability benefits only to determine whether the Secretary's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1383(c)(3), 405(g); Farris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 773 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir.1985). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). The evidence National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co. 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct. 501, 505, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939). Further, "[s]ubstantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole." Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir.1980). The court "may not focus and base [its] decision entirely on a single piece of evidence, and disregard other pertinent evidence." Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.1978).
There was no evidence or history of insomnia, loss of weight, or suicidal or antisocial tendencies. Appellant failed to establish on the record during the pertinent time such 'recurrent and persistent periods of anxiety, with tension, apprehension, and interference with concentration and memory' to qualify as disabled under the law and pertinent regulations. 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1, Sec. 12.04. The Secretary found substantial basis in the record, considered as a whole, to support his finding of 'no marked restriction of daily activities and constr[i]ction of interests.' Gerst failed to show, in summary, any mental, emotional or personality disturbance type of disorder related to his alcoholism that would establish a disability under sections 223(d)(1) or 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act, or any impairment under 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1517 (1980)." 709 F.2d at 1077.
Gerst, a former stockbroker, had been able to handle the sale of his home, certain stocks, a boat and other real estate. He also managed to do the shopping for himself and his mother with whom he lived. Id. at 1076, n. 1.
The claimant in the instant case, according to his own testimony, has likewise been able to engage in a wide range of normal functions. He has been able to drive four or five miles to his son's place of employment almost every day. He goes out to visit friends and family for an hour or two each day. All of these friends are within four or five miles of his home. He does occasional yard work, mowing his lawn with a riding mower "about four times in the past year [1982]." He is able to take care of his personal needs most of the time, although he says he is sometimes unable to lift his arms to put on a shirt or care for his hair. (It will be recalled that he has been found to have a normal range of shoulder motion.) He exercises by walking for periods of about twenty-five or thirty minutes. Like Mr. Gerst, he seems to have "no marked restriction of daily activities and constr[i]ction of interests." Gerst, 709 F.2d at...
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