Lemay v. Hardin
| Decision Date | 22 May 2001 |
| Citation | 48 S.W.3d 59 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2001) Doyal Lemay, Respondent v. Esther G. Hardin, Appellant. WD58626 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Justine Elisa DelMuro
Opinion Summary: Respondent Doyal Lemay brought an action in partition seeking a division of real property titled jointly with the right of survivorship with Ms. Esther Hardin. He contributed the full amount of the purchase price, and the trial court award him one hundred percent of the property and ordered him to pay Ms. Hardin $3,875.00 for improvements and repairs to the property.
Division Two holds: Where one joint tenant with the right of survivorship brings an action in partition, seeking a division of the property, § 528.030 authorizes the trial court to either divide the property in kind or to order a sale of the property and divide the proceeds among the joint tenants according to their respective contributions. Section 528.030 does not grant the trial court the authority to award one cotenant the entire property while ordering that same cotenant to reimburse the other joint tenant for her contributions to the property.
Mr. Doyal Lemay brought an action in partition for real property located at 10900 East 97th Terrace, Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri. Mr. Lemay and Ms. Esther G. Hardin entered a real estate contract, and both parties' names appeared on the recorded deed as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Several years ago, they had a social relationship, but they separated, and Mr. Lemay eventually married another lady named Judith. Mr. Lemay and Judith eventually divorced. Mr. Lemay and Judith owned property in Louisiana. His former wife executed a quitclaim deed to the property following the dissolution of their marriage. Mr. Lemay sold the Louisiana property, and the proceeds were used to purchase the subject property. He lived alone in the new home while Ms. Hardin lived in her own home. Hence, the subject property was purchased with one hundred percent of Mr. Lemay's money, and Ms. Hardin did not contribute any money to the purchase of the property.
According to Mr. Lemay, he did not want Ms. Hardin to sell her home or contribute any money to fund the purchase of the new property. He testified at the trial that Ms. Hardin advised him to place her name on the deed so that his former wife would not have any claims to the property. He also testified that Ms. Hardin agreed to execute a quitclaim deed at his request. Ms. Hardin testified that Mr. Lemay purchased the property in contemplation of their marriage. Mr. Lemay placed the proceeds from the sale of his Louisiana home into a payable on death account shared by Ms. Hardin. He financed the purchase of the new home with the money from that account. But, after he purchased the home, the couple had a disagreement and never discussed marriage again. She did not execute a quitclaim deed to the property because she claims that he wanted her to have the property after his death.
The Honorable Justine Elisa Del Muro presided at the bench trial and found that Ms. Hardin's name was placed on the title to the property in contemplation of marriage, but the parties never married. Ms. Hardin did contribute to the home by painting and cleaning it, but Mr. Lemay paid for the home in full with his money. The trial court stated that she was only entitled to her contribution to the purchase of the home. The trial court, therefore, awarded Ms. Hardin three thousand eight hundred and seventy-five dollars ($3,875.00) as reimbursement for her contributions to the home. Furthermore, the trial court awarded Mr. Lemay one hundred percent of the property. This appeal follows.
Ms. Hardin raises two points on appeal. In her first point, she contends that the trial court erred by holding that Mr. Lemay was the owner of the real property because it was held in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, and the trial court's holding, misapplied the law of partition in that the land, which is the subject of the action in partition, must be sold if not capable of being partitioned in kind, with the sale proceeds distributed between the joint tenants. Further, the trial court failed to state whether the property could be partitioned in kind or order a sale of the property and, instead, awarded Mr. Lemay one hundred percent interest in the property and $3,875.00 to Ms. Hardin as her contribution to the purchase of the property. The final point on appeal alleges that the trial court erred in basing each joint tenant's award on his or her contribution to the acquisition of the property because ownership of jointly held property on the basis of contribution to the purchase of the property has been applied when persons acquiring property as married persons are found to be not married and living in a meretricious relationship.
The standard of review in a court-tried case is guided by the principles enunciated in Murphy v. Carron.1 The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law.2
Ms. Hardin alleges that the trial court was obligated under Chapter 528, RSMo 1994, and Rule 96.08, which govern actions in partition, to order the real property located at 10900 East 97th Terrace, Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, titled jointly with the right of survivorship, to be sold if it could not be divided in kind without prejudice to the parties. The trial court awarded Mr. Lemay one hundred percent of the property, but ordered him to compensate Ms. Hardin in the amount of $3,875.00 for her contribution to the home. Ms. Hardin contends that this judgment failed to comply with the remedy available for partition actions by failing to order the property to be sold or failing to divide it in kind. Since this point is dispositive of this appeal, we will not address Ms. Hardin's second point on appeal.
Ms. Hardin fails to clearly apprise this court of the relief she is seeking, but after careful review of her Appellate Brief, we glean from her argument that she believes she is entitled to more compensation than the trial court afforded her for the subject property because the property was titled jointly. Although her argument is flawed, we nevertheless recognize that the relief granted by the trial court to each party was erroneous.
Partition is an action governed by statute.3 Section 528.030 states:
In all cases where lands, tenements or hereditaments are held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or coparcenary, including estates in fee, for life, or for years, tenancy by the curtesy and in dower, it shall be lawful for any one or more of the parties interested therein, whether adults or minors, to file a petition in the circuit court of the proper county, asking for the admeasurement and setting off of any dower interest therein, if any, and for the partition of the remainder, if the same can be done without great prejudice to the parties in interest; and if not, then for a sale of the premises, and a division of the proceeds thereof among all of the parties, according to their respective rights and interests.
Partition is the appropriate remedy when parties who hold land as joint tenants want to divide the property.4 The trial court, however, did not divide the property; instead it determined which party owned the property. Partition is appropriate when the trial court is asked to divide the interests of the property where ownership is not at issue. Although the trial court awarded one hundred percent of the property to Mr. Lemay, Ms. Hardin claims that the trial court did not actually order partition, or if it did, that the trial court did not order the proper relief for partition. We agree.
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