Lemberos v. Laurel Racecourse, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. H-79-710. |
| Citation | 489 F. Supp. 1376 |
| Parties | Nikitas LEMBEROS, Plaintiff, v. LAUREL RACECOURSE, INC., Frank J. Brady, General Manager, Laurel Racecourse, Inc., Louis Raffetto, Racing Secretary, Laurel Racecourse, Inc., Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., William Linton, Past General Manager, Timonium Race Track, Howard M. Mosner, Jr., Acting General Manager, Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., Southern Maryland Agricultural Association of Prince George's County, Maryland, Inc., Alvin A. Karwacki, General Manager, Southern Maryland Agricultural Association of Prince George's County, Maryland, Inc., Lawrence J. Abbundi, Racing Secretary, Southern Maryland Agricultural Association of Prince George's County, Maryland, Inc., Maryland Jockey Club, Charles J. Lang, General Manager, Maryland Jockey Club, James Fred Colwill, Chief Steward, Maryland Racing Commission, Lawrence R. Lacey, Associate Steward, Maryland Racing Commission, Edward Litzenberger, Associate Steward, Maryland Racing Commission, Clinton P. Pitts, Jr., Associate Steward, Maryland Racing Commission, Maryland Racing Commission, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Warren K. Rich and Niles, Barton & Wilmer, Annapolis, Md., for plaintiff.
William F. C. Marlow, Jr., and Thomas J. Peddicord, Jr., Towson, Md., for defendants Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., William Linton and Howard M. Mosner, Jr.
Nancy E. Paige and Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, Baltimore, Md., for defendants Laurel Racecourse, Inc., Frank J. Brady and Louis Raffetto.
Joseph M. Roulhac and Smith, Somerville & Case, Baltimore, Md., for defendants Maryland Jockey Club and Charles J. Lang.
James L. Shea and Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Md., for defendants Southern Maryland Agricultural Ass'n, Inc., Alvin A. Karwacki and Lawrence J. Abbundi.
Alan M. Foreman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for defendants Maryland Racing Com'n, James Fred Colwill, Lawrence R. Lacey, Edward Litzenberger and Clinton P. Pitts, Jr.
This civil action has been brought by a professional trainer of thoroughbred race horses against fifteen individual and corporate defendants and one governmental entity. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants have conspired to deprive him of his ability to pursue his occupation in the State of Maryland by preventing him from obtaining stall space for his horses at the four major race tracks in Maryland and thereby precluding him from obtaining entry of his horses in races at these tracks. Plaintiff asserts that, since he was not afforded the opportunity for a hearing before this action was taken, the defendants have violated his rights under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He has further alleged that he is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Other constitutional claims are also advanced, and finally plaintiff alleges that the defendants have tortiously interfered with several of his contracts.
Named as defendants in this case are the Laurel Racecourse, Inc., Frank J. Brady (its General Manager) and Louis Raffetto (its Racing Secretary); the Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., William Linton (formerly its General Manager) and Howard M. Mosner, Jr. (its General Manager); the Southern Maryland Agricultural Association of Prince George's County, Maryland, Inc.,1 Alvin A. Karwacki (its General Manager) and Lawrence J. Abbundi (its Racing Secretary); and the Maryland Jockey Club and Charles J. Lang (its General Manager). The four corporate defendants operate Laurel, Bowie, Timonium and Pimlico, which are the four major horse race tracks in the State of Maryland. All the individual defendants are currently serving as general managers or racing secretaries of the defendant corporations or were serving in one of those capacities at the time of the alleged violations. These eleven defendants will be collectively referred to as the "private defendants."
Also named as defendants are the Maryland Racing Commission (hereinafter the "Commission"), an agency of the State of Maryland which regulates horse racing in the State, and racing stewards James Fred Colwill, Lawrence R. Lacey, Edward Litzenberger and Clinton P. Pitts, Jr. Defendant Colwill is the Chief Steward and defendants Lacey, Litzenberger and Pitts are Associate Stewards appointed by the Commission.
Plaintiff's complaint contains six Counts. His first and second Counts allege due process and equal protection claims arising directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. His third Count incorporates claims asserted in the first two Counts and is based on § 1983. In Count IV, plaintiff contends that a Commission Rule2 which forbids a trainer from occupying stalls at a race track without the written permission of the track management violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff's fifth Count asserts that the Commission's broad delegation of powers to the racing stewards is unconstitutionally vague and also constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative functions in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In the final Count, plaintiff charges that the defendants have tortiously interfered with certain of his contracts. Counts I to IV are asserted under federal law, Count V under federal and state law and Count VI under state law.
Plaintiff seeks $1.3 million in compensatory damages, $2 million in punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs. He also requests a declaration that Commission Rule 09.10.01.57(v) violates the Federal and State Constitutions. Finally, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants from arbitrarily denying him stall space at the State tracks without cause and without notice and a hearing.
Presently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss the complaint, a motion for summary judgment and three motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, filed on behalf of all sixteen defendants. All of the pending motions will be treated as motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See Rule 12(b), F.R.Civ.P. Various affidavits and exhibits have been filed in support of and in opposition to the pending motions. Extensive briefs have been submitted by the parties, and oral argument on the motions has been heard in open court.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, the motions of the private defendants to dismiss or for summary judgment will be granted as to all Counts and judgment will be entered in favor of all eleven private defendants. The motion for summary judgment of the Commission and the racing stewards will be granted with respect to Count V, but will be denied with respect to Counts I, II, III, IV and VI.
The principles of law which are applicable to the granting or denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment are well known. A motion to dismiss should be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Under Rule 56, F.R. Civ.P., summary judgment may be entered if the pleadings, affidavits and other facts established by the record show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The motions of the private defendants
The claims asserted by the plaintiff against the four groups of private defendants are identical and the motions filed by these defendants raise the same questions. In general, the private defendants seek dismissal of the complaint or summary judgment on the following grounds:
1. That Counts I through IV require proof of state action and the record here establishes that defendants' actions did not constitute state action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment;
2. That the record here establishes that plaintiff has not been deprived of any right guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of the United States;
3. That Count V fails to state a claim against the defendants because it neither makes an allegation against them nor seeks relief from them;
4. That defendants are not liable as a matter of law to the plaintiff for tortious interference with any contracts which he may have entered into, as alleged in Count VI; and
5. That this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of Counts V and VI, insofar as the private defendants are concerned.
(1) State action
In Counts I through III, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendants denied his application for stall space at their tracks without providing him with notice or an opportunity for a hearing, in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 In Count IV, he has contended that a Commission Rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
With reference to the claims asserted by the plaintiff against the private defendants, the critical and threshold issue is whether their actions constituted state action as that term has been construed by the courts. A plaintiff must allege and prove state action if he is to recover under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). Similarly, § 1983 specifically provides remedies for unconstitutional acts performed under color of state law, and therefore § 1983 also requires proof of state action. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966). Since the standards are virtually the same, the state action issues under the Fourteenth Amendment a...
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