Lemieux v. Lataille
| Decision Date | 20 July 1950 |
| Docket Number | 9108,Nos. 9107,s. 9107 |
| Citation | 75 A.2d 184,77 R.I. 282 |
| Parties | LEMIEUX v. LATAILLE et ux. (two cases). Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Walter H. Sharkey, of Woonsocket, for plaintiffs.
Francis V. Reynolds and Joseph V. Cavanagh, of Providence, for defendants.
These two actions of trespass on the case for negligence were tried together in the superior court and, after verdicts for the plaintiffs, were brought to this court by defendants' bills of exceptions. Each bill contains identical exceptions as follows: First, to the overruling of defendants' demurrer to the declaration; and second, to the denial of their motion for a directed verdict.
The plaintiffs are husband and wife. The wife's action is for injuries alleged to have been caused by defendants' negligence. The husband's action is for expenses incurred by him in the treatment of her injuries. Since, under the exceptions being prosecuted, his case is dependent upon his wife's case we shall hereinafter for convenience discuss the points raised as though only her case were before us.
We are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in overruling the demurrer to the declaration. The declaration alleges substantially that the defendants were innkeepers and as such did keep an inn at 30 Ascension street in the city of Woonsocket, known as the Hillside Hotel, for the accommodation of guests for hire; that they received plaintiff as a guest on or about July 2, 1947 and assigned her a room on the third floor which she thereupon entered and occupied; that as a necessary part of such accommodations for guests on that floor toilet facilities were provided on a landing between the second and third floors; that it was the duty of defendants to keep the hallways and stairways leading thereto properly lighted and in a safe condition for the proper use of guests on the third floor; that on July 2, 1947 about 8:55 p. m. defendants not regarding such duty permitted the hallway and stairway leading to the second floor to remain unlighted; that plaintiff sought to use said stairway in order to avail herself of said toilet accommodations; and that as a result of seeking to use such unlighted stairway and while in the exercise of due care she was severely injured.
Defendants demurred to the declaration on the grounds that they were under no duty to plaintiff as therein alleged; that it was not their duty to keep hallways and stairways lighted; and that the declaration does not set forth a cause of action in trespass on the case for negligence. In support of their exception to the overruling of such demurrer defendants contend that at common law there is no duty incumbent upon them as innkeepers to light the hallways and stairways of their hotel, and for authority for such contention they rely upon Capen v. Hall, 21 R.I. 364, 43 A. 847, and Rietzel v. Cary, 66 R.I. 418, 19 A.2d 760.
Neither case is in point on the facts of the instant case which the demurrer admits. Here we have the relation of innkeeper and guest and not landlord and tenant or proprietor and invitee. In the Capen case the defendants were the owners of a business block in the city of Providence and the plaintiff was an invitee of a tenant thereof. She was injured when she tripped and fell because of insufficient light in the hallways and stairways. This court sustained a demurrer to the declaration on the ground that, in the absence of a structural defect therein in the nature of a trap or pitfall, such owner owed no duty to an invitee to light his premises. The court rested its opinion on established principles of the law governing the relation of landlord and tenant.
In the Rietzel case the defendant was the owner of an apartment house in which artificial lights in hallways and stairways were automatically shut off at 12:30 a. m. in accordance with an understanding or agreement between the owner and his tenants. The plaintiff who was the invitee of a tenant fell down an unlighted stairway after 12:30 a. m. and was injured. The declaration alleged that defendant was negligent in not lighting such stairway and also because of the peculiar construction of the stairway which was alleged to be dangerous unless artificially lighted. The sufficiency of the declaration was not questioned in that case, but after a decision on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs defendant excepted thereto on the ground that the decision was against the law. We followed the law laid down in the Capen case and held that defendant as a landlord was under no duty to his tenant or the invitee to light the stairway except as agreed to between them.
In the case at bar we are concerned with the relation of innkeeper and guest and not with that of landlord and tenant. An innkeeper is under a duty to keep his inn reasonably safe for his guests. 32 C.J., Innkeepers, 562, § 70; 43 C.J.S., Innkeepers, § 22. His guests are, in a sense, under his protection while properly under his roof enjoying the accommodations provided for them. As a part of his duty to them generally, he must in particular 'exercise ordinary or reasonable care to keep the hallways, passageways, and stairways reasonably well lighted and free of obstructions or hazards.' 43 C.J.S., Innkeepers, § 22, p. 1179. The following are a few of a great number of cases which have recognized the above-mentioned rule in actions against hotel keepers for personal injuries suffered by guests by reason of falling in unlighted hallways or stairways. Criswell v. Bankers Mortgage Co., 128 Kan. 609, 278 P. 722; Williams v. Mayer, La.App., 4 So.2d 71; Ritter v. Norman, 71 Wash. 563, 129 P. 103, 43 L.R.A., N.S., 657; Morten Investment Co. v. Jordan, Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 887; Stein v. Buckingham Realty Co., Mo.App., 60 S.W.2d 712; Burgauer v. McClellan, 205 Ky. 51, 265 S.W. 439; Fort Dodge Hotel Co. v. Bartelt, 8 Cir., 119 F.2d 253.
The declaration in the instant case properly states a cause of action based upon the established principles of the common law regulating the conduct of innkeepers toward their guests. Irrespective of the statute, General Laws 1938, chapter 357, § 13, as amended, which plaintiff did not plead but relied upon in argument, the declaration clearly alleges the common-law duty and a breach of it. And it further alleges that such breach was the proximate cause of her fall and injury, she being in the exercise of due care. Defendants' demurrer to the declaration was, therefore, properly overruled by the trial justice.
After all the evidence was in, defendants renewed in substance the contentions which they had made in support of their demurrer and moved for a directed verdict in their favor on such grounds and also on the ground that on no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury find that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. Under their exception to the denial of...
To continue reading
Request your trial