Lemire v. Pilawski

• Decision Date: 07 October 1913
• Parties: LEMIRE v. PILAWSKI.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

88 A. 702

77 N.H. 116

LEMIRE

v. PILAWSKI.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Hillsborough.

Oct. 7, 1913.

Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Chamberlin, Judge.

Action for negligence by Oliva Lemire against Joseph Pilawski. Transferred from the Superior Court, after a verdict for plaintiff, on defendant's exception. Exception overruled.

The action was brought to recover for injuries received through a collision with a runaway horse belonging to the defendant. The plaintiff offered evidence of a conversation in which the defendant stated that the horse was in charge of servants, who, contrary to his instructions, left it unattended in the street, but that he could do nothing because the horse was insured and he had reported the accident to the office. The defendant objected to the admission of the statement that the horse was insured and that the accident had been reported to the insurance company, but the same was admitted as part of a conversation acknowledging liability, and for no other purpose, subject to the defendant's exception.

David W. Perkins, of Manchester, for plaintiff.

Branch & Branch, of Manchester, and Milfied O. Garner, of Boston, Mass., for defendant.

PARSONS, C. J. Whether the fact that the defendant carried insurance against liability for negligence is, or not, relevant to his care in any particular instance, is a question not presented. The evidence objected to was admitted as a part of a conversation acknowledging liability, but for no other purpose. In the absence of exception to the charge, it must be assumed that the effect of the evidence was properly limited in the instructions to the jury, and that they followed the instructions. Mitchell v. Railroad, 68 N. H. 96, 117, 34 Atl. 674. If the evidence objected to was relevant and competent upon the issue upon which it was admitted, its admission is not error because it might be considered by the jury, in the absense of instructions, or in violation of their duty, upon an issue upon which it was incompetent. Conn. River Power Co. v. Dickinson, 75 N. H. 353, 74 Atl. 585.

The facts stated by the defendant in the conversation tended to show liability on his part. If the defendant's servants carelessly left the horse unattended in the street while engaged in his business, the defendant was liable for the resulting injury. His admission of those facts, if he made it, was practically an admission of liability; and an important issue in the case was whether in...