Lemon v. United States
| Citation | 68 F. Supp. 793 |
| Decision Date | 26 November 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 2812.,2812. |
| Parties | LEMON v. UNITED STATES et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
E. Milton Altfeld, Sidney Hillman and Hillman & Hillman, all of Baltimore, Md., for libelant.
Bernard J. Flynn, U. S. Atty., C. Ross McKenrick, Asst. U. S. Atty., Theodore R. Dankmeyer, and Niles, Barton, Morrow & Yost, all of Baltimore, Md., for respondents.
The question before the court arises on the respondents' exceptions to the amended libel in which it is alleged that the death of a seaman, William Lemon, Jr., employed by the respondents, was caused by their negligence. The suit is evidently brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act which permits suits against the United States, and under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, which permits a suit for damages for injuries caused by negligence in accordance with the principles of the Employers Liability Act.
The facts pleaded in the libel are these.
William Lemon, Jr., on February 4, 1946, was a seaman and member of the crew of the American Steamship "Francis Scott Key", owned and operated by the respondents. The vessel on that date was anchored at Bolivar Roadstead (the entrance to Galveston, Texas Harbor), awaiting an unloading berth at the San Jacinto Ordnance Depot. Some of the crew, including the named seaman, were granted shore leave. About 11 P. M. the seaman in proceeding back to his vessel "found no means afforded him by the Respondents to return from land to the vessel * * * and therefore was forced to board an itinerant launch plying the Galveston Harbor in order to return to his vessel". When the launch arrived at the vessel the seaman was found dead in the cabin of the launch "through fumes of carbon-monoxide gas enveloping the cabin of the launch". The libel then proceeds, as a basis for the charge of negligence and the proximate cause of the seaman's death therefrom, to say "that the death was occasioned by the negligent failure of the Respondents to afford him a reasonably safe place in which to work, safe appliances with which to work, and a reasonably safe means of returning to his vessel".
It will be noted that the libel does not state by what means of transportation the seaman proceeded from the ship to the shore, and particularly does not allege that the ship afforded him this means of transportation by employment of a launch, and does not allege that the ship either expressly or impliedly promised or held out to the seaman that it would furnish either directly or indirectly a launch or other vessel for transportation of the seaman back from shore to the ship. At the hearing on the exceptions special inquiry was made by the court as to the possibilities of amending the libel by alleging further facts in this respect. And it was then stated by counsel for the respondents and conceded, as I understand it, by counsel for the libelant, that the seaman and other members of the crew had engaged and paid for their own transportation from ship to shore and return from shore to ship by paying their own passage money to "itinerant" craft plying in the harbor. Particularly it is to be noted that there is no allegation in the libel and apparently no opportunity to the libelant on the facts to allege or contend that the itinerant launch so employed by the seamen was in any way employed by or under the control or management either directly or indirectly of the ship. Nor are any facts alleged in the libel which would give rise to the obligation of the ship either in law or in fact, by virtue of custom or otherwise, to provide safe transportation for the members of the crew to and from shore.
The point of the case therefore seems to be the narrow one whether, as a feature of the maritime law, in the duties of the ship to members of the crew who have been granted shore leave, there is the obligation on the part of the ship to furnish free and safe transportation to and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dixon v. Grace Lines, Inc.
...the ship is anchored away from the dock. (Miles v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 1370, 1373 (E.D.Tex.1971); Lemon v. United States, 68 F.Supp. 793 (D.Md.1946).) However, if a shipowner contracts with a third party to provide launch service to and from the ship, and a seaman using s......
-
Paul v. United States
...had no dominion or control." (Emphasis supplied.) Also militating against appellant's position is the case of Lemon v. United States, D.C.Md.1946, 68 F.Supp. 793, where it was held that there is no obligation upon the shipowner to furnish transportation to and from shore to seamen granted s......
-
Dangovich v. Isthmian Lines, Inc.
...(3rd Cir. 1953); Wheeler v. West India S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y.1951), aff'd., 205 F. 2d 354 (2d Cir. 1952); Lemon v. United States, 68 F.Supp. 793 (D.Md.1946). This Court said in Wheeler at page 634 of 68 "Though the defendant was duty-bound to provide reasonably safe means of i......
-
Wheeler v. West India SS Co.
...cases indicate an extension of the shipowner's liability so as to include such situations was clearly rejected in Lemon v. United States, D.C., 68 F.Supp. 793, 1946 A.M.C. 1640. The court accordingly is forced to conclude that, at least as yet, it can not be held that the shipowner's liabil......