Lemont v. Estate of Ventura
| Decision Date | 13 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | C.A. NO. PC 06-4776 |
| Parties | GARY LEMONT v. ESTATE OF MARY DELLA VENTURA |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before this Court are the Estate of Mary Della Ventura's ("Defendant") post-trial motions. Gary Lemont ("Plaintiff") asserted a claim of premises negligence against Defendant. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant renewed its previous Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and filed a Motion for New Trial. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14, Super. R. Civ. P. 50, and Super. R. Civ. P. 59.
In September of 2003, Plaintiff visited the house owned by Defendant at 32 Waller Street, Providence, Rhode Island ("the property") to help a tenant at the property move out of a second floor apartment. Plaintiff was moving a nightstand when he paused on the second floor landing. Plaintiff leaned against the second floor landing's railing while attempting to maneuver the nightstand, which Plaintiff later testified was too heavy to carry alone. Plaintiff leaned against the landing's railing, moving the nightstand. One of the railing's posts broke, resulting in Plaintiff's injury.
Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, alleging premises negligence due to "a dangerous and unkempt stairway railing." (Compl. ¶ 4.) On the morning of the fourth trial date certain, September 27, 2010, Plaintiff gave Defendant an "Amended Interrogatory Answer." This document stated Plaintiff's intent to call a building inspector as an expert witness to testify to a building code and violations thereof on the property. The Court construed Plaintiff's action as an oral motion in limine and instructed the parties to prepare for a hearing on that motion. At the hearing, Plaintiff argued for the admissibility of a building code and a building code expert's testimony to describe the alleged code violations on the property. Plaintiff described how he planned to incorporate this evidence into his case and the conclusions he would suggest the jury draw therefrom in his closing argument. Plaintiff did not state that he planned to call upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("res ipsa") to provide an inference of negligence.
The Court denied Plaintiff's motion to admit the proffered building code. In ruling the code irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, the Court reasoned it was unclear whether the code Plaintiff submitted, a document entitled "International Residential Code 2003," ever was or is in effect anywhere in Rhode Island. The Court further reasoned that, even if "International Residential Code 2003" was incorporated into the Rhode Island Building Code, the Rhode Island Code was enacted decades after Defendant's property was built. Thus, the property was "grandfathered in" and not bound by either code. Geloso v. Kenny, 812 A.2d 814, 817 (R.I. 2002) (citing Rodriguez v. Kennedy, 706 A.2d 922, 924 (R.I. 1998)). Consequently, the building inspector's testimony, which would explain the code's requirements and describe shortcomings on the property, was also irrelevant and inadmissible.
The trial was held October 6, 2010. In support of his negligence claim, Plaintiff testified and submitted photographs of the premises. Plaintiff did not refer to res ipsa at any point during the trial. Towards the end of the trial, the Court invited the parties to submit proposed jury instructions. The Court held a conference to discuss the instructions with the parties. Plaintiff neither proposed instruction on res ipsa, nor mentioned the doctrine at the conference.
The Court, as is its customary practice, instructed the jury after the close of the evidence. As res ipsa was never pleaded, brought up in a motion in limine, presented in Plaintiff's case during the trial, suggested in Plaintiff's proposed jury instructions, or mentioned in the jury instruction conference, the Court did not instruct the jury on this evidentiary device. The parties then delivered their closing arguments.
Plaintiff's closing argument focused on the ability of the jury to make an inferential leap from the fact that Plaintiff fell when the railing broke to the conclusion that either the railing or the landing constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition. Plaintiff also encouraged the jury to find that the staircase landing was an unreasonably dangerous condition that Defendant negligently permitted on her property, a finding Plaintiff also suggested the jury could reach by taking an inferential leap from the fact that Plaintiff fell. Plaintiff further urged the jury to find that Defendant should have known about the condition because she purchased insurance. Defendant objected numerous times during Plaintiff's closing argument. Defendant renewed its previously-filed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and moved for a new trial. The Court reserved decision on these motions and permitted the matter to go to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because there was no legally sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find negligence, even with the inference of negligence that res ipsa could permit. Defendant argues that given the dearth of evidence, the jury had to have reached its verdict through speculation and conjecture. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. 1-2.)
In response, Plaintiff argues that the "the jury found sufficient evidence that the landlord was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries." (Pl.'s Mem. in Obj. to Def.'s Mot. p. 1.) Plaintiff further argues that the evidence permitted the jury to infer negligence pursuant to res ipsa. (Pl.'s Mem, in Obj. to Def.'s Mot. p. 3.)
Rule 50(a)(1) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue."
"The trial justice considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and drawsfrom the record all reasonable inferences that support the position of the nonmoving party." Bliss Mine Road Condo. Ass'n v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 11 A.3d 1078, 1083 (R.I. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted). The trial justice must deny the motion "if there are factual issues on which reasonable people may draw different conclusions." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
When a motion for a new trial is not granted, "the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion." Super. R. Civ. P. 50(b). As was the case here, the movant may renew his motion after the entry of judgment. Id. "[I]n disposing of a renewed motion, the court may allow the verdict to stand or may . . . order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law." Id.
Plaintiff's claim of premises negligence is governed by well settled principles of law. "A landlord owes a duty to '[m]ake all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.'" Ramos v. Granajo, 822 A.2d 936 (R.I. 2003) (). To demonstrate a breach of this duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injurious condition on the premises constituted an "unreasonably dangerous condition." Errico, 713 A.2d at 794. If the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence of an unreasonably dangerous condition, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the landowner knew, or should have known, about the dangerous condition. Id.
In his closing argument and in his objection to Defendant's motions, Plaintiff argued that the jury could find, with the help of res ipsa, that either the railing or landing constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition, and that Defendant had, or should havehad, notice thereof. Res ipsa is an evidentiary device that "establishes inferential evidence of a defendant's negligence, thus making out a prima facie case for a plaintiff, and casts upon a defendant the burden of rebutting the same to the satisfaction of the jury." McLaughlin v. Moura, 754 A.2d 95, 98 (R.I. 2000) (quotations omitted).
"The mere occurrence of an accident, without more, does not warrant an inference [derived pursuant to res ipsa] that a defendant has been negligent." McLaughlin, 754 A.2d at 98; see also 57B Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 1170 (2004) (). "It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may reasonably be drawn by the jury." Parrillo v. Giroux, 426 A.2d 1313, 1321 (R.I. 1981) (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 328(D) (1965)).
Before the Court permits the jury to infer negligence pursuant to res ipsa, the Court must be satisfied that the plaintiff has "'produce[d] sufficient evidence from which a reasonable [person] could say that, on the whole, it was more likely than not that there was negligence on the part of the defendant.'" Errico, 713 A.2d at 796 (quoting Parrillo, 426 A.2d at 1319) (alterations in original). This preliminary showing ensures that "'the causal connection between negligence and a plaintiff's injury [is] established by competent evidence and [is] not [] based on conjecture or speculation.'" McLaug...
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