Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey

Decision Date23 July 1954
Docket NumberLEN-LEW
Citation107 A.2d 403,141 Conn. 524
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesREALTY CO., Inc. v. FALSEY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

David M. Reilly, Jr., New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was David M. Reilly, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

Harold M. Mulvey, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was George W. Crawford, Corp. Counsel, New Haven, for appellees (defendants).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ., concurring.

WYNNE, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff is the owner of a hotel at 105 Crown Street in New Haven. On July 25, 1950, the defendant Falsey, as building inspector of the city of New Haven, notified the plaintiff by letter that it had not complied with a notice in the name and under the authority of the fire marshal directing a number of things to be done for fire safety in the building. Falsey's letter included an order in the following language: 'You are hereby ordered, therefore, under the authority of Section 633i of the Fire Safety Code and Section 4101 of the General Statutes of the State of Connecticut, to cause all of the work necessitated by such order to be completed on or before October 24, 1950.'

The finding discloses that in issuing the orders in question Falsey acted, in conjunction with the other defendant, the acting fire marshal of New Haven, under General Statutes, §§ 3665, 3666, 3668, 3676, 3677, 3678 and 4101, and under the provisions of the fire safety code established by the state fire marshal. The assignment of errors, while expressed in three paragraphs, raises simply the question of the constitutionality of these statutes and the validity of the code. The action is in two counts. The first in terms is an appeal from the orders in question. Section 3679 of the General Statutes provides for such an appeal. The second count raises the question of constitutionality and seeks an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with the orders. The trial court found the statutes and the code valid, and it is this conclusion that is the subject of appeal.

The plaintiff makes the claim that the authority granted to the state fire marshal under §§ 3665 through 3678, inclusive, is an unlawful delegation of power. It is claimed that these statutes do not declare a legislative policy or establish primary standards for carrying out a declared legislative policy. Section 3665 provides for the establishment of a fire safety code. Section 3666 defines in general terms the purport of such a code. These sections read as follows: 'Sec. 3665. Fire safety code. The state fire marshal shall establish a fire safety code and at any time may amend the same. The regulations in said code shall provide for reasonable safety from fire, smoke and panic therefrom, in all buildings except in private dwellings occupied by one or two families, and upon all premises except those used for manufacturing. Sec. 3666. Code to specify minimum requirements. Said code shall specify reasonable minimum requirements for fire safety in new and existing buildings and facilities. Regulations may be in accordance with the size, type of construction and nature of use or occupancy of such buildings or facilities. No regulation made in accordance with sections 3665 to 3667, inclusive, shall be inconsistent with the provisions of the statutes nor impair the rights of municipalities to enact ordinances and make orders with respect to buildings as provided in section 4087 and section 4088, so far as such ordinances or orders specify requirements equal to, additional to or more stringent than the regulations issued under the authority of sections 3665 to 3667, inclusive.'

In §§ 3667, 3668, 3675, 3676, 3677 and 3678, provision is made for the publication of the code, the penalty for its violation, inspections by local fire marshals and reports, the abatement of fire hazards, the conferring of authority for the proper execution of the code, and the manner in which orders under it are to be promulgated and enforced. Finally, in § 3679 an appeal is provided as follows: 'Sec. 3679. Appeal. Any person aggrieved by an order of the local fire marshal or state fire marshal relative to the enforcement of the statutes concerning fire prevention and safety may appeal therefrom to the court of common pleas in the county where the premises concerned are located.'

The fire safety code which, prepared under the statutes referred to above, was in effect at all times in question consists of forty-seven pages. General provisions are set forth in five pages. That part of the code dealing with hotels is found under article 2 and covers seven pages. There follows in articles 3 and 4 various provisions applicable to all buildings included in the code. Article 5 deals with hospitals and article 6 with convalescent homes.

We first consider the claim that the statutes are unconstitutional. When the General Assembly has passed a law deemed to be for the public welfare, it will be upset only when it is found to be clearly in violation of constitutional provisions. We said in Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 514, 52 A.2d 702, 705; '[A] proper regard for the very limited authority of the judicial department to interfere with the determination by the General Assembly as to those provisions of law which will serve to further the welfare of the citizens of this state requires that we make every intendment in favor of the validity of the act, and we can hold it unconstitutional only if there is no reasonable ground upon which it can be sustained. 'It is our duty to approach the question with great caution, examine it with infinite care, make every presumption and intendment in its favor, and sustain the act, unless its invalidity is, in our judgment, beyond reasonable doubt." While it is true that the law-making power is in the legislative branch of our government and cannot be delegated, we have recognized the place of administrative agencies in modern society. The General Assembly in passing a law designed to accomplish a particular purpose may expressly create an administrative agency. The statutes under...

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14 cases
  • Bottone v. Town of Westport
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 17, 1989
    ...concerns. New Milford v. SCA Services of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 174 Conn. at 149, 384 A.2d 337, quoting Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 528, 107 A.2d 403 (1954). In Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission, supra, a case involving a delegation of power to a munic......
  • State v. White
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 14, 1987
    ...from fire, smoke and panic therefrom," and that such a conferral was a valid delegation of authority. See Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 529-30, 107 A.2d 403 (1954). Had the original statute been in effect during this case, there would be little doubt that the challenged fire ......
  • Teuscher v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Westport
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 30, 1967
    ...288, 99 A.2d 112, 38 A.L.R.2d 1136; Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 671, 103 A.2d 535; Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 529, 107 A.2d 403; Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 704, 81 A.2d 266.' Calve Bros Co. v. City of Norwalk, 143 Conn. 609,......
  • Clark v. Town Council of Town of West Hartford
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1958
    ...authorities. State v. Vachon, 140 Conn. 478, 482, 101 A.2d 509; Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., supra; Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 529, 107 A.2d 403. The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from Keating v. Patterson, 132 Conn. 210, 216, 43 A.2d 659, 663. That ......
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