Lendsay v. Cotton

Decision Date27 October 1960
Docket NumberNo. 60-282,60-282
Citation95 A.L.R.2d 1029,123 So.2d 745
PartiesOliver N. LENDSAY, a/k/a Oliver N. Lindsay, Appellant, v. Polk F. COTTON and Betty Anne Cotton, his wife Individually, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Charles C. Papy, J., Miami, and John Carruthers, II, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Cowart & Dollar and K. Neil Glassford, Miami, for appellees.

HORTON, Chief Judge.

This interlocutory appeal 1 seeks review of an order in a common-law action 'finding that the plaintiffs have obtained proper jurisdiction over the defendant,' and denying the defendant's motion to dismiss directed to the amended complaint. The amended complaint sought damages as the result of an alleged automobile accident and further alleged that the defendant was a non-resident of the State of Florida and a resident of the State of New Jersey. Service of process was attempted under § 47.30, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., which provides:

'Service of such process shall be made by the plaintiff or his attorney by either leaving a copy of the process with a fee of two dollars in the hands of the secretary of state, or in his office, or by mailing a copy of such process with a fee of two dollars to the secretary of state and such service shall be sufficient service upon a defendant who has appointed the secretary of state as his agent for the service of such process; provided, that notice of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff, or his attorney, to the defendant, and the defendant's return receipt and the affidavit of the plaintiff, or his attorney, of compliance herewith are filed with the papers in the case on or before the return day of the process or within such further time as the court may allow, or that such notice and copy are served upon the defendant, if found within the state, by an officer duly qualified to serve legal process, or, if found without the state, by a sheriff or deputy sheriff of any county of this state or by any duly constituted public officer qualified to serve like process in the state or jurisdiction where the defendant is found; and the officer's return showing such service to have been made is filed in the case on or before the return day of the process or within such further time as the court may allow. Proof of service of process on the secretary of state shall be by a copy of the notice or said secretary accepting such process.' [Emphasis supplied.]

Here, the registered letter sent to the defendant was subsequently returned, marked 'unclaimed.' Thereafter, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs showing the defendant's failure to claim the registered letter directed to him in compliance with § 47.30, supra.

The appellees here contend that the appellant subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his motion to dismiss the amended complaint to which he did not join a motion to quash process for insufficiency of service thereof. As their only authority, appellees cite the concurring opinion in Dunscombe v. Sayle, Fla.App.1960, 120 So.2d 802. A concurring opinion has no binding effect as precedent; such an opinion represents only the personal view of the concurring judge and does not constitute the law of the case. Carl's Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, Fla.1953, 69 So.2d 789; Ephrem v. Phillips, Fla.App.1957, 99 So.2d 257; 8 Fla.Jur., Courts, § 165. Although considering this concurring opinion as well as the special concurring opinion in Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. Green, Fla.App.1959, 114 So.2d 710, we feel compelled to conclude that a motion to dismiss, as well as a motion to quash, is appropriate to question the trial court's jurisdiction over the appellant upon the grounds of insufficiency of the service of process. Rule 1.11(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A.

The remaining question for determination is whether or not the 'substitute' service in this case meets the requirement of the quoted statute. Statutes such as the one under consideration, providing for substituted service of process on non-residents, are in derrogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 386, 182 So. 427; Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. for Use and Benefit of Fountaine v. Holt, 154 Fla. 77, 16 So.2d 649; Wedekind v. McDonald, D.C., 82 F.Supp. 678; Fidler v. Victory Lumber Co., D.C., 93 F.Supp. 656; Gallant v. McKinney, D.C., 104 F.Supp. 277. The only reported Florida decision touching upon the question under consideration is Cherry v. Heffernan, supra. There, the defendant refused to accept delivery of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 21, 2006
    ...no precedential value and it cannot serve to condition or limit the concurrence in the [majority] opinion. . . ."); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 So.2d 745, 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) ("A concurring opinion has no binding effect as precedent; such an opinion represents only the personal view of the co......
  • Arnold v. Crestwood Bd. of Ed., Docket Nos. 77-3520
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • December 28, 1978
    ...70 Ga.App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 310, 311 (1944); Paxson v. Crowson, 8 Terry 114, 47 Del. 114, 117, 87 A.2d 881 (1952); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 So.2d 745, 747 (Fla.App.1960). We agree with the proposition for which these cases are cited, that is, that receipt of notice of attempted delivery alone w......
  • Boyles v. Boyles
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 31, 1983
    ...to pick up one's mail, standing alone, does not amount to a refusal to accept notice of a pending lawsuit. In Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 So.2d 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1960), the only evidence that defendant had refused service of process was: 1) a registered letter addressed to the defendant but r......
  • Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. SC03-1856 (Fla. 7/6/2006)
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 6, 2006
    ...precedential value and it cannot serve to condition or limit the concurrence in the [majority] opinion . . . ."); Lindsay v. Cotton, 123 So. 2d 745, 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) ("A concurring opinion has no binding effect as precedent; such an opinion represents only the personal view of the con......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT