Lenexa 95 Partners, LLC v. Kin, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-2367-JWB |
| Parties | LENEXA 95 PARTNERS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. KIN, INC. f/k/a KOHL'S INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Plaintiff moves for a new trial. (Doc. 209.) Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion. (Doc. 213.) The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 209, 210, 213, 221) and ready for decision. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's motion for new trial is DENIED.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging breach of contract related to a commercial lease in Johnson County, Kansas in June 2020. (Docs. 1, 1-2.) Defendant removed the case to this court in July 2020. (Doc. 1.) The case involved extensive discovery and both parties ultimately moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 117, 120.) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied. (Doc. 148.)
This case was tried to a jury in April 2022. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on April 29, 2022. (Doc. 193.) Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $305,222.00 on May 2, 2022. (Doc. 196.) Both parties have subsequently filed several motions, including the motion for new trial at issue here. (Doc. 209.)
After a jury trial, a motion for new trial may be granted “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A). “Such a motion is ‘generally not regarded with favor, and is granted only with great caution.'” Smith v. Cochran, 182 Fed.Appx. 854, 864 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Perea, 458 F.2d 535, 536 (10th Cir. 1972)). “The party seeking to set aside a jury verdict must show either trial error which constitutes prejudicial error or that the verdict was not based on substantial evidence.” Id. (citing White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir. 1983)); see also Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A new trial cannot be granted unless the error was prejudicial and affects the party's substantial rights.”).
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a new trial for five reasons: (1) the jury's verdict was grossly inadequate and the result of a jury compromise; (2) Plaintiff was not allowed to submit claims under lease §§12.1 and 12.1.1 to the jury; (3) Defendant asked the jury to consider their personal leases in deciding the case; (4) Defendant called Plaintiff and David Christie “greedy”; and (5) Defendant mentioned Plaintiff's profits on the sale of the building to suggest a windfall. (Doc. 210 at 1.) Naturally, Defendant disagrees. (Doc. 213.) These arguments will be addressed in turn.
Plaintiff argues that the jury's verdict was the result of improper jury compromise. (Doc. 210 at 3.) In arguing improper jury compromise, Plaintiff argues that the jury's verdict was grossly inadequate because it is against the weight of the evidence. (Id. at 3-6.) In its brief, Plaintiff goes through the award of damages for several property conditions and analyzes both the award of damages and the evidence to support each award. (Id.) Plaintiff also argues that the evidence, including the jury's question and the timing of the verdict, suggests that the jury reached a compromise verdict to resolve a disagreement. (Id. at 7.)
Defendant argues that there is no evidence that the jury abused its discretion or was influenced in some way. (Doc. 213 at 2.) Defendant also notes that the jury heard evidence from many witnesses, posed a question to the court, and deliberated for several hours before returning a verdict that “was rational, thoughtful, and supported by the evidence.” (Id.) Finally, Defendant argues that there is no evidence that the jury had difficulty reaching agreement on the issue of liability and that the remaining factors do not support a finding that a new trial is necessary. (Id. at 3-8.)
Here, Plaintiff requested an award of just above $1,297,000.00 for the categories of damages submitted to the jury (Tr. at 1195)[1] and ultimately obtained an award of $305,222.00 (Doc. 193). The jury awarded damages as follows: $12,860.00 for the North Asphalt Parking Lot; $132,760.00 for the East Concrete Parking Lot; $146,248.00 for the South Concrete Parking Lot; $8,534.00 for the West Sidewalk; $0 for the Roof; $5,000.00 for the HVAC Units; and $0 for the Carpeting. (Id.)
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 208 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1212 (D. Kan. 2002) (quoting Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1445-46 (10th Cir. 1988)). There does not seem to be a dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant that this case involved a close question of liability.[2]
“Damages are not inadequate merely because a jury awards less than the plaintiff has requested.” Shugart v. Cent. Rural Elec. Coop., 110 F.3d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1997). Further, “[w]here the damages have not been stipulated, the jury is entitled to believe that a claim does not merit an award.” Id. (citing Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1983)). A jury's award of damages will be upheld unless they are so grossly inadequate as to raise the inference that bias, prejudice, or passion influenced the jury or if the damages shock the court's conscience. Moore v. Subaru of Am., 891 F.2d 1445, 1451-52 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1985)).
One case illustrates what is meant by “grossly inadequate damages.” Skinner, 859 F.2d at 1446. In that case, the jury awarded approximately ten percent of the plaintiff's claimed damages, and there was no evidence in the record to support this specific amount. Id. This, along with the pattern and timing of the deliberations, suggested that the jury reached a compromise. Id.
The jury awarded approximately 24% of the damages requested by Plaintiff.[3] While the amount of damages awarded by the jury is significantly less than the amount of damages requested by Plaintiff, that does not necessarily mean the damages were grossly inadequate.
In Plaintiff's own words, “[t]hree of the four jury damages figures can be tied to evidence presented at trial.” (Doc. 210 at 4.) And this is true - the damage awards for the North Asphalt Parking Lot, South Concrete Parking Lot, and West Sidewalk can all be connected to evidence which was presented at trial. (Id. at 4-5.)
The jury awarded $12,680.00 for the North Asphalt Parking Lot. (Doc. 193.) As Plaintiff points out, Jeff Hoge testified at trial that it would cost $12,680.00 to tear out and replace the curb and gutter. (Doc. 210 at 4; Exh. 481.)[4] Hoge also testified that it would cost $146,248.00 to tear out and replace the concrete in the South Lot, which is the amount the jury awarded for the South Concrete Parking Lot. (Doc. 210 at 4; Exh. 481.) And Hoge testified that it would cost $8,534.00 to tear out and replace the West Sidewalk, the amount the jury awarded for the West Sidewalk. (Doc. 210 at 4-5; Exh. 481.)
Because each of these awards is directly connected to evidence offered, and because Plaintiff concedes that these awards are connected to the evidence, the court finds that the damage awards as to these three conditions were supported by substantial evidence and do not support a finding that the damages were grossly inadequate.
The only remaining category of damages which is less directly tied to the evidence is the award for the East Concrete Parking Lot. The jury awarded $132,760.00. (Doc. 193.) Plaintiff's expert testified that it would cost $257,760.00 to tear out and replace the parking lot. (Tr. at 180:20-22; Exh. 481.) Plaintiff contends that the only evidence presented was that the entire parking lot needed to be removed and replaced. (Doc. 210 at 5.) But the jury was free to draw its own conclusions about what good condition, subject to ordinary wear and tear, was and whether Defendant was responsible for damages to replace the entire parking lot. The jury saw pictures of the parking lot and could have concluded that only a portion of the lot needed to be replaced or repaired. Ultimately, the jury made a decision which indicates that it believed that Defendant should not be solely responsible for paying the entire cost of replacing the parking lot. These lower damages do not equal “grossly inadequate damages.”
Plaintiff also contends that the jury's failure to award damages for the roof was grossly inadequate. (Id. at 6.) There was evidence presented at trial that the roof needed some repairs and was in poor condition. (Id.) But there was also evidence presented at trial that there was no reason to replace the roof and that it was in good condition subject to ordinary wear and tear. (Doc. 213 at 6-7; Tr. at 1041.) The jury was free to decide that issue on the evidence presented. And the jury had evidence to rely on in finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to damages for the roof.
Plaintiff argues that the jury's question during deliberations and shortly before reaching a verdict is evidence that the jury reached a compromise verdict. (Doc. 210 at 7.) During deliberations, the jury asked: “Are we able to portion out dollar amounts on specific items instead of the full amount of each item as asked for by the plaintiff?” (Doc. 189.) The court answered that the jury could award the damages that Plaintiff had proven and that the jury could award less than Plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial